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ABSTRACT
PRIVACY-PRESERVING SANITIZATION IN DATA
SHARING
SEPTEMBER 2014
WENTIAN LU
B.S., NANJING UNIVERSITY
M.S., NANJING UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerome Miklau
In the era of big data, the prospect of analyzing, monitoring and investigating all
sources of data starts to stand out in every aspect of our life. The benefit of such
practices becomes concrete only when analysts or investigators have the information
shared from data owners. However, privacy is one of the main barriers that disrupt the
sharing behavior, due to the fear of disclosing sensitive information. This dissertation
describes data sanitization methods that disguise the sensitive information before
sharing a dataset and our criteria are always protecting privacy while preserving
utility as much as possible.
In particular, we provide solutions for tasks that require different types of shared
data. In the case of sharing partial content of a dataset, we consider the problem
of releasing a database under retention restrictions such that the auditing job can
v
still be carried out. While obeying a retention policy often results in the wholesale
destruction of the audit log in existing solutions, our framework allows to expire data
at a fine granularity and supports audit queries on a database with incompleteness.
Secondly, in the case of sharing the entire dataset, we solve the problem of untrusted
system evaluation using released database synthesis under differential privacy. Our
synthetic database accurately preserves the core performance measures of a given
query workload, and satisfies differential privacy with crucial extensions to multi-
relation databases. Lastly, in the case of sharing derived information from the data
source, we focus on distributing results of network modeling under differential privacy.
Our mechanism can safely output estimated parameters of the exponential random
graph model, by employing a decomposition of the estimation problem into two steps:
getting private sufficient statistics first and then estimating the model parameters. We
show that our privacy mechanism provides provably less error than common baselines
and our redesigned estimation algorithm offers better accuracy.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of mobile devices, internet and social networks, vast numbers
of documents and datasets are maintained by companies from a range of industries
such as healthcare, insurance and information technology. These datasets are highly
valuable as they contain information about persons. Not surprisingly, there is in-
creasing need from governments, researchers and even the inside of enterprises that
requests access to the data for monitoring, understanding and analyzing purpose.
However, privacy concerns could be one of the main barriers that disrupt such be-
haviors. So the question of how to share these data but still preserve privacy is an
important and realistic problem in the real world.
Researchers in the privacy community propose mechanisms to share information
from various data sources while preventing the disclosure of the sensitive parts. The
sensitive information could either be explicitly specified by a declarative language,
e.g., access control [85], or indicated by the semantics of privacy definition, e.g.,
differential privacy [23]. Before sharing a dataset that contains sensitive information,
the process of data sanitization disguises sensitive information and replace it with
non-identifiable values.
1.1 Problem setting
A typical scenario of data sharing involves two parties: data owner and data
consumer, where data owner shares the data and data consumer consumes data, as
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Figure 1.1: A typical scenario of data sharing
shown in Figure 1.1. For data owners, they need two clearly defined objects, data
source and privacy requirement.
Data source is the actual target of sanitization, which is the first thing that should
be decided. A precise definition of data source helps to further investigate potential
threats and possible methods for manipulating the data later. In the real world,
there is a wide range of data sources in a sanitization process, e.g., text documents,
relational databases and social networks.
The purpose of sanitization is to protect sensitive information from being dis-
closed. The privacy requirement defines the sensitive contents of the current data.
Without suitable insight of sensitive information, people cannot illustrate or prove
the correctness of a sanitized output. A clear definition of sensitive contents will also
help to understand the underlying sanitizing algorithms when end users look for a
particular technique on their data sets. In the literature, there are several commonly
accepted definition for sensitive information. For example, for tabular data, access
control [85] pins down sensitive information by predefined tables or views; differential
privacy [23] treats each individual’s existence as a sensitive object.
For a data consumer, we assume that the only way to access the data source is
through a sanitization interface, as shown in Figure 1.1. As there is no restrictions on
how shared data can be used, our major focus is to guarantee the released data satisfy
privacy requirements, event though a data consumer could be potentially malicious.
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The most challenging part is designing a proper method for sanitizing data. Good
sanitization should always care about utility, otherwise we can just release an empty
dataset which prevents any information leakage. If we consider the potential analysis
applied on the shared data, the output of sanitization should ease the future compu-
tation and do as much as possible to reduce the damage to the utility. So the key of
sanitizing algorithms is to achieve as much utility as we can, while still guaranteeing
the correctness of privacy protection.
The output of sanitization process, shared data, could be either homogenous or
heterogeneous to the data source. We say the output is homogenous when the shared
data is syntactically close to the data source, meaning that both are represented by
one data model so that queries can be answered with both data in a similar way.
Consider the case when the data source is a relational database. As long as the
shared data are tables under the relational data model, they are homogenous as the
well-established query evaluation techniques can be applied on the shared data. In
this thesis, we study two problems that aim for releasing homogenous data, sharing
partial contents of the data source and sharing the entire data source. On the other
hand, the output of sanitizing process could be fundamentally different from the data
source, where the typical operations on the shared data are distinct from operations
on the data source. In such cases, we say the shared data are derived or heterogeneous.
An example is to release the estimated power law exponent from the degree sequence
of a network. In this thesis, we solve one problem with the goal of releasing derived
data from a network.
1.2 Overview of contributions
1.2.1 Sharing partial data
Chapter 3 addresses the data sanitization problem when a data owner is sharing
partial contents of the data source. In particular, the privacy requirement demands
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Figure 1.2: Auditing a database with retention policies
protection of a subset of information in the data source, while the rest is safe for
releasing.
We consider the scenario of auditing the changes to a database, where auditors
(data consumers) submit audit queries and inquire about what happened to the
database, when it happened and who did it. But an accurate audit log is an his-
torical record of the past that can also pose a serious threat to privacy. In many
domains, retention policies are introduced to govern how long data can be preserved
by an institution. Data owners often adopt their own policies for the purpose of
limiting retention and removing sensitive data after a period of time to avoid unin-
tended release. Our goal is to audit a database system in the presence of retention
restrictions. As explained in Figure 1.2, in the sanitization-based approach, an audit
log is sanitized with the enforcement of retention policies while data consumers are
restricted to submit audit queries to the shared sanitized data.
Though the goal of sanitizing is to limit the conflicts between private information
(limited retention) and sharing information (insensitive database changes), unfortu-
nately, existing mechanisms for auditing and managing historical records have few
capabilities for managing the balance between these two objectives. Obeying a reten-
tion policy often means the wholesale destruction of the audit log.
In Chapter 3, we will illustrate the importance of our framework that properly
models the data source, which allows expressive privacy requirement specification and
efficient data sanitization. An effective data model not only defines the data semantics
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eid name dept sal from to
101 Bob Sales 10 0 200
101 Bob Mgmt 10 200 300
101 Bob Mgmt 15 300 now
201 Chris HR 8 0 300
Table 1.1: Data source: relational data model with temporal information
eid name dept sal from to
101 Bob Sales sx 0 200
101 Bob Mgmt sx 200 300
101 Bob Mgmt 15 300 now
201 Chris HR 8 0 300
Table 1.2: Sanitized data under retention policies
after sanitization but also determines the scope of manipulation on the data. In our
work, we propose a relational data model that can deal with historical information
and incompleteness, which supports temporal-based operations and uncertainty in the
query results. To be precise about private information and retain as much utility as
possible, it is important that the privacy requirement is specified in a flexible way. We
propose a rule-based expressive language for data owners to define retention policies
at the granularity of attributes. Under retention policies, the audit history is partially
incomplete. Thus, audit queries on the protected history can include imprecise results
and our challenge is to solve the problem of representing and computing such imprecise
answers over incomplete databases. Chapter 3 illustrates that the combination of
data model and policy language is the strong basis for auditing purpose. Despite of
removal of information, our query answering system in many cases enables an auditor
to monitor the record of actions taken on the database.
Example 1.1. Table 1.1 is a transaction-time table that represents the complete
data history of the table, where the from and to columns is the active period of each
tuple in the database.
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Figure 1.3: Sharing private synthetic database
Now consider two different retention polices. One is to hide attribute values while
revealing the existence of the tuple, e.g., hiding Bob’s salary between time 0 and
300. The other is to completely remove the tuple, e.g., removing the record of all
employees in the HR department between time 0 and 300. The resulting sanitized
table (Table 1.2) will have data deleted, particularly, removed tuples (in gray) and
substituted variables (in bold). In Chapter 3, we discuss in detail the correctness
of this sanitization process and the problem of how to answer audit queries with
sanitized tables.
This work appeared in the proceedings of the International Conference on Very
Large Data Bases, 2008 [67], the International Conference on Data Engineering, 2009
[68], and in the International Journal on Very Large Data Bases, 2013 [69].
1.2.2 Sharing the whole dataset
Chapter 4 addresses the data sanitization problem when data owners want to share
the whole dataset. In particular, we offer solutions of generating private synthetic
datasets.
We consider the scenario when database evaluation tasks should be outsourced to
untrusted data consumers, where a typical evaluation task is to assess the performance
of a given SQL query workload. There is a strong need in industry for synthetic
databases, as resorting to common benchmark databases (e.g. a TPC benchmark)
6
doesn’t help. Because benchmarks target the common case, they often cannot reflect
particular properties that may significantly impact performance for a given enterprise.
The data source in this problem is a standard relational database and the privacy
requirement is to protect every individual in the data source, i.e., the shared synthetic
database should not disclose information of any individual who involves in the data.
To meet the privacy goal, we adopt another privacy standard, differential privacy,
which guarantees that data consumers cannot distinguish the existence of any person
from sanitized data. In fact, differential privacy allows us to enforce more rigorous
sanitization and provide a provably private solution. In Figure 1.3, data owners
share the database synthesis under differential privacy and data consumers conduct
performance evaluation using given query workloads.
Chapter 4 describes a novel and fundamentally different approach compared to
Chapter 3, which is called model-based database synthesis. Our framework first selects
a set of queries that serve as the model of database. From the model, we can compute
the statistics of database by answering those selected queries. We then sanitize the
statistics. Finally, we sample databases using sanitized statistics and release them.
The whole process is proved to satisfy differential privacy, and our experiments show
that the shared synthetic database preserves core performance properties of given
query workloads.
Our work is a novel combination of research into private data release and syn-
thetic database generation. Generating private synthetic data is a common goal of
privacy research, but existing techniques do not support complex relational schemas
and have not targeted our specific utility goal: accurate system testing and evalua-
tion. Likewise, generating synthetic relational data is a common goal of relational
database research. Privacy concerns are often mentioned as one motivation for the
use of synthetic databases, however the vast majority of database generation ap-
proaches [2, 7, 13, 48, 65] do not offer any formal privacy guarantees. Instead, they
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Figure 1.4: Sharing exponential random graph estimation under differential privacy
often rely merely on the fact that data is generated from aggregate statistics about
the database. Unfortunately, this does not imply that the synthetic data is safe to
release. For example, Arasu et al [2] acknowledge the privacy issues of releasing car-
dinality information during data generation. One exception is the work of Wu et
al. [113], in which cell suppression and perturbation are used to offer some protec-
tion against disclosures, but this method cannot satisfy differential privacy and is
susceptible to the previously-documented attacks on anonymization schemes.
To achieve differential privacy, we extend its definition to multiple tables by re-
defining the core concepts. This is a crucial extension for our framework and is useful
beyond the present work.
This work appeared in the proceedings of the International Conference on Data
Engineering, 2014 [70].
1.2.3 Sharing derived data
Chapter 5 addresses a sanitization problem when the shared information is derived
and heterogeneous from the data source.
We consider the scenario of social network analysis under differential privacy,
where data consumers are demanding the results of computation on graph-structured
data. While differentially private algorithms for computing basic graph properties
have been proposed, graph modeling tasks that are common to the data mining
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community can not yet be carried out privately. In Chapter 5, we study for the
first time the differentially private use of the classic exponential random graph model
(ERGM [71]), the most promising and central of social network analysis [19, 28, 25]
in recent years. Technically, ERGM describes a parametric statistical model over
graphs, and one of most important tasks in modeling practices is to find the best
parameters for the observed data source.
A common paradigm that implements differential privacy is output perturbation,
i.e., adding noise to the output of computation, while the amount of noise should be
carefully adjusted with regard to the properties of the computation. As the shared
data in this situation are the parameters of ERGM, a straightforward idea for san-
itizing under differential privacy is to execute output perturbation, as illustrated in
Figure 1.4. One precomputes parameters (box with dashed boundaries) using stan-
dard ERGM algorithms and then add proper noise before sharing them. However,
due to internal complexity of ERGM itself, such methods are generally not feasible.
To be specific, we are facing the case that either the amount of noise required for
differential privacy is extremely hard to compute, or direct noise is so large that
perturbed result doesn’t make any sense any more.
Our solution in Chapter 5 takes a different approach, employing a decomposition
of estimation process into two steps: getting private sufficient statistics first and then
estimating the model parameters. The estimation process, a Bayesian based method,
is carefully designed, such that the particular noise added into sufficient statistics
will be leveraged in the process but still preserves privacy. Compared to Figure 1.4,
we save the step for estimating non-private parameters for ERGM (box with dashed
boundaries). We consider recent specifications of ERGMs and show that our privacy
mechanism offers provably less error than comparable methods. We also illustrate
better accuracy by using our redesigned estimation algorithm in the experiments.
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1.3 Thesis organization
Chapter 2 reviews the background knowledge related to privacy-preserving data
sanitization, including access control, managing incompleteness with historical data
and differential privacy. Each of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focuses on the
work related to a particular aspect of contributions discussed in previous sections.
These chapters also include detailed discussion of problem settings, contributions,
solutions and experiments. Chapter 6 concludes with the review of contributions and
future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter provides discussions of background information for this thesis work.
We start with access control techniques in database systems, as the problem in Chap-
ter 3 has a similar privacy setting. In both cases, sensitive information is enforced by
policies and query answers are generated with compositions of those enforcements.
We next review works that focus on managing incompleteness in a temporal database,
for the purpose of defining data source in Chapter 3. Last, we discuss a strong and
rigorous privacy definition, differential privacy, which is the privacy requirement for
Chapter 4 and 5.
2.1 Access control
Access control [85] is the classical technique in database systems to limit the data
access of users. The control is implemented by granting users certain access rights
(such as read, modify and delete) on predefined objects. In SQL, this is implemented
using GRANT command. An example that grants read privilege to user Ann on object
Salary is as follows:
GRANT select ON Salary TO Ann
The object Salary could either be a base table or a view. In database systems,
a view is essentially a virtual table defined by a query. For example, the view Salary
contains grades from Sales department, generated from the following query:
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CREATE VIEW Salary (name, salary) AS
SELECT name, salary
FROM Employee
WHERE dept = ’Sales’
Queries submitted from clients will have to pass the permission check. If there
is not sufficient access privilege, the query will be denied. In database systems,
control policies are typically enforced by administrators, who is a trusted party to
data owners.
Fine-grained access control As the traditional access control are executed at
table-level, there is growing needs for fine-grained control at row-level or even cell-
level. One of the major motivations is privacy protection. Lower level controls have
the ability of protecting individual information across tuples and cells in the database.
For example, the teacher will allow each student to access his own grade in the Grades
table. So consider student Ann attempts a read as
SELECT salary
FROM Employee
The database system actually executes:
SELECT salary
FROM Employee
WHERE name = ’Ann’
In general, a fine-grained access control system is implemented in two steps.
Firstly, users specify rules using a policy-defining language. Secondly, the database
enforces those rules when answering queries. Several commercial databases provide
solutions for fine-grained access control, such as Virtual Private Database (VPD) in
Oracle [81] and label-based framework in DB2 [87].
Recently, Wang et. al. [108] proposes a set of theoretical terms that are formal-
ized to guarantee the correctness of the enforcement of fine-grain policies. They are
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secrecy, soundness and maximality. A mechanism is secure when the query answers
do not reveal any information that should be protected by policies. Soundness means
the query answers under access control are consistent with answers when no access
control is presented. Maximality requires that query evaluation returns as much in-
formation as possible. These terms also serve as the basis for our sanitization process
in Chapter 3.
2.2 Managing incompleteness with data history
To support retention policies, a database should not only contain current data
but also historical information. Such history is usually recognized as temporal data,
and database that facilitates managing and operating time-oriented information is
called temporal or transaction-time database. In fact, transaction-time databases
have been studied extensively by the research community including work on query
languages and logical foundations [17, 30, 103], implementation techniques [53, 66,
96], techniques for accommodating time in standard databases [92, 101], as well as
implemented extensions to existing systems [102]. Jensen studied querying backlog
relations to monitor changes to a database [52].
On the other hand, when enforcing retention policies, a common method is re-
moving expired tuples or attributes, which could potentially generate a database with
incomplete history. With the absence of time information, incomplete information
also has a long history in databases [9, 37, 51].
When managing retention policies, a data model that handles both temporal data
and incompleteness is necessary. Though both areas have been studied extensively,
incomplete temporal databases have attracted less attention. The data models of
Gadia [31] and Koubarakis [58] establish the foundations of this area.
Gadia’s model [31] The model of temporal incompleteness presented by Gadia et
al. allows for uncertainty about values, as we do, but also represents certain values
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whose active period is uncertain. By combining the different kinds of incomplete
information, the model can represent the known and unknown values of an object
where its existence could be clear or not.
In Gadia’s model, each cell in a table is defined as a set of temporal assignments,
i.e., a constant associated with different active time period. For example, the cell
of Bob’s salary is {10[0, 100], 12[101, 200]}, which means Bob’s salary was 10 from
time 0 to 100 and then 12 from 101 to 200. To represent uncertainty, each cell
(temporal assignments) is assigned with two temporal periods, l and u. l represents
the time period that we are sure it exists, while we are also sure the value beyond
u definitely does not exists. Therefore, Bob’s salary is noted as a triple (x, l, u),
where x ={10[0, 100], 12[101, 200]}, l = [0, 150], and u = [0, 300]. The semantics is as
follows:
• [0, 150]: we know for sure Bob’s salary is 10 before time 100 and 12 after that.
• [151, 200]: we are not sure whether Bob’s salary exists, but if it exists it should
be 12.
• [201, 300]: we are not sure existence of Bob’s salary and its value.
• [301, now]: we are sure Bob’s salary does not exist.
Koubarakis’ model [58] Koubarakis proposed a constraint-based incomplete
temporal data model, which integrates global and local inequality constraints on
the occurrence time of an event. With constraints only on temporal information, it
supports indefinite instants. An indefinite instant is a very general kind of instant
that includes indeterminate instants, instants with disjoint sets of possible chronons,
and instants with incompletely specified upper and lower supports.
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Bus Time Condition
bus1 x 10 ≤ xl, xr ≤ 15
For example, in the above table, the scheduled time of bus1 is represented as
variable x = [xl, xr]. The starting time of x, xl is unknown, but limited to a value at
least 10. Similarly, the ending time xr, uncertain either, but must be at most 15.
In fact, Koubarakis’ model can model more complicated scenarios, e.g., we can say
this event a happens between time 0 and occurrence of event b, but we do not know
its exact time. Such information related to event ordering is not allowed in Gadia’s
model. However, unlike Gadia’s model, without variables in traditional attributes,
we cannot represent the information that allows attribute values to be unknown in
the (possible and certain) active period of that tuple.
2.3 Differential privacy
When querying a database, differential privacy protects individuals by restricting
the impact on the output of any individual opts in or out the database, such that an
intruder cannot tell whether any particular individual is in the dataset. Differential
privacy [23] is traditionally defined over a tabular based database x consisting of
records, each of which describes an individual. Two databases that differ by one
record are called neighbors. Formally, we say an algorithm is differentially private if
distributions of outputs on neighboring databases are unchanged.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [23]). Let x and x′ be neighboring databases
and K be any algorithm. For any subset of outputs O ⊆ Range(K), the following
holds:
Pr[K(x) ∈ O] ≤ exp()× Pr[K(x′) ∈ O] + δ
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If δ = 0, K is standard -differentially private. Otherwise, K is relaxed (, δ)-
differentially private.
Differential privacy provides a well-founded means for protecting individual tuples
in a table while releasing reasonably accurate aggregate properties of the entire table.
It is robust against attackers with background knowledge about the database, the
major weakness of access control type of protection. Achieving differential privacy
usually requires perturbing statistics computed from the true database. The input
privacy parameter  (and δ if using the relaxed definition) are non-negative and are
used to measure the degree of privacy protection. Smaller  means better privacy as
exp() is close to one.
2.3.1 Differentially private mechanisms
Differential privacy can be achieved by adding noise to the output of algorithms
according to the privacy parameters ( and δ) and the query sensitivity.
Global sensitivity and Laplace mechanism The global sensitivity of a query
is the maximum possible difference in the output when evaluating the query on two
neighboring graphs. E.g., the query asking for the size of a table has global sensitivity
1, because adding or removing one tuple changes the size by one. Let Lap(b) be a
Laplace random variable with mean 0 and scale b.
Definition 2.2 (Laplace mechanism [25]). Given query f on input x, the following
algorithm K(f, x) is -differentially private:
K(f, x) = f(x) + Lap(GSf/)
where global sensitivity
GSf = max∀x1,x2 neighbors
|f(x1)− f(x2)|
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An important property of differential privacy is that post-processing a noisy, dif-
ferentially private output using any algorithm that does not access the original data
cannot alter the privacy guarantee. Past research has shown that post-processing the
noisy output can, however, have significant impact on utility. In addition, compo-
sition rules for differential privacy allow us to compute the  privacy standard that
results from the combined release of multiple query answers or releases. Precisely, if
each release is i-differential privacy, the combined is then
∑
i i-differential privacy.
Gaussian mechanism Correspondingly, a similar noise adding mechanism is avail-
able for the relaxed (, δ)-differential privacy. Slightly different, the global sensitivity
is based on L2 distance between output on two neighboring inputs and the noise is
generated from Gaussian distribution. Let Normal(σ) be a Normal random variable
with mean 0 and scale σ.
Definition 2.3 (Gaussian Mechanism [23, 73]). Given query f on input x, the fol-
lowing algorithm K(f, x) is (, δ)-differentially private:
K(f, x) = f(x) +Normal(GSf
√
2 ln(2/δ)

)
where global sensitivity
GSf = max∀x1,x2 neighbors
||f(x1)− f(x2)||2
2.3.2 Differential privacy for graph data
The above definition of differential privacy applies on tabular data, where protec-
tion of individuals naturally nails down to each record in a database. When adapting
differential privacy to graph data, such concept of “individual” is no longer obvious,
because network contains not only major entities (nodes) but also their relationship
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(edges). In tabular data, differential privacy relies on the precise definition of neigh-
bors, adding or removing single record. In graph data, we can simulate the idea but
with carefully selected “record”.
If the neighbors are restricted to graphs by adding or removing single edge, we
call it edge differential privacy [45]. Intuitively, edge differential privacy protects rela-
tionship among nodes in a graph, where the attacker cannot identify the existence of
edges from output. Alternatively, node differential privacy [45] is another interpreta-
tion when the neighboring graphs consider inserting or deleting single node. Though
node differential privacy is more desirable, as we can assume the “individuals” in a
graph match better with nodes, it is usually infeasible in real application. This is
because the global sensitivity associated with node differential privacy is usually too
large for noise calibration. For instance, the number of edges in a graph, can change
from n to 0 in node differential privacy if there is a single node connects every others.
A compromise for that is k-edge differential piracy [45] where a group of k edges are
protected and usually mechanisms designed for edge differential privacy can be easily
adjusted to it. In Chapter 5, we follow the edge differential privacy, as it is the most
common interpretations in the literature [45,55,83,90,109].
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CHAPTER 3
AUDITING A DATABASE WITH RETENTION
RESTRICTIONS
This chapter describes a framework for auditing the changes to a database system,
which is sanitized in the presence of retention restrictions. We consider a historical
data model and propose three kinds of rules for selectively obscuring or preserving
sensitive data from the record of the past. We then address the problem of answering
audit query on the incomplete data.
3.1 Introduction
Auditing the changes to a database is critical for identifying malicious behavior,
maintaining data quality, and improving system performance. But an accurate audit
log is an historical record of the past that can also pose a serious threat to privacy.
In many domains, retention policies govern how long data can be preserved by an
institution. Regulations mandate the disposal of past data and require strict reten-
tion periods to be observed. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act limits the
retention, by credit reporting agencies, of personal financial records. In addition,
institutions and companies often adopt their own policies limiting retention, choos-
ing to remove sensitive data after a period of time to avoid its unintended release,
or to avoid disclosure that could be forced by subpeona. Failure to dispose of the
expired data can result in serious consequences and is often viewed as an institutional
risk [112]. At the same time, other forces may require the preservation of records,
for example when ongoing litigation makes removal of data unlawful. Institutions are
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increasingly recognizing that a consistently enforced retention policy reduces their
legal risk by ensuring that electronic data is handled properly [62].
Limited retention conflicts with the goals of accurate auditing, analysis, and pre-
diction based on past history. This conflict is evident in the guidelines for record
keeping published by a records management trade group [3], which include princi-
ples of data availability and data retention along with data disposal. Data own-
ers thus have to carefully balance the need for accurate auditing with the privacy
goals of retention policies. An emerging industry has begun to address the needs
of these institutions, building systems that offer varying combinations of records
and document management, archiving, eDiscovery, retention, and compliance ser-
vices [26, 39, 80, 84, 91, 118, 119] . Unfortunately, existing mechanisms for auditing
and managing historical records have few capabilities for managing the balance be-
tween these two objectives. Obeying a retention policy often means the wholesale
destruction of the audit log.
In this chapter we propose a framework for auditing the changes to a database
system in the presence of retention restrictions. We consider an historical data model
and propose two kinds of rules for selectively removing or obscuring sensitive data
from the record of the past. Despite the removal of information, it is often still
possible for an auditor to monitor the record of actions taken on the database.
3.1.1 Applications
The tension between audit analyses and retention restrictions is present in a broad
range of industries where sensitive records are managed, including financial services,
healthcare, insurance, technology, education, telecommunications, and others. For
example, financial legislation mandates limited retention periods for personal credit
reports, including special treatment of negative credit events which are purged from
records separately from other events. Search engines are not governed by legislation
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in the U.S. but many elect to sanitize their search logs after 9 months. Logs are gen-
erally not disposed of completely, but certain fields are removed to reduce identifying
information and to resist subpoenas and court orders.
Healthcare databases store sensitive information about patients, physicians, test
results, diagnoses, billing details, and hospital procedures. State and federal laws
specify record retention time frames that may depend on whether a patient is en-
rolled in medicare or medicaid, whether the patient is a minor, whether the medical
procedure involves immunization, or on the statute of limitations for medical mal-
practice claims. At the same time, after mandated retention periods have passed,
physicians may have discretion about how or when to dispose of records, or whether
to partially sanitize records to remove personally identifiable data or sensitive di-
agnoses, while still permitting historical analysis. For example, we will define the
operation of redaction on fields in a record. This could be applied to the diagnosis
field of medical records while still permitting an analysis of a physician’s consistency
of diagnosis based on test results.
As another example, the office of information technology in a university is re-
sponsible for maintaining and monitoring network services for faculty, students, and
staff. Network logs may contain information about machines, network connections,
web browsing history, search engine requests, and/or file transfers, where users are
identified by IP address or login name. Internal auditing may include analyzing logs
for evidence of security vulnerabilities with the university. Researchers within the
university may wish to perform traffic analysis on network logs. Lastly, external
authorities such as the RIAA may request log data pertaining to specified users or
specified content. In this setting, retention restrictions arise from privacy protections
of individuals using the network. Some logs that are retained for network security
purposes may be subject to removal of identifiers or sensitive content like web ad-
dresses. In addition, information technology staff reportedly prefer the timely removal
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of some network logs so that they do not have to bear the cost of inquiries by external
authorities.
Next we provide an overview of the motivation and contributions of this work through
the following detailed example over a simple employment database. The schema and
queries serve as a running example in later sections.
3.1.2 Example Scenario
We begin with a database consisting of tables belonging to a client schema. Clients
interact with the database by submitting queries and updates, always on the current
snapshot. In the running example used throughout this chapter, the client schema
consists of a single table, S, describing employees:
S(eid, name, department, salary)
The auditor is responsible for monitoring access to the database and tracking
down malicious actions after they have occurred. Auditors typically inquire about
what happened to the database, when it happened, and who did it.1 To enable the
auditor to query the state of the database over time, the system maintains an audit
log table, LS, for each table S in the client schema. Each modifying operation, issued
by a client on S, is recorded in LS along with additional audit fields describing the
time of modification, the type of modification (insert, update, delete), and any other
fields possibly of interest to the auditor. Table 3.1 shows an audit log table including
audit fields recording the name of the issuing client and their IP address.
The audit log can easily be converted to an alternative transaction-time represen-
tation. Table 3.2 shows such a table, denoted TS. It represents the complete data
1We are concerned here with auditing modifications only. We do not audit queries that read from
the database.
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history of the table, recording, in the from and to columns, the active period of each
tuple in the database. Throughout the chapter we will use both the log-based and
transaction-time representations as they each have benefits for expressing queries and
defining concepts.
These historical tables can support a variety of queries of interest to the auditor.
Some simple examples include:
A1. Return all employees who earned a salary of 10 at some point in time.
A2. Return the clients who updated Bob’s salary, and the time of update.
A3. Return the clients who updated any employee’s dept, and the time of update.
A4. Return the time periods when Bob earns a salary of 10.
Some audit queries are conventional queries over a transaction-time data model (such
as A1, A4). Others ask specifically about changes, and reference the special audit
fields contained in the audit log (such as A2, A3).
The compliance officer is a trusted entity, responsible for enforcing data retention
restrictions arising from privacy regulations or institutional policies. These policies
are typically non-negotiable – they must be respected by all users of the system, in-
cluding the auditor. We propose two kinds of declarative retention rules for limiting
the lifetime of data. The compliance officer is also responsible for enforcing preser-
vation rules, which reflect requirements to keep certain data items in the database.
Notably, these policies are expressed in terms of TS, the transaction time table de-
scribing the data history. This is the most natural choice because retention policies
refer only to the client schema, and to the notion of time.
Our first retention rule is called redaction. When redaction is applied to an
attribute value, it removes the value but does not hide its existence. For example,
a redaction rule may say: Hide Bob’s salary between time 0 and 250. The second
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client IP time type eid name dept sal
Jack 1.1.1 0 ins 101 Bob Sales 10
Jack 2.1.1 100 upd 101 - - 12
Kate 3.1.1 200 upd 101 - Mgmt -
Kate 4.1.1 300 upd 101 - - 15
Jack 1.1.1 0 ins 201 Chris HR 8
Jack 2.1.1 300 upd 201 - Mgmt 10
Kate 4.1.1 500 del 201 - - -
Table 3.1: The audit log LS describing the history of operations performed on a
client table with schema S(eid,name,dept,salary). Columns client and IP are audit
fields.
eid name dept sal from to
101 Bob Sales 10 0 100
101 Bob Sales 12 100 200
101 Bob Mgmt 12 200 300
101 Bob Mgmt 15 300 now
201 Chris HR 8 0 300
201 Chris Mgmt 10 300 500
Table 3.2: The transaction-time table TS describing the data history of the client
table. It is derived from the audit log in Table 3.1.
operation, called expunction, is more extreme. When a tuple is expunged, it is
completely removed, along with all evidence of its existence. For example, an ex-
punction rule may say: Remove the record of all employees in the HR department
between time 0 and 300. We believe these rules are sufficiently expressive for practi-
cal applications, allowing users to selectively choose related data items, which could
be tuples, selected tuples, or individual attribute values [76]. We also support a basic
rule for preservation, which takes priority over the removal rules above, ensuring
that specified records are not altered or removed.
24
eid name dept sal from to
101 Bob Sales sx 0 100
101 Bob Sales sy 100 200
101 Bob Mgmt sy 200 250
101 Bob Mgmt 12 250 300
101 Bob Mgmt 15 300 now
201 Chris HR 8 0 300
201 Chris Mgmt 10 300 500
Table 3.3: The transaction time table, transformed under the following retention poli-
cies: RedactS(name = Bob, {salary}, [0, 250]) and ExpungeS(dept = HR, [0, 300]).
(The gray row has been deleted.)
Applying a set of retention rules transforms the stored history of the database.2
Table 3.3 shows a new transaction-time table, the result of applying the retention
rules to the table TS. In applying the redaction rule, salary values have been replaced
with variables (sx, sy). Instead of suppression with NULLs, we use variables to
support more accurate auditing by retaining more information, as different values
are suppressed to different variables. Also note that there is an extra row in Table
3.3 because the time interval [200,300] in the original data has been split into two
intervals: [200,250], in which Bob’s salary is hidden, and [250,300], in which Bob’s
salary can be revealed to be 12. In applying the expunction rule, Chris’s membership
in the HR department has been removed from the history: he is now only in the
Mgmt department from time 300 to 500. For illustration purposes, the expunged row
is included in Table 3.3, but displayed with a gray background.
A main goal of this chapter is provide a proper semantics for audit queries in the
presence of retention policies. Because the transformed history has tuples removed
by expunction and values obscured by redaction, the answers to audit queries may
2As a practical matter, retention rules may be applied physically, altering storage of the table,
or logically, in which access is restricted but hidden data is still physically stored. Sec. 3.8 provides
further detail.
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be uncertain or, in some cases, provide false information. We reconsider the previous
audit queries under retention restrictions:
A1. Return all employees who earned a salary of 10 at some point in time.
This query is a straightforward selection on the transaction-time table. On the
original data in Table 3.2 the answer to this query is {Bob, Chris}. On Table
3.3, under the retention policy, the answer to this query includes Chris as a
certain answer. However, Bob is only a possible answer because the predicate
depends on the unknown value of variables sx and sy. Our implemented system
returns both answers, labeled appropriately as possible or certain.
A2. Return the clients who updated Bob’s salary, and the time of update.
The answer to this query on the original data is {(Jack, 100), (Kate, 300)}. The
transformed history in Table 3.3 shows that Bob’s salary definitely changed at
time 100 (from sx to sy) and at time 300 (from 12 to 15). In addition, it may
have changed at time 250 (from sy to 12), depending on the unknown value
of variable sy. (Note that the uncertainty about this change is crucial – if it
is possible to deduce that the change did not occur, then it is clear that Bob’s
salary was indeed 12 between 250 and 300, and the retention policy is violated.)
In order to fully answer the query, we must use the audit log to get the names
of the clients who issued the update. Jack and Kate performed the updates at
time 100 and 300, respectively, so the certain answers to this query are: {(Jack,
100), (Kate, 300)}. A subtlety here is how to return the possible answer for the
update at 250, since there is no known client that performed that update. The
possible answer that could be returned is: (NULL,250), but not if it reveals
that this is a fake update.
A3. Return the clients who updated any employee’s dept, and the time of update.
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The answer to this query on the original data is {(Kate, 200), (Jack, 300)},
which can easily be computed from the original audit log LS. In the transformed
history in Table 3.3 we find evidence of only one update to the department field,
at time 200. This is a result of the expunction policy that removed Chris’ record
from time 0 to 300. Thus, the answer to this query under the retention policy
is {(Kate, 200)} and the record of Jack’s update is lost.
Notice that the answer to query A3 is incorrect: a tuple that is in the true answer
(i.e. with respect to the original data) is omitted from the new answer. From the
auditor’s perspective this is a worse outcome than that of A1 and A2 where the
true answer is one of the possible answers. One of the goals of our framework is to
provide answers to audit queries that, while possibly imprecise, do not lead to false
conclusions. Also note that in reasoning about the answers to queries A2 and A3 we
referred to the transformed transaction-time table and used it to infer actions that
were performed on the database. Later in the chapter we make this process explicit
by computing a sanitized audit log, consistent with the retention policies, that can
be queried directly.
The answer to an audit query under retention rules usually consists of two parts:
certain tuples and possible tuples. Such results are uncertain answers, because they
are computed on a history with incompleteness introduced by applying retention
rules. On the contrary, querying the original history without retention rules returns
a real answer. Intuitively, each uncertain answer represents a set of real answers,
each of which is returned by the query over some original history that is consistent
with the transformed history under the retention policies. In the case of A1, the
uncertain result could represent two real answers. One is {Chris} when A1 is executed
over the history where neither sx nor sy is 10 and the other is {Chris,Bob} when
either sx or sy is 10. Similarly, if the uncertain result of A1 contains two possible
tuples, say, Bob and Ann, we have four real answers represented, {Chris}, {Chris,
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Bob},{Chris, Ann} and {Chris, Bob, Ann}. Here we simply assume the existence of
each possible tuple in a real answer is independent of others, and thus we have four
different ways of choosing two possible tuples. We propose the Tuple-Independent
model (TI) for answering audit queries under retention policies, and define the
semantics of uncertain answers returned by TI under this independence assumption.
Later we will show, due to this assumption and the extended relational algebra, that
there is no extra cost to decide certain and possible tuples of the query results since
they are efficiently computed during query evaluation. Thus TI guarantees efficiency
and this fact serves as a major advantage of the TI model, along with it simplicity.
However, the independence assumption is not always correct and thus the information
delivered by the uncertain answer is not precise, as demonstrated by the following
query A4. To solve this problem, we introduce a more sophisticated model, the Tuple-
Correlated model (TC), which does not rely on an independence assumption and
gives precise interpretations of uncertain answers.
A4. Return the time periods when Bob earns a salary of 10.
The answer to this query on the original data is {(0,100)}, which can easily be
computed from the original audit log LS. In the transformed history in Table
3.3, our result is {(0,100),(100,200),(200,250)} and all are possible answers due
to the unknown value of two variables sx and sy. When using TI, we assume
the three periods are independent of each other and therefore we could interpret
them as eight different real answers. However, a closer look will tell us such
an assumption is invalid. (100,200) and (200,250) are correlated because they
are bound to the same variable sy. (0,100) is also not independent of either
(100,200) or (200,250) because sx and sy are correlated: they are not equal
(recall that they represent distinct values). In fact, this uncertain result only
represents three different real answers. If sx equals 10, then (0,100) is the
output; if sy equals 10, then (100,200) and (200,250) is the output; finally
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if neither sx nor sy is 10, then the output is empty. For a more accurate
representation we use the TC model which can maintain the correlations among
three time periods. Instead of indicating “certain” or “possible” directly for each
tuple, TC records extra information in the form of conditions associated with
each tuple. The example above may be represented as:
(0, 100) : sx = 10,
(100, 200) : sy = 10,
(200, 250) : sy = 10
Because all three equations are satisfiable, we have three possible tuples. Tu-
ples (100,200) and (200,250) occur together, or not at all, depending on the
assignment to sy.
Query A4 demonstrates that there are cases where the independence assumption
fails and thus the TI model is incapable of representing the result accurately. Our TC
model abandons the independence assumption and is able to provide accurate answers
by recording equalities and inequalities of variables. We use this extra information
to decide certain and possible tuples. From the auditors’ perspective, the ability to
calculate the correlation is important and delivers more valuable information. For
instance, given a possible suspect Alice, if the auditor has some external information
in Alice’s favor, the TC model can help to answer questions like “Who remains a
suspect if I assume Alice is not a suspect?” Our system (using either the TI or
TC models) returns uncertain answers which reflect the unavoidable imprecision of
carrying out an audit task in the presence of a partially removed history. In the
absence of our techniques, a conventional system would be unlikely to produce valid
query answers at all.
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We use the term expressiveness to measure the ability to precisely represent the
set of correct answers. TC is strictly more expressive than TI because it can interpret
the uncertain answer of A4 but TI can’t. After analyzing their expressiveness and
investigating other alternatives later in this chapter, we conclude that the combination
of TI and TC meet the needs of our application. We will see that the cost of TC’s
expressiveness is the decreased efficiency of deciding which tuples are certain and
which are possible.
In summary, the main contributions of this chapter are:
• We propose declarative rules for expressing retention restrictions over an his-
torical data model. (Section 3.4)
• We define the tuple-independent model (TI) for answering audit queries in the
presence of retention restrictions and we analyze the impact of retention policies
on the accuracy of audit queries. (Section 3.5)
• We present the tuple-correlated model (TC) for answering audit queries. Tuple
level correlations are captured by additional conditions appended to each tuple.
We define the extended relational algebra for TC. We compare the expressive-
ness of TI and TC and prove that TC is a complete data model meaning that it
can represent any possible set of answers. (Section 3.6) We show the advantages
of TI and TC in comparison to other models.
• We discuss the complexity of deciding whether tuples are possible or certain in
Section 3.7. In TI, this is given explicitly by an extra column. In TC, deciding
that a tuple is possible is NP-complete and deciding that it is certain is coNP-
complete. However, for a large subclass of instances, we show that efficient
scheduling algorithms can determine possiblility in P.
• We implement our framework via extensions to Postgres, showing that uncertain
answers can be computed efficiently over both models. (Section 3.8)
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• We demonstrate (through simulation on sample data) that useful auditing can
be performed in the presence of retention restrictions, despite uncertain answers.
The study of the impact of retention policies on the accuracy of query results
under TI and TC shows cases where TC can significantly improve accuracy over
TI. (Section 3.9)
We describe our threat model, in Section 3.2, and our data model and queries, in
Section 3.3. We distinguish our contributions from related work in Section 3.10.
3.2 Threat Model & Security Objectives
3.2.1 Adversaries
Our threat model focuses on two major categories of adversary: auditors and
external authorities.
An auditor is an authenticated user of the system who is permitted to ask queries
about past events in the database. We use the single term auditor to refer to either an
entity external to the enterprise who is authorized to perform audit tasks, or a user
internal to the enterprise who wishes to compute analytics or monitor changes in the
database. We assume auditors are not capable of subverting standard authentication
procedures or access controls imposed by the compliance officer. In our framework,
this means that the auditor is restricted to the sanitized data history only.
An external authority is an entity, such as a legislative body, a governmental in-
stitution, or a legal authority, capable of issuing audit queries that the enterprise
is compelled to answer using all information available in the database. An external
authority is not restricted by access controls imposed by the compliance officer. How-
ever, information that is physically removed from the data history will no longer be
available to anyone, even the external authority. In addition, the external authority
can issue a data hold to the compliance officer, preventing the compliance officer from
removing specified data from the history.
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3.2.2 Threats and Security Objectives
Data Disclosure The primary threat we address is unintended disclosure of the
data history. When the compliance officer intends to protect portions of the data
history through one or more retention policies, but that data history is nevertheless
exposed to an auditor or external authority, then data disclosure has occurred. For
example, in our motivating scenario, if Bob’s salary is not appropriately sanitized by
Policy 1, the answer to Query A1 may have Bob as a certain answer, resulting in a
compromise of Bob’s privacy.
Maintenance of data holds We assume that if an external authority issues a
data hold for a portion of the data history, the enterprise is required to retain that
history for later audit queries by the external authority. Failure to comply with
this requirement may result in significant liability for the enterprise, so we consider
maintenance of data holds an important security property of our framework.
We consider avoiding data disclosure and respecting data holds as non-negotiable
requirements of our framework, treating these as hard constraints that must be met.
Subject to these constraints, we desire to provide the best utility and availability
possible for auditing. In the best case, audit answers are precise. If they are not
precise, the auditor may be faced with uncertainty about the actual audit query
answer, but we nevertheless insist that answers be sound, so that they do not lead to
false conclusions. These assumptions favor compliance over auditing, and imply that
some retention policies established by the compliance officer may not allow accurate
auditing for some auditing queries. It is possible for the compliance officer to detect
the interaction between a retention policy and audit query (see discussion in Sec.
3.4.3).
There are other enterprise security threats that are not the primary focus of this
work. We assume that conventional methods are used to prohibit database clients
from altering the data history or log in any manner other than through inserts,
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updates, and deletes on the current snapshot. We also assume that the compliance
officer is trusted to implement policies correctly: we do not defend against the threat
posed by an untrusted compliance officer intentionally altering the log. Such threats
have received considerable attention elsewhere [28,43,44,80,91,96,104]. Lastly, while
external authorities are capable of accessing any data stored by the enterprise, we
assume they cannot carry out a full forensic examination of the enterprise system to
reveal further data remnants that may be retained. Such threats have been considered
by prior work [105] and we assume suitable countermeasures are employed.
3.2.3 Achieving security objectives
The retention policies described in this chapter have a single well-defined semantics
(described in Sec 3.4). But applying the retention policies to the data history can be
done in one of two ways: physically or logically. Logical implementation addresses the
threat of data disclosure only with respect to auditors, but not external authorities.
An advantage of logical implementation is that it is easy to modify or re-apply the
retention policy, and because data is not physically removed, logical application never
conflicts with data hold requirements. Physical implementation, in which redaction
and expunction result in physical removal of data, is more secure, addressing the
threat of data disclosure for both auditors and external authorities.
3.3 Data Model and Audit Queries
In this section we describe our data model, based on backlog and transaction-time
databases [52,53], and our language for expressing audit queries.
3.3.1 Data model
Let (S1, . . . , Sk) be the client schema. We refer to each relation Si as a regular
relation to distinguish it from transaction-time relations defined below. tuples(Si) is
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the set of all tuples that could occur in Si (i.e., the cross-product of the attribute
domains).
Audit Log
An audit log is a complete record of the operations on a client table over time, and
we maintain an audit log table LS for each table S of the client schema. Each row
in LS represents a transaction modifying a tuple of S. Table 3.1 shows an example
audit log table. In general, the schema of LS is:
(〈audit-fields〉, ttime, type, 〈client-fields-from-S〉)
The audit fields may contain an arbitrary set of attributes describing facts about
the transaction. In our examples, the audit fields record the name of the issuing client
and their IP address, but in general they may include many other fields describing the
context of the operation. ttime is a time stamp, from a totally-ordered time domain
T , reflecting the commit time of the transaction. We assume each transaction receives
a unique time stamp. The type field describes the modification as an insert, update,
or delete. The fields of the client schema describe the changes in data values. If the
transaction is an insert, each attribute value is included; for updates, only modified
values are included, with unchanged attributes set to NULL; for deletes, all attribute
values are NULL. This description of an audit log is essentially a backlog database [53]
with the addition of audit fields.
We assume that each audit record refers to a unique tuple, identified by the key
of the client table. In practice, a transaction may affect multiple tuples. If necessary,
this relationship can be recorded in a statement-id, relating the changes to tuples
made by a statement. Without loss of generality we omit this.
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Transaction-time relation
A transaction-time relation (a t-relation for short) represents the sequence of
states of a relation in the client schema. Formally, a t-relation over S is a subset of
tuples(S)× T . A tuple (p1, . . . , pn, t) ∈ TS represents the fact that tuple (p1, . . . , pn)
is active at time instant t. In examples (and our implementation) we use the common
representation for t-relations in which (p1, . . . , pn, from,→) means that (p1, . . . , pn)
holds at each instant t, for from ≤ t ≤→. Table 3.2 is an example of a t-relation.
Audit log versus T-relation
Given an audit log table LS, a unique t-relation can be computed from it in a
straightforward way by executing each statement. After a modification, the values of
a tuple are active until the time instant of the next operation modifying that tuple.
We use exec to indicate this procedure, and we define TS to be exec(LS) for each S
in the client schema.
It is also possible to reverse this procedure, computing an audit log from a t-
relation (although no audit fields will be included). This procedure, denoted exec−1,
computes initial insertion transactions at the time instant a new tuple is created,
subsequent update transactions at the instant of each change to a tuple, and (for
tuples that are no longer active) deletion transactions. Notice that computing an
audit log from TS will reproduce a table similar to LS but with the audit fields
removed: Πttime,type,S(LS) = exec
−1(TS).
The audit log LS and the t-relation TS represent similar information. As a practi-
cal matter it is not necessary to maintain both. However, in the formal development
presented here, each representation serves an important purpose. We will see in the
next section that retention policies are defined in terms of TS, and can be applied
directly to TS. But TS does not include audit fields. We will also reconstruct an au-
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dit log from the protected TS in order to make explicit the possible inferences about
changes to the database.
3.3.2 Audit queries
A variety of interesting audit queries can be expressed over TS and LS. LS is
a regular relation, but queries over t-relation TS may use extended relation algebra
operators to cope with transaction-time. We omit a formal description of these op-
erators, which can be found in the literature [17, 30], and instead present examples
highlighting their features.
The example audit queries from Section 3.1.2 are expressed as follows on TS or
LS:
A1. Return all employees who earned a salary of 10 at some point in time. Πname(σsal=10(TS))
A2. Return the clients who updated Bob’s salary, and the time of update.
Πclient,ttime(σtype=upd∧name=Bob∧sal 6=NULL(LS))
A3. Return the clients who updated any employee’s dept, and the time of update.
Πclient,ttime(σtype=upd∧dept6=NULL(LS))
A4. Return all the time periods when Bob earns a salary of 10. Πfrom,to(σsal=10(TS))
Conventional joins on t-relations are possible, as well as joins between a t-relation
and regular relation. For example, our audit log LS can be joined with TS on the
ttime attribute. In addition, we can use concurrent cross-product (denoted ×) or
concurrent join (denoted ./) as binary operators on t-relations that combine tuples
active at common time periods. The following additional example query includes a
concurrent self join on TS:
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client IP ttime type eid name dept sal
Jack 1.1.1 0 ins 101 Bob Sales sx
Jack 2.1.1 100 upd 101 - - sy
Kate 3.1.1 200 upd 101 - Mgmt -
NULL NULL 250 upd 101 - - 12
Kate 4.1.1 300 upd 101 - - 15
NULL NULL 300 ins 201 Chris Mgmt 10
Kate 4.1.1 500 del 201 - - -
Table 3.4: A sanitized audit log, P (LS), transformed under the retention policies of
Section 3.1.2 and Example 3.5.
A5. Return all employees who worked in the same department as Bob at the same
time.
Πname(σname′=Bob(TS ./

dept=dept′ T
′
S))
Finally, the time-slice operator restricts a t-relation to a specified interval in time.
For the interval [m,n], it can be defined as: τm..n(R) = R×{〈m,n〉} where {〈m,n〉} is
a singleton t-relation without user-defined attributes. The result of applying the time-
slice operator is a t-relation. A regular relation representing the snapshot database
at time m can be written as pi
S−{from,to} (τm..m(TS)).
3.4 Describing and Applying Retention Policies
In this section, we define the semantics of our redaction, expunction, and preser-
vation rules, and discuss how they are applied to the stored history. When the imple-
mentation respects the semantics of these rules, the threats and security properties
in Sec. 3.2 will be satisfied.
3.4.1 Retention policy definitions
Retention policies are used to restrict access to tuples or attribute values in one
or more historical states of the database. The need for retention policies arises from
the sensitivity of data items in the client schema. Thus it is most natural to express
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retention policies in terms of the t-relation, TS, which describes states of the client
relation as it evolves through time. We define our retention policies formally below
as transformations on TS.
Our first retention operation is called redaction. It suppresses attribute values in
tuples for a specified time period. Redaction is useful because it hides sensitive data
values, but preserves the history of modification of the tuple. Our second retention
operation is called expunction. An expunged tuple is removed from history, and the
historical record is modified accordingly to hide its existence.
These two operators serve different purposes as they enact value removal in the
case of redaction, and existence removal in the other. Expunction is a more extreme
operation because it does not merely suppress information, but changes the historical
record in ways that can substantially change answers to audit queries. We believe
that a variety of privacy policies can be satisfied through the use of redaction policies
alone, which will lead to more accurate auditing.
In the definitions that follow, a Boolean condition φ, on client relation S, is a
Boolean combination of comparisons S.A θ c, or S.A θ S.B, for any θ ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤
, >,≥}.
Definition 3.1 (Expunction Rule). An expunction rule, over a client table S, is
denoted E = ExpungeS(φ, [u, v]) where φ is a Boolean condition on attributes of S,
and [u, v] is a time interval (u, v ∈ T , and u ≤ v).
An expunction rule asserts that all tuples matching condition φ should be removed
from a specified interval in time. When an expunction rule E is applied to a t-relation
TS, the intended result is a new t-relation. Denoted E(TS), this new t-relation consists
of all facts from TS except those that satisfy φ and have time field in [u, v]:
Definition 3.2 (Expunction Rule Application). For a client relation S, let TS be a
t-relation over S, and
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E = ExpungeS(φ, [u, v])
be an expunction rule. The application of E to TS, denoted E(TS), is a new t-relation
with the same schema: E(TS) = TS − {x ∈ TS | φ(x) ∧ x.t ∈ [u, v]}
Unlike expunction, a redaction rule does not remove tuples from the historical
record. Instead, a redaction rule asserts that the values of certain attributes should
be suppressed in all tuples that match condition φ and are active during a specified
time interval.
Definition 3.3 (Redaction Rule). A redaction rule, over client table S, is denoted
R = RedactS(φ,A, [u, v]) where φ is a Boolean condition on attributes of S, A is a
subset of the columns in S, and [u, v] is a time interval (u, v ∈ T , and u ≤ v).
When a redaction rule R is applied to a t-relation TS, the intended result is
a new t-relation, denoted R(TS), in which some attribute values have been sup-
pressed. To formalize R(TS) we use a suppression function supp(x,A) which re-
places attributes of A in the transaction-time tuple x with variables. For example, if
x = (101, Bob, Sales, 10, 300) then supp(x, {dept, salary}) = (101,Bob,dx, sx, 300).
We assume that suppressions of distinct values always use distinct variable names,
and that all instances of a value are replaced by the same variable.
Definition 3.4 (Redaction Rule Application). For a client relation S, let TS be a
t-relation over S, and R = RedactS(φ, A, [s, t]) be a redaction rule. The application
of R to TS, denoted R(TS), is a new t-relation with the same schema:
R(TS) = {supp(x,A) | x ∈ TS, φ(x), x.t ∈ [u, v]} ∪
{x | x ∈ TS,¬φ(x) ∨ x.t 6∈ [u, v]}
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We assume for simplicity that A does not contain the key for table S. If the
key for R is sensitive, and subject to retention policies, a surrogate non-sensitive key
attribute can be introduced to the schema. This means that even if all attributes of
the schema are redacted, the history of changes to a tuple is still preserved.
Having applied a redaction policy, the resulting table R(TS) is formally an in-
complete t-relation. It is a representation of a set of possible worlds, each resulting
from a different substitution of distinct values for the variables introduced by the
suppression of attributes. We define incomplete relations formally in Section 3.5.
Retention policy composition
Retention rules can be combined to form composite retention policies. A set of
redaction rules is combined by hiding any attribute value that satisfies the selection
condition and time-period of any individual redaction rule. A set of expunction
rules is combined by removing all tuples satisfying any individual expunction rule.
Expunction rules take precedence over redaction rules: a tuple satisfying both an
expunction and redaction rule will be removed rather than suppressed.
Example 3.5. In Section 3.1.2, we described informally two retention policies. The
redaction rule that hides Bob’s salary between time 0 and 250 is written formally
as R = RedactS( name=‘Bob’, sal, [0, 250]). The expunction rule that removes the
record of all employees in the HR department between time 0 and 300 is written E =
ExpungeS(dept=‘HR’, [0, 300]). Table 3.3 is the t-relation that results from applying
both E and R to the original table TS shown in Table 3.2.
Suppression by Variables vs. NULLs
The choice to use variables instead of NULL values for cell suppression allows for
improved audit accuracy but can sacrifice confidentiality because it reveals when two
redacted values are identical. For example, suppose Bob’s salary was 10 at time x
but is later redacted. If Bob has the right to access both his and other employees’
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information, he may find Jack’s salary at time y is equal to his redacted salary at
time x, allowing him to infer that Jack has salary 10 at time y, in violation of the
redaction policy.
Nevertheless, we believe this is a worthwhile trade-off and we show in Section 3.9
that the use of variables can substantially increase auditing accuracy for some queries.
Our framework can easily be adapted to a suppression function using NULL values.
3.4.2 Sanitizing the audit log
Consider a policy P consisting of redaction and expunction rules. According to
the definitions above, we apply the policy to TS to get the t-relation P(TS). As
we have seen in the examples of Section 3.1.2, the answers to audit queries are not
determined completely by the table P(TS). For one, the audit fields in LS are not
present. We must use LS in combination with P(TS) to answer queries that reference
the audit fields. In addition, the operations applied to the database need to be
inferred from P(TS) which represents just the history of database states. In order
to combine audit field information, and to make explicit the changes to the database
that are implied by P(TS), we compute a sanitized log consistent with P(TS). This
new log is denoted P(LS) and has the property that running it results in P(TS), that
is: exec(P(LS)) = P(TS). The auditor, and other users, will have access to both
P(TS) and the sanitized audit log. Together we refer to these as the sanitized history.
The relationship between the audit log and transaction-time tables in our framework
is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
When computing the sanitized history, we hope to satisfy the following properties.
• A sanitized history is secret if it respects the semantics of the policy, hiding
tuples and values appropriately. This means it is not possible to infer from the
protected history anything that is not present in P(TS) (the defined meaning).
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the relationships between original history (LS and TS) and
the history under retention policy P . P (TS) is defined directly, while P (LS) is the
sanitized log derived from P (TS) and including audit fields from LS.
This property defines the fundamentals of preventing data disclosure (in Section
2).
• A sanitized history is sound if it omits information, but does not lead to false
answers to audit queries. This property is ensured for all queries if the possible
worlds implied by P(TS) include the original history. In that case, the true an-
swer to any audit query must be a possible answer under retention restrictions.
This property is essential for data utility (in Section 2) and it provides the basis
for answering queries precisely.
Note that for any redaction rule R and expunction rule E , R(TS) and E(TS) are
secret by definition. The challenge to secrecy comes from integrating LS. Also note
that expunction policies necessarily violate soundness. Because an expunction policy
changes history by removing records, it produces false answers to audit queries.
Definition 3.6 (Sanitized Log). Let P be a retention policy consisting of redaction
rules, expunction rules, or both, and let P(TS) be the (possibly incomplete) t-relation
that results from applying P to TS. The sanitized log under P is denoted P(LS) and
is defined as follows:
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1. Treating any variables present in P(TS) as concrete data values, compute the
audit log table exec−1(P(TS))
2. Let L0S = Π〈audit-fields〉,ttime(LS)
3. P(LS) = L0S ./=ttime exec−1(P(TS))
This procedure first uses the exec−1 to compute an audit log from P(TS). Then
we extract the audit fields and time column from the original audit log. This table,
L0S, is then joined with exec
−1(P(TS)). We use a right outer join to preserve tuples in
exec−1(P(TS)) which may not have a match in L0S. This occurs when the application
of a redaction policy splits the active interval of one or more records. It suggests that
an update operation occurred in the history, but the time instant of this update does
not match any update in the original audit log.
Example 3.7. Table 3.4 is the sanitized audit log computed according to the above
definition, for the policy described in Example 3.5.
Note that Definition 3.6 is not itself an attractive strategy for computing the
sanitized log. We describe our implementation of policy application in Section 3.8.
In addition, we will see below that policies can be “applied” logically, in which case
P(LS) need not be materialized.
3.4.3 Retention policy analysis
We can show the following properties of the sanitized log.
Proposition 3.1. Let LS be an audit log, TS the t-relation derived from it, and let P
be a retention policy consisting of a set of redaction rules R1 . . . Rn where each Ri =
RedactS( φi, Ai, [ui, vi]).
• The computation of P(LS) is sound.
43
• The computation of P(LS) is secret iff
ui, vi ∈ Πttime(LS) for all i.
Proof. (Sketch) Soundness follows from that fact that P(TS) is sound, and the fact
that P(LS) is consistent with P(TS), in the sense that exec(P(LS)) = P(TS). It
follows that the original history is one possible world of P(LS). If the condition ui, vi ∈
Πttime(LS) fails, then there are dangling tuples in the join described in Definition 3.6.
The absence of audit fields leaks information and violates secrecy. If the condition
holds then there are no dangling tuples. Secrecy follows from the fact that R(LS) is
consistent with R(TS) and uses only the projection, L0S, of LS.
The sanitized log from Example 3.7 and Table 3.4 demonstrate the problems that
result from arbitrary redaction intervals. These policies split intervals and suggest
phantom updates that cannot be convincingly represented in the log. The failure of
secrecy appears not to be merely an artifact of the semantics of redaction, but instead
a fundamental difficulty in presenting an audit log that is consistent with a redacted
data history. It is possible that secrecy could be achieved by introducing additional
uncertainty about phantom modifications, but this entails a more powerful model of
incompleteness, potentially sacrificing efficiency, and degrading audit query accuracy.
Further investigation is a topic of future work.
As a practical matter, to avoid sacrificing secrecy for redaction rules, the desired
time interval [u, v] of each redaction rule can be shifted, either forward or backward,
to the time of the nearest modification (to any field) in the log.
Policy/Query Independence
It is possible to decide statically, for a given policy and audit query, whether the
query answer will be unaffected by the policy. This problem is closely related to the
study of view independence of updates [10, 11]. Here the audit query occupies the
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place of the view. Our retention policies can be considered deletions (in the case of
expunction) or updates (in the case of redaction). Known results provide sufficient
conditions for determining policy-query independence in our framework.
3.4.4 Supporting preservation rules
Redaction and expunction are removal rules. They implicitly indicate the seman-
tics of data holds: the system only removes information that satisfies removal rules,
and retains the rest. Thus, when there is a litigation hold, we change the existing
removal rules accordingly to prevent unwanted deletion. However, a specific preser-
vation rule may provide more flexibility for compliance officers. Our framework is
able to support tuple-level preservation rules. A preservation rule tells the system to
retain all tuples matching the conditions in ψ for a specified interval of time.
Definition 3.8 (Preservation Rule). A preservation rule, over a client table S, is
denoted H = PresrvS(ψ, [u, v]) where ψ is a Boolean condition on attributes of S,
and [u, v] is a time interval (u, v ∈ T , and u ≤ v).
When a preservation rule alone is applied to a t-relation, the t-relation is un-
changed. When a preservation rule and a removal rule are applied together, the
process of generating the new t-relation should ensure that those tuples matching the
preservation rule are always retained, taking priority over the removal rule. To main-
tain data holds (described in Section 2), preservation rules must be applied correctly.
Definition 3.9 (Preservation Rule Application). For a client relation S, let TS be a t-
relation over S, and P be the current set of removal rules (expunction and redaction).
If a preservation rule H = PresrvS(ψ, [u, v]) is added to P to get P+ = P ∪{H}, then
we generate a new set of removal rules, P ′, from P by transforming each condition
p.φ for p ∈ P into p.φ ∧ (¬ψ ∨ (p.t 6∈ [u, v])) where p.t is the specified time period
in original rule p. If P+(TS) denotes the application of all the rules, we then have:
P+(TS) = P ′(TS)
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The definition above defines the semantics of integrating preservation rules by
logically transforming the original removal rules. It follows from the definition that
preservation rules take precedence over removal rules. Further, the properties of
removal rules and sanitization processes defined earlier in this section hold also for
policies that include preservation rules.
3.4.5 Physical vs. logical policy application
The discussion above has implicitly suggested the physical application of retention
policies to the audit log and derived transaction-time table, in which record removal
and attribute suppression are reflected in the storage system. Physical sanitization
is appropriate when it is necessary to defend against external authorities as well as
auditors, or when privacy policies mandate direct removal of data.
An alternative is logical removal, in which the audit log is not physically changed.
Instead, a logical view is computed which is consistent with the retention policy.
Logical sanitization can support multiple distinct retention policies that can be as-
sociated with users or groups of users, in a manner very similar to an access control
policy, which physical deletion is unable to support. Under logical log sanitization,
our retention policies can be seen as a combination of fine-grained and view-based
access control over a transaction-time database.
By the semantics of preservation rules, we always physically enforce them. This
fact applies to all preservation rules with no exceptions. But whether to logically
enforce them is a choice made by compliance officers. For example, if preservation
rules are the requirements of external authorities, the compliance officer first prevents
physical deletion of the related tuples to maintain the data hold. At the same time, if
he thinks that these preservation rules are beyond the auditor’s accessibility, he will
probably choose to ignore them in the logical application, which means allowing logical
deletion of the tuples matching these preservation rules. By doing this, the system
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provides better privacy guarantees while still satisfying data holds. Alternatively, the
compliance officer can add a data hold purely for the sake of preserving information of
interest to auditors. In this case, he will enforce the preservation rule both physically
and logically. But one should be warned that in this circumstance data could also be
exposed to external authorities and thus data disclosure is not prevented with respect
to them.
Based on the discussion above, we believe a hybrid method of history sanitization,
instead of purely physical or logical application, would better accommodate common
scenarios. Assume P is the set of rules defined on the database, containing preserva-
tion rulesH and removal rulesR. The compliance officer can adopt a hybrid approach
as follows. Physical application is always executed on all preservation rules H since
it does not prevent logical application of these rules later. Physical application on
removal rules should be carefully chosen as logical sanitization is not available for
them subsequently. So the officer selects a subset consisting of important removal
rules R1 ⊆ R for physical sanitization. Next, in the logical application step, for each
group of users/auditors, he decides what information to retain for them and enforces
a corresponding subset of preservation rules H1 ∈ H. For removal rules, he decides
what to be deleted logically for each group of users/auditors, and enforces a proper
subset of non-physically-applied removal rules R2 ⊆ R−R1.
In Section 3.8 we describe the implementation of our policies both physically
(using an update program that transforms stored tables), and logically (by rewriting
incoming audit queries to return answers in accordance with the stated policy).
3.5 Audit Queries under Retention Restrictions: A Tuple-
independent Model
Under a retention policy that includes a redaction rule, audit queries must be eval-
uated over tables containing variables in place of some concrete values, i.e., this table
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contains incomplete information or uncertainty. In this section we discuss the tuple-
independent model (TI), using techniques for querying incomplete information [51]
to describe precisely the answers to audit queries under retention policies. The major
benefit of TI is that there is no additional cost of deciding certain and possible tuples
because extended relational operators can compute and label each tuple explicitly on
the fly.
3.5.1 Incompleteness in relations and t-relations
Both regular relations and transaction-time relations can be incomplete. There
are two main features that distinguish an incomplete relation from a concrete relation.
The first is the presence of variables in attribute values. The second is a status column,
included in the schema of every incomplete relation. The status column is C when
the tuple is certain to exist in the relation, and P when the tuple may possibly exist.
Under a retention policy P , the inputs to our audit queries are the audit log table
P(LS) and t-relation P(TS). Both tables may be incomplete, since they may contain
variables. In addition, each of their tuples is understood to have a status of certain.
In general, audit query answers will include both possible and certain tuples.
An incomplete relation represents a set of possible relations. Let R be a relation
schema (regular or transaction-time) and let IR be an incomplete relation over R.
Also let IR = I
p
R ∪ IcR where IcR are the certain tuples and IpR are the possible tuples.
If V is the set of variables appearing in R, and f is a one-to-one function from the
variables V into the domain of R, then a possible world consists of the certain tuples
under f , plus any subset of possible tuples under f . Thus, the set of possible worlds
represented by IR, denoted rep(IR), is defined as:
rep(IR) = {f(IcR) ∪X | f ∈ F,X ⊆ f(IpR)}
48
where F is the set of all one-to-one functions that assign values in the relevant domains
to variables in V and f(IR) is the relation after replacing variables according to f .
Recall that in our framework, variables only appear in attributes of the client
schema – not in time stamps. Extending the definition of t-relation from Section
3.3, an incomplete t-relation over S is a set of tuples(S) × T × {P,C}. A tuple
(p1, . . . , pn, t, u) ∈ IS represents the fact that tuple (p1, . . . , pn) is certainly active at
time instant t (if u = C) or possibly active at time instant t (if u = P). Incomplete
t-relations can also be represented as tuples (p1,. . . , pn, from,→, u) which means that
(p1, . . . , pn) has status u at each instant t, for from ≤ t ≤→.
3.5.2 Extended relational algebra on incomplete relations
Next we define the extended relational algebra operators on incomplete relations.
The semantics of these operators is similar to the model of relational incompleteness
presented by Biskup [9], but includes extensions for transaction-time. Naturally, these
operators return incomplete relations, inheriting variables from the input relations
and computing the status field appropriately for output tuples. We provide definitions
of selection, cross-product, concurrent cross-product, and set difference. Join and
concurrent-join are derived from these, and projection, union, and the time-slice
operator are defined in a standard way.
Selection
Let IR be an incomplete relation, and E be a selection condition that is the Boolean
combination of comparisons of the form R.x = c (for constant c) or R.x = R.y. Com-
parisons can evaluate to P, C, or False. If the arguments are two different constants,
or two different variables, the comparison evaluates to False. The comparison of a
variable with a constant evaluates to P. If the arguments are identical variables, or
identical constants, the comparison evaluates to the status value for the tuple. The
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Boolean combination of terms is evaluated using the rules of three-valued logic where
P is interpreted as Unknown, and C is interpreted as True.
Tuples are included in the output of the selection operator if their status evaluates
to either P or C. When the condition E has evaluated to P under the comparison
of a variable with a constant, this variable binding needs to be applied to the output
tuple. Formally we have:
σE(IR) = {〈f(r.∗), E(r)〉 | r ∈ IR, E(r) = P ∨ E(r) = C}
The tuples returned have all non-status attributes (denoted r.∗) with variables re-
placed under mapping f , and a new status field E(r).
Example 3.10. Consider the selection condition R.a = 100 ∧ R.b = R.c. On the
input relation {〈dx, dy, 9, C〉}, the selection operation will return {〈100, 9, 9, P 〉}.
Cartesian product
If IR and IS are two incomplete relations over schema R and S, the cartesian
product IR × IS is defined as:
IR × IS = {〈r.∗, s.∗, status〉 | r ∈ IR, s ∈ IS}
where status is set to r.status ∧ s.status.
Concurrent cartesian product
If IR and IS are two incomplete t-relations over schema R and S, the concurrent
cartesian product IR × IS is defined as:
IR × IS = {〈r.∗, s.∗, from, to, status〉 | r ∈ IR, s ∈ IS,
[r.from, r.to] ∩ [s.from, s.to] 6= ∅}
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where status is set to r.status ∧ s.status, from = max( r.from, s.from), to =
min(r.to, s.to).
Duplicate Elimination
Duplicates (on the non-status columns of a table) can arise as a result of projection
or union, as well as selection and join (because of the substitution for variables). If a
tuple is both possible and certain, it is only necessary to preserve the certain version
of the tuple. In general, duplicates on the non-status columns are eliminated by
preserving a single tuple with a status value equal to the disjunction of all duplicates’
status values. That is, it will be C if at least one duplicate had status C.
Set Difference
If IR and IS are two incomplete relations, then in computing IR − IS, the tuple
〈r.∗, status〉 will be removed from IR only when there exists a tuple 〈s.∗,C〉 ∈ IS
where r.∗ and s.∗ shares the same value or variables on each attribute. Otherwise,
write 〈r.∗,P〉 into result when there exists a tuple 〈s.∗, status〉 ∈ IS where evaluation
of r.A = s.A (described in operator Selection section) is P or C for all attributes A
in the client schema. The rest of the tuples in IR that do not match the two cases
above will remain unchanged in the result. When IR and IS are t-relations, we must
expand the temporal intervals into instants (according to our definition of t-relation),
execute the set difference, and finally coalesce them back into intervals.
Example 3.11. Recall from Section 3.1.2 that audit query A1 returns all employees
who earned a salary of 10 at some point in time, and can be written Πname(σsal=10(TS)).
On the incomplete t-relation shown in Table 3.3 (for which the omitted status column
is uniformly C) we have the intermediate result of σsal=10(TS):
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eid name dept sal from to status
101 Bob Sales 10 0 100 P
101 Bob Sales 10 100 200 P
101 Bob Mgmt 10 200 250 P
201 Chris Mgmt 10 300 500 C
and the final result of Πname(σsal=10(TS)):
name status
Bob P
Chris C
3.6 Audit Queries under Retention Restrictions: A Tuple-
Correlated Model
As we have seen, in the query A4 of the motivating scenario, TI is incapable of
representing answers accurately due to the failure of the tuple independence assump-
tion. In such cases, the P and C status is no longer enough to preserve a precise
result. In this section, we introduce a tuple-correlated model (TC) for the purpose
of more accurate auditing. TC achieves greater accuracy by maintaining correlations
among tuples explicitly. It appends additional conditions to each tuple during query
processing, instead of simply using “possible” and “certain” indicators. We will define
the TC model and its relational algebra operations. Also we will show the benefit
in terms of the expressiveness. However, the extra conditions make checking certain
and possible tuples more complicated (remember in TI there is no additional cost
for that) and we will discuss that in Section 3.7. Comparison with other models is
investigated in Section 3.6.4.
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3.6.1 Representing incompleteness
In the TC model we associate the schema with an extra column cond. cond
represents a conjunction of clauses, where each clause is a variable-variable or variable-
constant comparison, e.g., X < Y and Z > 5. Consider a database D consisting of
relations over schemas R1, R2, . . .. Each schema Ri = {Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aij, cond}. Let
A =
⋃
Aij. We define a function h : A → T to classify each attribute into some
data type, where T is the set of all data types. In TC, all the values (variables) in
the same column have the same data type, and values (variables) are only allowed to
compare with those of the same type. For example, attributes salary and bonus are
of the same type and are comparable.
Side conditions η(D) (or η(IR)) are defined for database D (or relation IR, the
incomplete relation over schema R). η(D) (or η(IR)) is a conjunction of inequalities
which captures the distinctness among variables of the same type. The definition
of the side condition conforms to the semantics of retention policies, and captures
constraints that apply to all the tuples, in contrast to tuple-level conditions in the
cond column. v(D) (or v(IR)) represents all the variables involved in D (or IR).
For each variable x, dom(x) represents the domain of the variable. Usually when a
variable is corresponding to some attribute, dom(x) is the domain of that attribute.
Example 3.12 illustrates a relation r in TC.
Example 3.12. r=
name sal cond
Bob x x < 50
Chris y true
η(r) = {x 6= y}, v(r) = {x, y}, 0 ≤ dom(x) = dom(y) ≤ 100
An assignment for database D is a mapping from all variables in v(D) to their
domains, i.e., ∀x ∈ v(D), f(x) ∈ dom(x). An assignment f for database D is qualified
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when f |= η(D). A set of tuples S is a possible world represented by D if and only if
there is a qualified assignment f for D and S is equal to the set of tuples when we
replace all variables with values in D, i.e., f(D) = S. Thus, the set of possible worlds
represented by database D, denoted rep(D), is defined as:
rep(D) = {f(D) | f |= η(D)}
Example 3.13. For the database in Example 3.12,
f = {〈x, 10〉, 〈y, 20〉}
is a qualified assignment, therefore the possible world represented by f is f(r) =
name sal
Bob 10
Chris 20
TC vs. TI. TI allows variables but no tuple-level local conditions. The implicit
constraint on distinctness of variables in TI is written explicitly by the side condition
in TC. Another difference is that in TC you can specify domains of variables, while
in TI variables are always assumed to have infinite domains in order to simplify the
constraints.
TC vs. c-table. In a general c-table (conditional table) [51], each tuple is
associated with a condition, which is a Boolean combination of equalities. A TC
table can be viewed as an extended c-table with general local inequalities and special
global conditions, as the side condition plus explicitly claimed variable domains can
be written as global condition in a c-table. In our application, the side conditions
are usually from retention policies and tuple-level conditions are generated by queries,
thus TC separates the two distinct types of constraints.
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3.6.2 Extended relational algebra
We now describe a slightly different extended relational algebra compared to TI
(Section 3.5.2), since we have to incorporate conditions in the query evaluation. The
semantics of relational operators are defined as follows. Let IR, JR and IS be tables
in database D. Note that the side condition of D remains unchanged after query
evaluation.
ΠA(IR) = {〈r.A, r.cond〉 | r ∈ IR}
σE(IR) = {〈r.∗, r.cond ∧ E(r)〉 | r ∈ IR}
IR × IS = {〈r.∗, s.∗, r.cond ∧ s.cond〉 | r ∈ IR, s ∈ IS}
IR × IS = {〈r.∗, s.∗, from, to, r.cond ∧ s.cond〉 |
r ∈ IR, s ∈ IS, [r.from, r.to] ∩ [s.from, s.to]
6= ∅} where from = max(r.from, s.from),
to = min(r.to, s.to)
IR ∪ JR = {〈t.∗, t.cond〉 | t ∈ IR ∨ t ∈ JR}
In projection (Π), we always preserve the cond column in the result. For those
duplicates with the same non-cond attribute values but no cond formula, we could
combine them into a single tuple by taking the disjunction of all cond formulas. In
TC, we choose not to do this in order to keep each formula succinct. This does not
change the semantics of queries and relations. In selection (σ), we return all non-cond
attribute values (denoted as r.∗) and extend the cond column by a conjunction with
the selecting condition E, which itself is a conjunction. If the selection condition is
E = E1 ∪ E2, we will execute two selection operations followed by a union opera-
tion. Cross product (×) is defined by combining tuples in two inputs and taking the
conjunction of their cond columns. Concurrent cross product (×) is computed in a
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similar way as in TI model, plus the process on cond columns as in a normal cross
product defined above.
3.6.3 Expressiveness
In the context of incomplete databases, expressiveness measures the ability to
represent sets of possible worlds. A data model is said to be complete [93] when it
can represent any set of possible worlds. TI is not complete because it is impossible to
represent a set of possible worlds in which two possible tuples are mutually exclusive,
as shown in query A4 in the motivating scenario. However, TC is complete.
Theorem 3.2. TC is a complete data model, i.e., any set of possible worlds can be
represented by a TC table.
Proof. Assume we have any set of possible worlds W = {r1, r2, . . . , rn}. Now we
construct a table R in TC: we generate a new relation by adding each tuple in every
possible world, as well as distinguishing them by appending cond condition z = i
for the ith possible world. Variable z has dom(z) ∈ [1, n]. Therefore, any qualified
assignment f(z) = i will only associate with the ith possible world. It is obvious that
the relation R represents the exactly same set of possible worlds of W .
We say that model A is at most as expressive as model B (A  B) if for any
relation a in A there exists some relation b in B such that rep(a) = rep(b) where
rep() denotes the set of possible worlds represented by the relation. A is as expressive
as B if and only if A  B ∧ B  A. From the theorem above and the fact that TI
cannot capture tuple correlations, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. TC is more expressive than TI, i.e., TI  TC and TC 6 TI.
3.6.4 Comparison with Other Models
Our approach combines methods from the uncertain database and temporal database
communities. Some known models (Gadia [31] and Koubarakis [58]) provide a foun-
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dation for this area. A recent model U-relation [1] for uncertain databases is efficient
and expressive. Although it is not designed for temporal databases, we can extend
the relations with time information, such as from and to columns, to answer audit
queries under retention policies. Next we are going to compare TI and TC with these
models and show the advantages of TI and TC.
Gadia’s model [31] It is surprising that by only using nulls instead of variables
in TI (Let’s call it TInull), the extra status column helps us gain the same expressive
power as Gadia’s model (proof omitted here). This fact highlights our model TI,
because Gadia’s model is not in the normal form of the relational database and is
difficult to implement.
Example 3.14. Here is an example where Table 3.5 in Gadia’s model and its equiv-
alent representation Table 3.6 in TInull.
name dept sal
Bob [0,100] Sales [10,30) 10 [10,40)
Mgmt [30,55) 12 [40,45)
[0,50] [0,50] [0,50]
[0,100] [0,100] [0,100]
Table 3.5: A table in Gadia’s model
name dept sal from to status
Bob NULL NULL 0 10 C
Bob Sales 10 10 30 C
Bob Mgmt 10 30 40 C
Bob Mgmt 12 40 45 C
Bob Mgmt NULL 45 50 C
Bob Mgmt NULL 50 55 P
Bob NULL NULL 55 100 P
Table 3.6: The equivalent table in TInull
U-relation [1] U-relation is a c-table styled data model for incomplete databases.
Every relation (named U-relation) is a restricted c-table, in which the global condition
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is always “true”, variables are only allowed in the condition column and the local
condition must be a conjunction of formula x = a where x is a variable and a is a
constant. Each possible world is defined by a total function f : V → N, where V
is the set of variables appeared in the table. The variables in U-relations are used
for two purposes: representing possible worlds by valuation and encoding correlation
between tuples. U-relation is a complete data model, as our TC model, capable of
representing any set of possible worlds.
Consider utilizing this model for audit queries under retention policies. We should
enumerate all the possible assignments of each variable and list each of them as one
tuple in U-relation, e.g., the tuple (Bob, x, true) in TC that tells us Bob has a salary
x will be split into 10 tuples if the domain size of x is 10. In the query evaluation, we
also need to modify the semantics of operators in order to guarantee the distinctness
property among variables. For example, when joining two tables, the query processing
matches the tuples that satisfy the join condition and then takes extra effort to filter
out the inconsistent combinations. The join operation in U-relation is defined as
R ./ϕ S = R ./ϕ∧ω S where ω-condition is used to remove inconsistent tuples, i.e.,
one variable in two tuples is assigned with two different values. To make this join
operation working in our model, we need to rewrite the ω-condition to additionally
exclude the cases when two distinct variables are assigned with the same value. Let
C be the set of conditions in each tuple in the form of “variable = value”. And ↔
can be read “if and only if”.
ω =
∧
c1∈R.C,c2∈S.C
(c1.var = c2.var ↔ c1.val = c2.val)
The main advantage of U-relation is its simple representation and efficient imple-
mentation (incorporating state-of-art relational database systems). However, when
our variables tend to have large domain size, you can not avoid listing all of those
possible values by simple equations attached to each tuple in U-relation. In TC, there
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are variables in the attributes, as well as variables only existed in the cond column.
Moreover, inequalities and equalities are both allowed for cond formula. Such richness
enables TC to represent uncertainty in a concise form. The vertical decomposition
(attribute-level uncertainty) in U-relation has no conflict with the semantics of TC
and it is possible to incorporate for further succinct representation.
Koubarakis’ model [58] Koubarakis proposed a constraint-based incomplete
temporal data model, which integrates global and local inequality constraints on
the occurrence time of an event. With constraints only on temporal information, it
supports indefinite instants. For example, we can say this event a happens between
time 0 and occurence of event b, but we do not know its exact time. Such information
related to event ordering is not allowed in Gadia’s model. However, unlike Gadia’s
model, without variables in traditional attributes, we cannot represent the informa-
tion that allows attribute values to be unknown in the (possible and certain) active
period of that tuple. We basically do not allow incompleteness in temporal columns
for both TI and TC, which simplifies the computation by avoiding complicated event
ordering problems in the query processing. We believe that Koubarakis’ model has
the potential for building a more powerful system, and we save this as our future
topic.
3.7 Complexity
For the TI model, as we have seen, certain and possible tuples are decided by the
status column. However, we will show the problem of checking if a given tuple in TC
is possible is NP-complete in Theorem 3.4. And Theorem 3.7 states that deciding
a certain tuple is coNP-complete. However, we show in Theorem 3.5 and 3.6 that
for a large subclass of instances, the possibility problem is in polynomial time. The
certainty problem remains hard even within subclasses, therefore we use an exhaustive
search with heuristics to compute certain tuples.
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3.7.1 Deciding possible tuples
Given a TC table, there are usually tuples whose cond formulas are unsatisfiable,
which means their existence is impossible. Computing possible tuples is the process
of eliminating those unsatisfiable tuples. We begin with the definition of database
satisfiability and possible tuples.
Definition 3.15. A databaseD in TC is satisfiable when it has a qualified assignment.
It is clear satisfiability ofD is decided by checking satisfiability of η(D) ∧∧x∈v(D) dom(x),
where η(D) is the side condition of the database which indicates the distinctness
among variables of the same type and
∧
x∈v(D) dom(x) defines all of the variable do-
mains in D.
Definition 3.16. A tuple t is a possible tuple in database D when there exists a
qualified assignment f such that f |= t.cond.
Recall that a qualified assignment f of database D satisfies ∀x ∈ v(D), f(x) ∈
dom(x) and f |= η(D). Thus, it is easy to see that deciding possibility of the tuple t
is equivalent to the satisfiability problem of the following formula:
ψ(t) = t.cond ∧ η(D) ∧
∧
x∈v(D)
dom(x)
Of course the satisifiability of database D is a necessary condition for the satis-
fiability of any of its tuples. When we know that D is satisfiable, we can simplify
the above condition ψ(t) by replacing D with the current tuple t, i.e., t.cond∧ η(t)∧∧
x∈v(t) dom(x). Here η(t)∧
∧
x∈v(t) dom(x) are side conditions and domains only re-
lated to variables involved in t.cond. The simplified ψ(t) is equivalent to the original
one when database D is satisfiable: assignments to variables not in t.cond will not
change the satisfiability of tuple t. For simplicity we assume that all of the variables
in t.cond have the same type.
60
Theorem 3.4. Given a database D in TC, and tuple t ∈ D, deciding whether t is a
possible tuple is NP-complete.
The proof is a reduction from the clique problem, which is known to be NP-hard.
We next show that two natural restrictions of the satisfiability problem can be
solved in polynomial time. We avoid the richness of constraints that leads to the
above NP completeness by restricting the kind of constraints that can occur at the
same time, namely we do not allow constraints to simultaneously express ordering,
e.g, X < Y , and distinctness from a given constant, e.g. X 6= C. Recall that distinct
variables are required to take distinct values. The two subclasses of TC corresponding
to these restrictions are named TC< and TC 6=.
Theorem 3.5. Given a database D in TC<, and tuple t ∈ D, deciding whether t is
a possible tuple is in P.
Proof. We first rewrite the ψ(t) as an H-representation of tuple t, Ht, consisting of
two different sets of inequalities Ht,1 and Ht,2. 1) Ht,1: inequalities like X < Y .
Since inequality X < Y is equivalent to X ≤ Y − 1, we only need < to represent
the relationship between variables (X 6= Y is implicit since we have X and Y the
same type). These inequalities define a topological ordering of variables. 2) Ht,2:
inequalities like X ∈ [XL, XR]. The lower bound of X is noted as XL while XR is
the upper bound. To compute the lower and upper bound of each variable, we take
advantage of the transitive property of<-relationship. For example, ifX > 5∧Y > X,
we have Y > X > 5 and because X 6= Y we further have Y L = 7. That is, if X < Y ,
Y L will be updated to max(Y L, XL+1) and XR is updated to min(XR, Y R−1). This
can be done by selecting variables in a topological ordering and inverse topological
ordering.
It is clear that the H-representation Ht is equivalent to ψ(t). Now we are ready
to create a scheduling problem such that there are n unit-time jobs (n equals the
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number of variables in Ht) with release times (X
Ls in Ht,2), deadline times (X
Rs in
Ht,2) and arbitrary precedence constraints (defined by Ht,1). It is easy to see finding
a feasible schedule for this problem is equivalent to our tuple satisfiability in TC<.
Since computing Ht is in P and finding a feasible schedule for this problem is in P [59]
, the tuple satisfiability can be solved in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.6. Given a database D in TC 6=, and tuple t ∈ D, deciding whether t is
a possible tuple is in P.
Proof. Consider the H-representation of ψ(t), different from Ht in TC<, we will have
an empty Ht,1 since there is no variable comparison and each variable has a union
of sets of intervals in Ht,2, instead of a single interval as in TC<. For example,
X > 1 ∧ X < 10 ∧ X 6= 5 will result in X ∈ [2, 4] ∪ [6, 9]. Now we are ready
to create a scheduling problem such that there are n unit-time jobs (n equals the
number of variables in Ht) with multiple release and deadline times (defined by the
intervals in H2). It is easy to see that finding a feasible schedule for this problem is
equivalent to our tuple satisfiability in TC6=. Since computing Ht is in P and finding
a feasible schedule for this problem is in P [97], the tuple satisfiability can be solved
in polynomial time.
Remark 1 Recall that we simplify tuple satisfiability by assuming the database is
satisfiable. Actually database satisfiability is a special case of Theorem 3.6 because
the satisfiability of formula
∧
x∈v(D) dom(x) ∧ η(D) does not contain inequalities like
X < Y . Thus, deciding database satisfiability can be done in polynomial time. In
addition, when uncertainty is generated by applying retention policies defined in this
chapter, the database is always satisfiable.
Remark 2 Consider the subclass TC= 6= consisting of TC restricted to conditions of
the form X 6= C and X = C in t.cond∧∧x∈v(t) dom(x). Such conditions are common
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for variables in enumerative domains in which there is no ordering among values, e.g.,
department type. Recall that TC6= allows all kinds of variable-constant comparisons,
but not variable-variable comparisons. Since TC=6= is a special case of TC6=, we could
use the algorithm for TC6=. Nevertheless, we can do it faster using an alternative
method. Since there is no ordering among variables and constants, all variables in
t.cond are treated equally. We can randomly pick one variable X and assign it a
qualified constant C such that C has not been assigned to other variables and X 6= C
does not exist. If all variables are assignable, then it is satisfiable, otherwise it is not.
Remark 3 When there are multiple variable types for tuple t, we classify inequalities
by data types. As long as the constraints concerning each distinct data type fall
entirely in TC< or TC6=, we can always compute possible tuples in polynomial time.
For example, t.cond ≡ Xsal < Ysal, Zdept 6= ’HR’ where Xsal < Ysal is in TC< (the
salary type) and Zdept is in TC6= (the department type).
Remark 4 A combination of TC< and TC 6= provides adequate expressiveness for
our purposes. TC< is well-designed for ordered domains (e.g., integer domains like
salary) and TC6= is suitable for unordered domains (e.g., enumerative domains like
department). If we consider the WHERE clauses of the TPC-H queries, each can be
represented in TC< and TC6= under any of our retention policies. This suggests that
in many cases NP-hardness is not a practical problem. Nevertheless, when the general
TC model cannot be avoided, we have to search the space for satisfiable assignments,
and the complexity bound is exponential in the number of variables, n, which is
bounded by a property of the schema. Variables are generated by redaction policies
and n cannot exceed the number of columns belonging to the same data type, thus
we expect to see n very small. In the TPC-H workload, n cannot be larger than ten.
With this small number of variables, complexity exponential in n will be feasible and
add very limited additional burden when compared to TC< and TC 6=.
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3.7.2 Deciding certain tuples
A tuple is certain when it occurs in every possible world represented by the
database.
Definition 3.17. Suppose we are given a database D, and the set of possible worlds
represented by D, W = {f1(D), f2(D), . . .} where F = {f1, f2, . . .} is the set of all
qualified assignments for D. A tuple t is certain iff it exists in every possible world
fi(D), for any fi ∈ F .
As each possible world contains only constants, we can infer that a certain tuple
contains no variables. In addition, if a tuple exists in every possible world, its cond
formula should be always satisfiable for all qualified assignments. To compute the
certain tuples in a TC table, we have a two-step process. First, we compute the
certain v-tuples. A certain v-tuple is a relaxed version of a certain tuple, meaning
its cond formula is always satisfiable but it could have variables in some columns.
We merge tuples with the same non-cond column into a new tuple t and generate
the new t.cond formula by making a disjunction of all the cond formulas. Then if
f(t.cond) = true for every qualified assignment f , t is a certain v-tuple. Second, we
transform certain v-tuples to certain tuples. Obviously, a certain v-tuple is a certain
tuple when it does not contain variables. When t has a variable on attribute A, it can
be transformed to a certain tuple if and only if there are another |dom(A)|−1 certain
v-tuples with different variables of A. In other words, there are at least |dom(A)|
certain v-tuples with distinct variables of A, therefore, by distinctness of variables of
the same data type, each corresponds to a certain tuple. When the size of database is
unbounded, the difficulty of the first step dominates, since step two can be computed
efficiently.
Theorem 3.7. For each variant of the TC model discussed above, namely TC, TC<,
TC6= and TC=6=, the tuple certainty problem is coNP-complete.
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4
k = 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
X1 X2 X3 X12 X13 X23 X4 X14
f =
A qualified assignment
Xv ∈ [1, 8], Xv "= 4, 5, 6
Xij ∈ [4, 8], Xij "= 7
Xi < Xij, Xj < Xij
v = {1, 2, 3, 4}
〈i, j〉 = {〈1, 2〉, 〈1, 3〉,
〈1, 4〉, 〈2, 3〉}
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.2: Reduction from clique problem to tuple satisfiability problem in TCall.
The proof involves reductions from the 3DNF tautology problem to prove the
coNP-completeness for the TC classes.
We can do an exhaustive search to detect certain tuples by a backtracking method.
We choose a variable, assign a value, and then simplify the formula, recursively check-
ing if it is still a certain tuple. Assume a variable’s valid intervals consists of the union
of all intervals in which the variable could find a qualified assignment that makes at
least one of the conditions in cond true. One necessary condition for a certain tuple
is that each variable should have its valid intervals equal to its domain. Thus, in each
recursive step, if any variable has a smaller valid interval than the domain, the tuple
is not a certain tuple. This heuristic will help to eliminate non-certain tuples quickly.
The worst case complexity of calculating certain tuples is primarily determined by
a term exponential in the number of variables n. Similar to our discussion in Remark
4 about possible tuples, n tends to be a small number. Thus, in practical cases, e.g.
for schemas like TPC-H, the overhead added here is limited.
3.7.3 Proof of the Theorems of TC
Here we finish the proofs of the theorems for TC in Section 3.7.
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Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. The problem is in NP because given an assignment, we can verify in polynomial
time whether t’s formula is evaluated to True. Now we are going to generate a
reduction from the clique problem to show it is NP-complete. Consider an instance
of clique problem: a graph G = (V,E) and k = 3. Let V = {1, . . . , n} and m = |E|,
we build a tuple t that consists of n+m variables: Xi : i ∈ V ; Xij : (i, j) ∈ E. These
variables must take distinct values in the range [1, n+m]. Furthermore we will write
inequalities so that the first k values are taken by vertex variables Xis and the next(
k
2
)
values are taken by edge variables, and the next n−k values are taken by the rest
of vertex variables. Furthermore, we will write inequalities requiring that for each
edge (i, j), Xi < Xij. Thus the conditions of the inequalities will be satisfiable iff G
has a k clique. Formally we define t.cond as follows,
• For each vertex i in V , we create a vertex variable Xi s.t. Xi ∈ [1, n + m] and
Xi 6= k + a for all 0 < a ≤ k(k − 1)/2
• For each edge (i, j) in E, we create a edge variable Xij s.t. Xi < Xij, Xj < Xij,
Xij ∈ [k + 1, n+m], and Xij 6= k + k(k − 1)/2 + b for all 0 < b ≤ n− k.
An example of the reduction on one small example is shown in Figure 3.2. It
is clear this reduction is polynomially bounded. To prove the correctness of the
reduction, we will see the tuple is satisfiable if and only if G has a k-sized clique.
When there is a k-sized clique in G, we can always find a qualified assignment that
makes the tuple satisfiable. From 1 to n + m, we put the variables into slots by the
following order: k vertex variables in the clique,
(
k
2
)
edge variables in the clique, n−k
vertex variables and rest of edge variables. Consider the case k-sized clique does not
exist in G. By construction, slots from k + 1 to k + k(k − 1)/2 are only allowed
for edge variables. Since there are less than
(
k
2
)
edges connected among any set of k
vertices, at least one of these slots is empty. With domain size equal to the number
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of variables, we can conclude the tuple is not satisfiable. Therefore the reduction is
correct and the theorem holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof. All the problems are in coNP because given an assignment in polynomial time
you can verify the tuple is not a certain tuple when t’s formula is evaluated to False.
To prove coNP-completeness, we construct a reduction from 3TAUT – the 3DNF
tautology problem, which is known to be coNP-complete. For any 3DNF instance A
with n variables, we will construct a table T in TC. The relation is a set of single-
column tuples. Each tuple has a value 100 and the number of tuples is equal to the
number of clauses in A. We create n variables with the same type for relation T and
a mapping f from variables in A to variables in T . Each variable in T has an index
associated with it, i.e. from x1 to xn. Variables in relation T have domain [1, n+ 1].
Each tuple corresponds to a clause, and add an inequality xi ≤ i (xi > i) in the cond
column for each positive literal (negative literal). Consider
A ≡ (x¯ ∧ y ∧ z) ∨ (x ∧ y¯ ∧ w¯)
we construct the T with variables x1, x2, x3 and x4.
value cond
100 x1 > 1, x2 ≤ 2, x3 ≤ 3
100 x1 ≤ 1, x2 > 2, x4 > 4
η(D) ≡ x1 6= x2 6= x3 6= x4
dom(xi) = [1, 5]
It is clear the construction is polynomially bounded. Now we prove the correct-
ness of reduction. 1) If A is not a tautology, there must exist an assignment to the
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variables in A such that none of clause can be evaluated True. Assume the assign-
ment is {a1, . . . , an} where ai = 0 or 1. We build a qualified assignment {b1, . . . , bn}
to variables in T , where bi = i if ai = 1 and bi = i + 1 if ai = 0. {b1, . . . , bn} will
not make any tuple’s condition true, otherwise the corresponding clause in A will also
become true under assignment {a1, . . . , an}, which is a contradiction. 2) If tuple 〈100〉
is not a certain tuple, i.e., there must exist some qualified assignment to variables
in T such that none of tuple’s conditions is true under this assignment. Assume the
assignment is {b1, . . . , bn} where bi ∈ [1, n+ 1]. We build an assignment {a1, . . . , an}
to variables in A, where ai = 1 if bi ≤ i and ai = 0 if bi > i. Similarly, {a1, . . . , an}
will not be valid to any clause, otherwise the corresponding tuple’s condition will be
true by assigning {b1, . . . , bn}. Therefore, the reduction is correct and polynomially
bounded. The T relation created here only has variable-constant comparisons and
no 6= operator in cond column, so it is an instance of TC, TC< and TC 6=. So coNP-
hardness holds for all of three different classifications. In addition, for TC=6= we could
have another reduction from 3DNF tautology problem. Consider the same formula
A as above, we construct a table T in TC=6= and the correctness of reduction can be
proved similarly.
value cond
100 x1 6= 1, x2 = 2, x3 = 3
100 x1 = 1, x2 6= 2, x4 6= 4
η(D) ≡ x1 6= x2 6= x3 6= x4
dom(xi) = [1, 4]
Moreover, since T in our construction only has one type of variable, deciding
certain tuples with variables of multiple types is also coNP-complete.
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3.8 Implementation
The implementation of our framework translates our historical data model into
standard relations in Postgres. Our goal is to show the practical feasibility of our
framework. We optimize our implementation using commonly-available indexing
strategies and query rewriting techniques. A fully optimized implementation might
make use of techniques specifically designed for transaction-time data, but these
are beyond the scope of our prototype. Note the earlier implementation described
in [67,68] only includes the TI model.
As a performance optimization, both the audit log and the transaction-time tables
are stored in our implementation. As noted earlier, the transaction-time tables are
redundant since they can be computed from the audit log. However, materializing
these tables and maintaining them upon changes to the log eases query expression
and evaluation for some audit queries. The efficiency gains seem well worth the space
overhead which is roughly double that of storing the audit log alone. The time stamp
fields from and to are combined into one attribute named trange, which is stored as
an interval type (actually a one-dimensional cube data type in Postgres). Utilizing
the cube data type simplifies the expression of the concurrent join, and we also use an
available R-tree implementation. In TI, status is represented as a Boolean value. In
TC, we split the conjunction in the cond formula and put each inequality (or equality)
into a text value column.
Recall that the application of policies can be executed either physically or logically
(see the discussion in Section 3.4.5). In the remainder of the section we discuss the
physical application of retention policies followed by query evaluation on physically
sanitized datasets. Then we describe the logical application of policies. Lastly we
discuss the computation of possible and certain tuples.
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3.8.1 The physical application of retention policies
The application of retention policies is implemented by transforming the input
rules into a set of update operations on the original t-relation and possibly the audit
log. Inconsistencies may arise if the subsequent application of new policy rules touches
the previously sanitized attributes [4, 98]. For example, one policy p1 removes the
department information and the other policy p2 hides employees’ salary in the HR
department. Applying p1 first will result in a different sanitized history than if p1
is applied second. In this example, p2 will remove nothing if p1 is already applied,
however, the sanitized history will be different if p1 is applied first. To avoid this,
we assume we have all the policy rules at the time of policy application. Policy
application for all rules is accomplished in one-pass scanning of the table, sanitizing
each tuple against all rules, which guarantees that all the conditions in the rules are
fully evaluated on the current tuple before removing any values from that tuple. For
example, if an employee is in the HR department, both his salary and department
information will be deleted when we have p1 and p2.
Redaction is implemented by replacing values with variables. As described pre-
viously, variables here preserve equality even after redaction. That is to say, the
relationship between value and variable is a strict one-to-one mapping. In our cur-
rent implementation, we use a cryptographic hash function. Specifically, each data
type has a distinct hash function, which allows consistent variable assignments on
the same values even across multiple tables. Remember that we define the data type
when introducing TC in Section 3.6 and this concept can also be applied on TI. As
a data type only relates to the comparability and does nothing with the domain,
another benefit of utilizing a hash function for each data type is to enable comparison
of variables that belong to different attributes, e.g., comparing salary and bonus.
Since the policies are specified over t-relations, a policy P with an arbitrary time
condition [u, v] may require a split of update intervals causing phantom updates in
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the sanitized log (as demonstrated from Example 3.7 and Table 3.4), which results in
residual disclosure and false conclusions in query evaluation (meaning audit answers
will no longer be sound). To avoid this, we adjust the redaction period to the nearest
modification period of any field. However, this method might be too restrictive and
hinders periodic policy application, especially when the nearest modification period
is much longer than that required by the retention policies. To favor practicality
and periodic application but still achieve no residual disclosure and soundness, one
possible approach is to impose a system-wide “soft” limitation of the active period of
time for each tuple. As a tuple’s active period is defined as to−from, the requirement
ensures that no tuple is going to stay in the current snapshot of the database longer
than the limit roughly. For example, if Bob’s salary remains unchanged for about one
year, which reaches the limit of a tuple’s active life time, the system will input a new
tuple with the same salary starting from some randomly selected date and archive
the old tuple in the history. In the log table, all audit fields of the new tuple are
copied from the last update. Thus, we can align the time with finer granularity and
apply policies periodically. This randomly cyclic strategy preserves the soundness of
query answering as long as we treat the system’s behaviors as true updates of the
history. Moreover, by assigning consistent variables on the same values, auditors can
still correctly monitor the changes to values.
3.8.2 Audit query evaluation
Next we implement in SQL the semantics of extended relational operators over
incomplete relations for both TI and TC. The basic strategy is to rewrite SELECT-
FROM-WHERE blocks to accommodate incompleteness.
The TI model. To get uncertain answers for any given user query, the query
evaluator runs over the rewritten version of that query. During query processing, it
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retains tuples whose status column evaluates to either P or C on the original WHERE
clause, and eliminates all others. Then it computes the correct trange (if necessary),
the status column, and appropriate values of variable bindings for the query results.
In the following algorithm, the function isvari(x) tests if x is a variable. onevari(x, y)
returns true only when one of x and y is a variable. binds(x, y) represents the value
bindings, described in Section 3.5. It outputs x if x is a constant, otherwise it out-
puts y. In addition, to simplify the representation, we assume that the WHERE
clause of the user query is always a conjunction of multiple condition expressions.
If there are attributes appearing in two conditions connected by the OR operator,
e.g., sal=10 OR sal=20, we can break the query into parts and later combine their
results. The algorithm for rewriting user queries is as follows:
1. WHERE clause: rewrite each condition by the following rules. T.A stands for
attribute A in table T . θ ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥}. c, c1 and c2 are constants.
A θ c ⇒ (A θ c OR isvari(A)) (3.1)
Let Z ≡ (A θ B OR onevari(A,B))
A θ B
⇒ Z (if θ ∈ {=,≤,≥}) (3.2)
⇒ Z AND A ! = B (if θ ∈ {<,>}) (3.3)
if exists T1.A = c1 and T2.A = c2 (c1 6= c2)
⇒ append T1.A ! = T2.A (3.4)
The general idea of rewriting a condition is to allow the query processing to
keep not only those tuples satisfying the condition but also those that could
possibly satisfy the condition when variables are involved. Rule (1) tells the
query evaluator that when A is a variable it will also retain the tuple. When
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comparing two attributes A and B, by rule (2), the answer is yes when AθB
is true, or one of them is a variable. If both of them are variables and the
comparison is < or >, we additionally make sure they are two different variables,
by rule (3). Similarly, in rule (4), the same attribute in different tables is
compared with different concrete values. Finally we also add conditions on
trange when necessary.
2. SELECT clause: for each column A in the original SELECT clause, we rewrite
it by the following rules. Assume W is the original WHERE clause.
If A is status : (3.5)
⇒ (W AND T.status) AS status
Elseif A ∈ W and exists T.A = c :
⇒ c AS A (3.6)
Elseif A ∈ W and exists T1.A = T2.A :
⇒ binds(T1.A, T2.A) AS A (3.7)
Else ⇒ A (3.8)
To calculate the status column, as shown by rule (5) above, put the original
WHERE clause into SELECT clause, and add a conjunction of related status columns
to the term. Rule (6) ensures the concrete value is returned if there is an equality
condition on that column. We must rewrite those columns when they appear in both
the SELECT list and some equality expression in the WHERE clause, in order to
make sure query evaluation returns the concrete value as shown in rule (6), or the
correct variable bindings for the selection as shown in rule (7). Finally, compute the
correct trange value if necessary (i.e., for concurrent join).
Example 3.18. The following is an example query on complete table emp:
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SELECT name, t1.dept, t2.sal
FROM emp AS t1, emp AS t2
WHERE t1.dept=t2.dept AND
t1.sal=100 AND t2.sal=200
The algorithm above will produce the following rewritten query if emp is incom-
plete:
SELECT name, binds(t1.dept,t2.dept) AS t1.dept,
200 AS t2.sal, (t1.dept=t2.dept AND
t1.sal=100 AND t2.sal=200 AND
t1.status AND t2.status) AS status
FORM emp t1, emp t2
WHERE (t1.dept=t2.dept
OR onevari(t1.dept, t2.dept))
AND (t1.sal=100 OR isvari(t1.sal))
AND (t2.sal=200 OR isvari(t2.sal))
AND t1.sal!=t2.sal
We first apply rule (1) and (4) to generate the AND-terms in the new query
since there are t1.sal = 100 and t2.sal = 200. Rule (2) is also applied on t1.dept
= t2.dept. Rule (8) keeps name in the selection list. We have 200 AS t2.sal and
binds... AS t1.dept by rule (6) and (7). Finally, we use rule (5) to calculate status
column in the selection list.
As discussed in Section 3.5, duplicates may arise in the result of operations such
as union, projection and join. The duplicate elimination process can be achieved by
grouping on all non-status columns and then aggregating the (boolean) status column
using bitwise OR.
The TC model. We apply a similar rewriting process as we used in TI. The
difference is how to generate cond formulas in the result and eliminate unsatisfiable
tuples.
Example 3.19. Given a query asking for employees whose bonus is more than his
salary, we rewrite it as follows:
SELECT name,
CASE WHEN isvari(sal) or isvari(bonus)
THEN ’[money]’|| sal ||’<’|| bonus
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ELSE NULL
END AS cond_1
FROM emp
WHERE (salary<bonus OR onevari(sal, bonus))
AND salary != bonus AND
check_sat(cond, array[
’[money]’|| sal ||’<’|| bonus])
In the SELECT clause we insert a case statement to output cond formulas with
each condition recorded in a single column. In the example, as shown in the SELECT
clause above, we refer to it as cond 1. Because the query is comparing salary with
bonus, the condition only exists in the result when at least one of them is a variable.
For example, if salary is z and bonus is 10, by the CASE statement, the produced in-
equality will be [money] z<10, because salary and bonus both belong to the data type
“money”. The number of inequalities generated, which is the number of CASE state-
ments needed, is determined by the length of the original WHERE clause. (Actually
we could reduce the size of the original WHERE clause by the process of computing
the H-representation described in the proof of Theorem 3.5 and 3.6 when we treat
each attribute name in the WHERE clause as a variable).
In the WHERE clause, as the last step before results are passed to the SELECT
clause, a customized function check sat is called to check tuple satisfiability by in-
puting two parameters: the current cond formula and inequalities formed by the
condition in the original WHERE clause.
3.8.3 Logical policy implementation
The implementation above is based on the physical removal of expired information.
We can also implement policies logically, or virtually, without altering the stored
contents of the database. A query Q is not evaluated on the underlying database
directly, but is first composed with the policy P to generate a rewritten query QP .
The rewritten query can be evaluated safely on the base relations and produces a
result equivalent to evaluating P on a physically altered database.
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Figure 3.3: Performance of the five queries. For each query, the bars from left to
right represent the execution time on different models. “physical”/“logical” means
policy application is implemented physically or logically . “w/” or “w/o cond” decides
whether the result will contain condition formulas.
For simplicity, we assume that the redaction policies satisfy the condition in Propo-
sition 3.1 of Section 3.4.3, so that their application is sound and secret. Generally the
composition will begin by adopting the rewriting algorithm in the previous subsec-
tion. Attributes appearing in either the SELECT or WHERE clause are called critical
attributes. A redaction rule is relevant to Q when its redaction attribute list shares
some attribute with Q’s critical attributes. In addition to the rewriting process in
the previous subsection, we also make the following changes:
1. FROM clause: for each table, add a case statement modification based on its
relevant redaction rules.
2. WHERE clause: for any expunction rules (φ, [u, v]), add conjunction of not (φ∧
trange overlap [u, v]).
Note that the case statement modification is inspired by similar work in [60], but
we change the semantics from NULLs to variables.
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3.8.4 Improving query evaluation in TC
In Section 3.7, we discussed how to decide possible and certain tuples given a TC
table. Consider an incomplete history D generated by the application of retention
policies, and suppose we wish to compute possible and certain tuples of query q over
D. Since D has no cond column, the conditions in the results will only be introduced
by q’s WHERE clause. In fact, the size of the WHERE clause might be reduced by
computing its H-representation, described in the proof of Theorem 3.5 and 3.6. Each
H-representation Ht contains two sets of inequalities: Ht,1, inequalities like X < Y
and Ht,2, inequalities like X ∈ [XL, XR]. The size of Ht,1 is bounded by O(n2) and
the size of Ht,2 is bounded by O(n + c) where n is the number of column names in
q and c is the number of 6=-inequalities. So if there are few or no 6=-inequalities in
q, the size of WHERE clause (the number of inequalities introduced by q) is usually
very limited when the number of columns in the database D is small.
In TC, possible tuples can be checked during query processing and certain tuples
are computed as a separate step after query evaluation is finished. To improve the
performance, we may be able to take advantage of static analysis on the original query
before rewriting and executing it on the database system. A simple example is that
if a query q has only =-comparisons, its possible tuples are the same under TI and
TC. Moreover, if this q also contains only columns not touched by retention rules,
which means returned results are always complete, TI and TC result in the same set
of certain tuples.
It is also possible to predetermine the satisfiability of results for some queries.
Consider the WHERE clause as a formula. We first replace each attribute name with
a different variable of that data type. If there exists equality between two variables
x = y, we replace all occurrences of y with x (this is important because of the
distinctness among variables of the same type). Now it is obvious the result is an
empty set (no possible tuples) if this formula is not satisfiable. When this formula is
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a tautology (for any qualified assignment), and all the columns in the WHERE clause
are removed together by redaction policies, then all possible tuples in the result are
certain v-tuples. (Recall that certain v-tuples are tuples with variables and an empty
cond column, defined in Section 3.7.2.)
3.9 Evaluation
In this section we study the performance of query processing in our framework
and evaluate the impact of retention policies on the accuracy of query results. Our
experiments address the following key questions:
Performance. We assess the performance overhead of evaluating audit queries
using both physical and logical policy application on TI and TC.
Accuracy of uncertain answers. We study the impact of retention policies on
the accuracy of query results under TI and TC. Over sample data, we measure the
precision and recall of query answers as a function of the selectivity of redaction
policies. We characterize the cases where accurate auditing can be achieved under
retention restrictions. And we show that TC can improve the accuracy significantly
over TI in some cases. We also compare the accuracy with suppression only using
NULLs. Using NULLs is a common solution in relational database research such as
fine-grained access control [60]. However, variables can hide values while preserv-
ing more information about changes. We show that the extra information kept by
variables significantly increases the accuracy of audit query answers.
3.9.1 Experimental setup
In all our experiments we use Postgres 8.3 running on an Intel Core2 machine with
2.26GHz CPU and 4Gb memory. Our datasets are synthetically-generated histories
based on our example client schema S(eid,name,dept,sal,bonus). Here sal and bonus
have the same data type which allows comparing between them.
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We generated our history with an initial set of employees that grows slowly over
time through periodic insertions. We apply a random sequence of independent up-
dates to attributes throughout the lifetime of individuals. Thus the total tuples in
the t-relation and log is closely approximated by the product of two parameters: the
initial number of employees (the original snapshot size) and the average number of
versions of each employee tuple (the history length). We measure the query execution
time by reporting the average of 10 runs with the largest and smallest runs omitted.
3.9.2 Performance
We use three redaction policies3 and five queries in our experiments. They are:
R1: (HideSal) Redact salary values for a set of departments ds1 before a specified time
t1.
R2: (HideBonus) Redact bonus values for a set of departments ds2 before a specified
time t2.
R3: (HideDept) Redact department values in a specified time period p1.
Q1: (GetAll) Return the whole emp table.
Q2: (GetEmp1) Return employees who are in department d1 and have salary m1.
Q3: (GetEmp2) Return employees’ information where salary is less than m2 and bonus
is larger than m3.
Q4: (GetCowker1) Return all employees who worked in the same department as a
specific employee e at the same time.
3We do not consider expunction and preservation rules since they will simply remove or preserve
tuples and change the size of the history.
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Q5: (GetCowker2) Return all employees who earned more bonus than their salary and
worked in the same department with a given employee e, at same period of
time, as long as the returned employees have a smaller salary than e, but a
larger bonus than e.
We measure the execution time of each query under physical and logical imple-
mentation of TI and TC models. For the TC model, we also consider the case of
returning results with and without cond formulas. The baseline (original) is the time
to compute the audit query without the retention policy, that is, on the original ta-
bles. In GetEmp1, d1 is in the set ds1, and thus there is uncertainty in the answers due
to HideSal and HideDept. Note that GetAll has no WHERE clause and GetEmp1 and
GetCowker1 only contain =-comparison, therefore they can be answered accurately by
TI model and thus a satisfiability check by function call in the database system is not
necessary in TC. In GetEmp2, we set m2 < m3, e.g., m2 = 10 and m3 = 40. Consider
an employee has the same salary and bonus, both redacted to variable x. Then he
will not be a qualified result for GetEmp2, because x < 10 ∧ x > 40 is unsatisfiable.
GetCowker2 has a more sophisticated situation. So rewriting GetEmp2 and GetCowker2
in the TI model can not produce results accurately. Only the TC model is able to
answer these two queries properly. The execution time on a history (roughly one
million tuples) with 10000 initial employees (snapshot size) and 100 versions for each
one (history length) is illustrated by Figure 3.3. Generally, we find that evaluating
queries under retention restrictions has a modest overhead, to be expected from the
added clauses in the queries and the fact that result sizes are increased because of
uncertain tuples.
In the TC model, the online satisfiability check is implemented as a function in
the plpython language in PostgreSQL. To estimate the overhead of the function call
in PostgreSQL, we create a fake satisfiability check function in plpython which does
nothing but returns a True value and insert it into GetAll’s WHERE clause in TC. As
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GetAll returns all one million tuples, the system will execute the fake function on each
of them, which results in a lot of the extra cost for TC model. Considering this cost is
introduced by the system and the size of result, we consider this overhead acceptable.
It would be possible to reduce this overhead by using more efficient native language
of the database system.
Since GetEmp1 and GetCowker1 only contain equality comparisons, checking tuple
satisfiability is not needed and the only difference between TI and TC is the way
they generate status and cond columns. As expected, the performance is very close
between these two models for both physical and logical implementations. GetEmp2 and
GetCowker2 add an extra cost of checking tuple satisfiability. Each tuple of GetEmp2’s
result has a condition consisting of at most two comparisons. In GetCowker2, there are
at most four variables and the size of the WHERE clause is about eight. For these
two queries, Figure 3.3 shows that computing possible (satisfiable) tuples in TC adds
a modest extra cost to TI when we take into consideration the cost of the system
call discussed above. When TC does not include the cond column in the result, the
performance is closer to TI.
In addition, the logical solution is uniformly slower than the physical because of
the more complex queries required when policies are composed with queries. Another
reason is the lack of indexes. When a query is logically rewritten, the only usable
index is the one built on ttime column. A possible optimization is only integrating
relevant policies into query rewriting, e.g., in GetCowker1, redaction rules for removing
two salary columns can be omitted from logical queries.
It is worth noting that the certain tuples alone can be computed more quickly than
the original result in TI [68]. This is because, given the rewritten query, computing
certain tuples can ignore variables and the certain tuple set returned tends to be
smaller than the true result. In TC, computing certain tuples is a separate step after
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Figure 3.4: Result relationship in Venn Diagram: The answer space is I (the largest
box) and the original answer are O (shaded box), the certain tuples in our model are
Ac, the possible tuples is Ap (both are boxes with dotted-line).
query evaluation is done and the execution time could be slow, depending on the
complexity of formulas and the number of duplicates.
3.9.3 Accuracy of uncertain answers
Next we evaluate experimentally the accuracy of audit query answers under re-
tention policies. We demonstrate the cases that TC and TI are at the same level of
accuracy and the cases when TC improves upon TI. Over the original data, an audit
query can be considered to partition the set of all feasible query answers (determined
by the active domain) into qualified tuples and disqualified tuples. Under retention
restrictions, an audit query partitions the set of feasible answers into certain tuples,
possible tuples, and disqualified tuples.
Our first measurement of accuracy considers the distribution of answers as a func-
tion of the selectivity of the redaction policies. The second measurement is the pre-
cision and recall of our answers with respect to the original answers. Assume the
answer space is I and the original answer is O. The certain tuples in our model are
Ac, the possible tuples are Ap. For simplicity we assume no variables in the possible
tuples. Intuitively, we want to know how large O∩Ac (Fig 3.4(a)) is in proportion to
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Figure 3.5: Accuracy of uncertain answers. We measure the accuracy (Y-axis) in
terms of the removal rate of values in the history (X-axis) defined by redaction rules.
In (a) and (b), we use the redaction rules defined in the previous section. (c) is
performed under a rule that removes only salary. (d), (e) and (f) have the same
redaction rule that deletes salary and bonus together.
O and Ac. Formally, the precision of certain tuples is defined by
O∩Ac
Ac
and the recall
of certain tuples is defined by O∩Ac
O
.
We can also define precision and recall of the disqualified tuples, which may be rel-
evant to auditors since they might have value in an investigation. Then I−O contains
the disqualified tuples in the original answers and I−Ac−Ap is the set of disqualified
tuples computed in the incomplete history. The precision of disqualified tuples is
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defined (I−Ac−Ap)∩(I−O)
I−O and recall of disqualified tuples is defined
(I−Ac−Ap)∩(I−O)
I−Ac−Ap . If
we consider sound and secret retention policies, as described in Section 3.4, then the
precision of certain and disqualified tuples is always equal to 1, shown in Fig 3.4(b),
because the soundness (Proposition 3.1) guarantees Ac ⊆ O and O ⊆ Ac ∪ Ap.
The first experiment is performed on GetCowker1 in the previous section (the con-
current self-join). The query answers in TI and TC will have exactly the same set
of possible and certain tuples, although they will differ in the way they represent the
condition. The answer distribution and recall are shown in Figure 3.5(a) and 3.5(b).
At the beginning, there are no possible answers against the original history, and thus
the recall of the certain and disqualified tuples is 1. When there are values removed
by retention rules, possible answers are introduced. The percentage of possible tuples
and the recall of the certain and disqualified tuples all have an inflection point as the
selectivity goes up. This is because, when the removal rate is low, fewer variables
are introduced so we can retain a high recall. When the rate increases, the number
of variables increases and the recall decreases. On the other hand, when the rate is
extremely high, the incomplete history is mostly replaced with variables on the join
attribute: department. We will get high recall since the equivalence among variables
can be inferred accurately, e.g., two employees both working in HR department re-
sult in the same variable x in their department attribute. Therefore, there are fewer
possible answers and we get very high accuracy when all the department information
is removed, similar to the answers under the original history.
There are also many queries where TC can obtain much greater accuracy. Figure
3.5(c) and 3.5(d) show the difference in recall of disqualified tuples for TI and TC
given two queries. (We omit the answer distribution figures here.) Since possible
tuples in the uncertain results are always coming from the disqualified tuples in orig-
inal results, these two figures actually illustrate the difference in size of the possible
(satisfiable) tuples. That is, TI will output more tuples which should be unsatisfi-
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able and eliminated. In Figure 3.5(c), we remove history by deleting salary values.
When salary is replaced with a variable X, the cond condition in the result will be
bonus < X < 10, i.e., the tuple is possible only when bonus is less than 10. In TI, this
fact cannot be captured. Therefore, when the number of removed salary attributes
increases, the size of possible tuples grows and finally all the tuples are possible when
the removal rate reaches 100%. However, in the case of TC, the size increases linearly
because salary and bonus are generated randomly and the probability of bonus less
than 10 is independent of the removal of salary. In Figure 3.5(d), the WHERE clause
in the query is an unsatisfiable formula. Thus, no matter how we redact salary or
bonus individually or jointly, TC will always return an empty result (as does the query
over the original history) while TI increases quickly when we remove more. Note that
when all of the salary and bonus attributes are redacted, TI does not return all the
tuples because it eliminates the tuple where salary and bonus are replaced with the
same variable. In fact, we can actually use the static analysis discussed in Section
3.8.4 for TI to avoid this but we can do nothing for the case of Figure 3.5(c).
Figure 3.5(e) and 3.5(f) show the recall of certain tuples for two different queries.
In Figure 3.5(e), with condition salary < bonus, a certain tuple in TC has conditions
such as X < Y ∨ Y < X, or X < 10 ∨ 8 < X after merging tuples with identical
non-cond columns. Thus, we can expect a smooth reduction when the removal rate
increases. The result shows ten thousand certain tuples in the original history and
half of the tuples in the case when all of the salary and bonus are redacted. For TI,
the size of the certain tuples is decreasing in proportion to increasing redaction and
ending at 0. In Figure 3.5(f), according to discussion in Section 3.8.4, the WHERE
clause becomes a tautology when salary and bonus are redacted jointly. In this case,
TC can capture the full semantics of the query no matter how much salary and bonus
is removed. As expected, TI’s result becomes worse when more salary and bonus is
removed.
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Figure 3.6: Compare the accuracy of query results between suppression with variables
and suppression with NULLs, measured by the recall of certain and disqualified tuples.
Suppression using variables v. NULLs In our final experiments we apply redac-
tion policies with a suppression function that uses NULL values instead of variables.
Recall that using nulls in TI, called TInull, has the same expressive power as Gadia’s
model [31] for incomplete temporal databases. Figure 3.6 shows the recall of certain
and disqualified tuples on GetEmp2 (with condition on an early employee) compared
with the variable solution. Variables significantly outperform NULLs. For example,
with a selectivity of 25% the recall of certain tuples is 97% using variables, but just
56% using NULLs. This is because any two tuples with NULL on the join column will
produce a possible output tuple. With distinct variable assignments, only identical
variables will result in an output tuple.
3.10 Related Work
Retention policies and problems of expiring historical data have been studied in a
variety of contexts. Garcia-Molina et al. considered expiring tuples from materialized
views in a data warehouse [33]. An administrator can declaratively request to remove
tuples from a view, and the system will remove as much information as possible as
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long as it does not impact views referencing the original view. Toman proposed tech-
niques for automatically expiring data in a historical data warehouse while preserving
answers to a fixed set of queries [107]. Skyt et al. consider vacuuming a temporal
database [98]. Policies remove entire tuples, and the authors are concerned with
the correctness of vacuum specifications, and mitigating actions to handle queries
referencing missing information. The above works differ from ours because they do
not consider cell-level removal, do not view the resulting database as an incomplete
history from which possible answers can be derived, and do not consider an audit
log accompanying the history. Ataullah et al. [4] considered retention restrictions on
complex business records, which they describe by logical views over relations. They
define protective and destructive policies, and reduce a number of retention problems
to well-studied relational view problems.
A number of authors have considered maintaining data integrity and preventing
deletion in the context of auditing. Hasan and Winslett [43] considered the case when
requested information is subject to a litigation hold and they addressed the threat
of an untrustworthy process vacuuming expired records. Their solution uses write-
once read-many (WORM) storage and extra auditing actions for enforcement of a
litigation hold, instead of relying on a DBMS. In [44], they proposed a transaction
log architecture to ensure that database contents are long-term immutable. Both of
these solutions are complementary to our framework when considering the institution
itself as an adversary. In a different setting, Perez and Moreau consider the problem
of securing provenance-based audits [82] by protecting the integrity of provenance
information. Fabbri et. al. [28] detect unauthorized access by re-executing a log of
past operations. Encrypting audit logs has also been widely studied in the literature
[94, 104, 110] with the goal of maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of log
records.
87
Our redaction policies (especially when implemented logically) are related to fine-
grained access control rules. Wang et al. [108] studied the correctness of query answers
under cell-level access control policies, and made an important connection between
that problem and models of incomplete information. To our knowledge there is little
work on access control over time-varying data. Research into temporal access control
models [5] refers to access rights that change over time, not the problem of negotiating
access to data with a time dimension.
When computing possible tuples in TC, efficiently solving the satisfiability prob-
lem of conjunctive inequalities is essential. Generally, the complexity depends on
the domain of variables (dense or sparse) which is determined by the corresponding
column in the schema, supported operators (=, <,>,≤,≥, 6=), form of conditions (X
op Y , X op C or more general linear inequalities) and type of formulas (conjunc-
tive or disjunctive). In [89], the authors proved the general satisfiability problem
for conjunctive inequalities is NP-hard. Restricted versions, such as eliminating 6=
and only considering the real domain can be solved efficiently in linear time [40].
For disjunctive inequalities, Hochbaum [47] proved that even 2I-SAT is NP-complete,
when considering linear inequalities. 2I-SAT only allows at most two inequalities per
clause. The distinctness among variables in TC distinguishes our problem from all of
the above.
The scheduling problem has a close relationship to our TC model. The “jobs”
in the scheduling problem correspond to variables in TC. The distinctness among
variables guarantees that each job will start at a different time on a single machine.
TC< and TC 6= can be solved by efficient scheduling algorithms [59,97]. It is possible
that other scheduling solutions are applicable to TC and its variants.
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CHAPTER 4
SHARING PRIVATE SYNTHETIC DATABASE
This chapter addresses the problem of sharing a synthetic database under dif-
ferential privacy. Our database synthesis, though private, preserves the core perfor-
mance metrics for a given query workload. The solution proposed is a model-based
method, where we first select a model of database, then sanitize the statistics com-
puted from the model, finally release synthetic databases that are sampled from the
private statistics. To perturb the statistics, this chapter also describes the crucial
extension of differential privacy to support multi-relation databases.
4.1 Introduction
Assessing the performance of database technologies depends critically on test
databases and sample query workloads. A database vendor or researcher who has
designed a novel database feature needs to evaluate the performance of her technol-
ogy in the context of a real enterprise in order to measure performance gains. This
applies broadly to new storage architectures, new query optimization strategies, new
cardinality estimation methods, new physical or logical designs, new algorithms for
automated index selection, etc.
This system evaluation would ideally be carried out using the actual data and
query workloads used by the enterprise. Unfortunately, the actual data is often un-
available to the evaluator because privacy, security, and competitiveness concerns
prevent the enterprise from releasing their data. The evaluator could resort to com-
mon benchmark databases (e.g. a TPC benchmark), which have been designed to
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capture common properties of popular application domains. But because benchmarks
target the common case, they often cannot reflect particular properties that may sig-
nificantly impact performance for a given enterprise. Researchers have also proposed
a number of database generation techniques [2, 8, 13, 48, 65, 106] that are able to cre-
ate databases with specific characteristics. For example, when testing cardinality
estimation methods, it is typically important to manipulate the skew of attribute
distributions in test data. But without access to real databases and workloads, they
can only guess at meaningful parameter settings for database generators. A final al-
ternative is to employ techniques for synthesizing databases that match a given true
database [2, 7, 27]. Unfortunately, none of these approaches provide a guarantee of
privacy and, in fact, many of them produce output that can easily lead to serious
privacy leaks.
The goal of our work is to safely support accurate performance analysis by po-
tentially untrusted evaluators. We describe techniques for synthesizing, in a provably
private manner, a relational database instance that matches the performance prop-
erties of the original database, especially with respect to a given target workload of
SQL queries. The private synthetic data sets can be safely released to a vendor or
researcher, and are designed to preserve core performance properties of queries such
as IO counts, results sizes, and execution times.
Our approach is based on model-based database synthesis, as illustrated in Figure
4.1. We consider the owner of a sensitive database instance D, which conforms to
schema S, along with a workload W containing queries commonly executed over the
database. An untrusted evaluator would ideally like to carry out performance analysis
using each of S, D, and W , but is prevented from doing so by privacy concerns. We
obfuscate the schema by transforming S into an isomorphic schema S ′, and likewise
transform W into W ′ by re-expressing queries in W in terms of the new schema S ′.
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Figure 4.1: Our Approach: the owner selects (procedure of box 1, Section 4.3) a model
Q (rounded box 2) given schema and workload. A model contains a set of carefully
chosen queries, and their answers (statistics) can be calculated with instance (D).
The owner now perturbs (procedure of box 3, Section 4.5) the statistics to get a
differentially private Q′ (rounded box 4). With the release of Q′, the analyst can
create/sample (procedure of box 5, Section 4.6) one or more synthetic instances.
We then provide a method for the owner to select, based on the schema and
workload, a set of queries that serve as a model Q of the database D. Using this
model and the dataset, a set of statistics are calculated and then perturbed so that
it satisfies the formal standard of differential privacy. The perturbed results, Q′, can
be safely released to the evaluator and any computation using Q′ will not weaken
the privacy guarantee. Finally, the analyst, in possession of S ′, W ′, and Q′, can
generate a synthetic database instance consistent with the schema and statistics.
There are typically many instances consistent with Q′, so the analyst can generate
many alternative database instances by sampling. An appealing by-product of our
approach is that the analyst can also choose to generate scaled-up synthetic databases
to evaluate performance on larger, statistically-similar instances.
Contributions
We achieve the goals of untrusted system evaluation through the following con-
tributions. First, we extend differential privacy to multiple tables, re-defining the
concept of neighboring databases and sensitivity. This is a crucial extension for our
framework and also useful beyond the present work. Next we propose a novel algo-
rithm for selecting the queries that constitute the model Q, where we must balance
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descriptive power with accuracy achievable under the privacy condition. After pri-
vately estimating the selected model statistics to produce Q′ we then propose an
efficient method for consistently sampling from Q′ to generate a privacy-preserving
synthetic instance of the database. Lastly, we assess the accuracy of our techniques
for a range of performance metrics. We compare the value of these metrics for the
true database, synthetic data generated from non-private models, and synthetic data
generated from private models. We conclude that the distortion due to privacy is
modest and that important performance properties are retained in the output.
4.2 Preliminaries
In this section we describe our data model, queries, the definition of differential
privacy, and the primary privacy mechanism we apply.
4.2.1 Data model and queries
We consider a database D that is an instance of schema S = {R1, R2, . . .}. Sys-
tem evaluation is performed with respect to a workload of queries W consisting of
SQL queries. A table R = (A1, A2, . . .) in S contains key attributes and non-key
attributes, where the key attributes may be primary or foreign keys. Throughout the
chapter, we focus on workload queries involving joins only on key attributes. This
assumption is also accepted by the literature (e.g. [2]) and it actually covers a wide
range of applications, including TPC-H benchmark. However, we claim that our pri-
vacy definition and mechanism is not restricted to such queries. We represent the
schema S as a directed graph GS, where each table is then a node and edges are
drawn from Ri to Rj when Rj contains a foreign key reference to a key attribute in
Ri. An example schema graph for TPC-H is shown in Figure 4.2, containing relations
R(region), N(nation), C(customer), O(orders), L(lineitem), P(part), S(supplier) and
PS(partsupp). We limit our attention to schemas with acyclic schema graphs.
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Figure 4.2: The schema of TPC-H represented as a directed graph.
A counting query q is an aggregate query that returns the number of tuples satis-
fying one or more predicates. A counting query may involve a single table or multiple
tables joined by their keys and foreign-keys. We refer to the relationship among tables
involved in the query as its signature, denoted by v(q). Counting queries are written
in relational algebra, as in the following examples:
q1 : |σC.gender=M(C)|
q2 : |σC.gender=M(C ./ O)|
These two counting queries return the number of male customers and the number of
orders from male customers, respectively. The signature of q1 is v(q1) = C and the
signature of q2 is v(q2) = C ./ O.
The model Q of the owner’s database, shown in Fig. 4.1 and described in detail in
the next section, is defined by a set of counting queries derived from the workload. We
refer to this set of counting queries as the model queries. Note that while the model
queries are restricted to counting queries, the workload may contain more general
queries.
4.2.2 The differential privacy guarantee
An algorithm is differentially private if its output is statistically close on two
database inputs that differ by one record. Recall in Section 2.3, we introduce the
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formal definition of differential privacy and basic methods that implement it, such
as Laplace mechanism. Achieving differential privacy requires perturbing statistics
computed from the true database. This perturbation protects against disclosures that
can result from releasing exact statistics about the original database, as is done by
existing database synthesis techniques [2, 7, 27].
In Section 4.4 we extend differential privacy to complex schemas with multiple
tables by focusing on a protected entity and the entity’s relationships. However, we
note that even under this extension, differential privacy does not offer protection
for the population. In our setting, the differential guarantee (which applies to the
model Q of D) means that we reveal very little about protected entities and their
relationships. But it does not prevent the release of accurate aggregates for the pop-
ulation (and in fact we require reasonably accurate aggregates in order to capture
the properties of D). In some settings, these aggregate query answers may not be
acceptable to release. For example, the average revenue for a company or the to-
tal number of customers may be sensitive values, even when the individual records
contributing to these aggregates remain protected. In domains where population ag-
gregates are highly sensitive, accurate and private database synthesis is likely to be
impossible. Nevertheless, we believe there are a wide range of applications in which
the primarily concern is the sensitivity of individual entities for which our techniques
provide strong privacy. Practical examples are requirements of working with medical
information [29], location data [18] and network traces [72].
The models of the database we consider are defined (in the next section) by sets
of counting queries over D. To release a differentially-private model to the evaluator,
we must produce private answers to a large and potentially complex set of counting
queries. The standard mechanisms (the Laplace for -differential privacy and Gaus-
sian (, δ)-differential privacy) are quite effective at answering single queries, but can
be highly sub-optimal for the large sets of queries we consider. Intuitively, one rea-
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son for this is that the counting queries in our models may overlap, leading to high
sensitivity and high per-query error.
Improved methods for answering sets of counting queries have received consider-
able attention from the research community recently [19,21, 42,46,63, 115–117]. Our
goal is framework for database generation that is agnostic to any particular privacy
mechanism. Thus choose to adapt the recent work by Li et al [64], based on the
matrix mechanism [63], for answering multiple linear counting queries with low er-
ror. This technique offers an adaptive mechanism which adds noise customized to
the set of counting queries required by the model. The adaptive method works best
for (, δ)-differential privacy (achieving error rates that are very close to a theoretical
lower bound for mechanisms of this form) and we therefore focus our experiments on
the mechanism satisfying this relaxed version of differential privacy.
We emphasize that our framework is largely independent of a particular mecha-
nism used to derive the private model. This means that, in the future, better utility
could be achieved using our framework as privacy techniques advance.
4.3 Deriving a model from a query workload
In this section we describe the process for deriving a statistical model of the input
database, and in particular, a model which is specialized to a given set of workload
queries. The challenge is selecting a model that captures properties of the database
relevant to performance evaluation while at the same time allowing for accurate release
under differential privacy. We restrict our attention to classical relational database
systems and workloads of SQL queries.
4.3.1 Extracting counting queries
The selected model will be defined by a set of counting queries. We select count-
ing queries relevant to a given workload of SQL queries by considering intermediate
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operations in the query evaluation process, similar to Arasu et al [2]. Ideally, the
synthetic database sampled should produce similar executions when running each
workload query. The cardinality of each intermediate operator output are called an
intermediate count. Since a modern query optimizer uses table statistics to generate
query plans, if our model gathers all the intermediate counts of query trees, i.e., the
size of intermediate results on each node of the query tree, the optimizer will utilize
the same table statistics as the original databases to produce query plans.
The intermediate counts are represented as counting queries, and they are inde-
pendent of the data instance, DBMS and physical organization of data. Let w be
a single workload query. Γ(w) is the set of statistics (counting queries) that can be
extracted from any possible query tree of w. With v(w) as the signature of w and
|v(w)| as the number of tables in the signature, we can describe Γ(w) as follows:
Γ(w) = {Γ0(w),Γ1(w),Γ2(w), . . . ,Γ|v(w)|(w)}
Each Γi(w) is the set of all counting queries over an i-way join of a subset of tables
in v(w). In fact, each item in Γi(w) represents the size of the intermediate result of
a node that involves an i-way join, thus each counting query can be mapped to a
node in some query tree. In particular, Γ0(w) contains counting queries for the size
of each table in v(w). For a multi-query workload W , we let m = maxw∈W (|v(w)|),
and Γi(W ) =
⋃
w∈W Γi(w), and define:
Γ(W ) =
⋃
i=0,1,..,m
Γi(W )
Example 4.1. Assume a workload W = {w1, w2} consisting of two queries:
w1 : σC.gender=M∧O.year=2010(C ./ O)
w2 : σC.age=40(C)
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Figure 4.3: Possible query trees for σC.gender=M∧O.amount>100(C ./ O)
Γ(w1) includes intermediate counts up to the 2-way join and Γ(w2) includes counts
over a single table. The set of intermediate counts of w1 is derived from the four
possible query trees (Figure 4.3). Thus, Γ(W ) is the union of following:
Γ0(W ) : |C|, |O|
Γ1(W ) : |σC.gender=M(C)|, |σO.year=2010(O)|,
|σC.age=40(O)|
Γ2(W ) : |σC.gender=M(C ./ O)|, |σO.year=2010(C ./ O)|,
|σC.gender=M∧O.year=2010(C ./ O)|
To select a good query plan, the query optimizer will estimate the number of rows
retrieved by the query using stored statistics on the data distribution. Although we
do not directly measure the data distribution on all attributes, the counting queries
we extract as model statistics represent a rough approximation of this, namely those
statistics relevant to the queries in the workload of interest.
4.3.2 A spectrum of models
Next we define a spectrum of models, each derived from the workload. While the
most descriptive model would likely be preferred in the absence of privacy concerns,
in our setting, a more descriptive model can ultimately be less effective because more
distortion must be applied to satisfy the privacy condition.
The most descriptive model is a Saturated Model (SM) that contains all inter-
mediate counts (counting queries) of any possible query tree. SM gathers the most
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information from the workload, but its size grows quickly as the workload becomes
larger, particularly when multiway joins are involved. Moreover, SM will typically
contain many related counting queries, resulting in high sensitivity, and requiring
significant noise in the perturbation step. Therefore, we identify a number of simpler
models. The idea is to quantify proper correlation among tables using intermediate
counts, which is generally identified as Correlation of i-Table Model, shortened as
CiTM, where i ∈ N.
The C1TM model considers just intermediate counts within a single table, which
are the set of all counting queries corresponding to leaf nodes in a query tree. The
C2TM model includes up to 2-way cross-table correlations, consisting of the inter-
mediate counts in a query tree from the leaves and their parents. In general, there
exist models that include up to the i-way cross-table relationships. For comparison
purposes, we also consider a Null Model (NM), reflecting only of the size of each
relation and containing nothing about the workload. For a set of workload queries
W , these models can be formally described as follows:
QSM = Γ(W )
QCiTM = Γ0(W ) ∪ Γ1(W ) ∪ . . . ∪ Γi(W )
QNM = Γ0(W )
With Γ(W ), we are able to define a family of models, by putting together ar-
bitrary Γi(W ). Selecting a model is complex because greater descriptive power in
a model generally means it has a higher privacy cost and therefore demands greater
perturbation for a fixed setting of the privacy parameters. We will show in the follow-
ing sections that the amount of perturbation required by a model can be calculated
directly and we evaluate the impact of distortion on performance testing in the ex-
perimental evaluation.
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nation pop
USA 200
Canada 100
name N_nation age
Ann USA 30
Bob Canada 45
Chris USA 59
id C_name date
1 Ann Mon
2 Ann Tues
3 Bob Wed
4 Bob Thur
5 Chris Fri
name age N_nation N_pop
Ann 30 USA 200
Bob 45 Canada 100
Chris 59 USA 200
Nation
Customer
Orders
id C_name date
1 Ann Mon
2 Ann Tues
3 Bob Wed
4 Bob Thur
5 Chris Fri
OrdersCustomer
nation pop
USA 200
name N_nation age
Ann USA 30
Chirs USA 59
id C_name date
1 Ann Mon
2 Ann Tues
5 Chris Fri
name age N_nation N_pop
Ann 30 USA 200
Chris 59 USA 200
Nation
Customer
Orders
id C_name date
1 Ann Mon
2 Ann Tues
5 Chris Fri
OrdersCustomer
join Nation and Customer
normalize c(D)
delete customer Bob
normalize c(D0)
join Nation and Customer
delete customer Bob
Figure 4.4: An example of neighboring multi-relation databases for schema S =
{N,C,O}. D and D′ are neighbors because collapsed instances c(D) and c(D′) are
neighbors where c(D′) is generated by a cascading deletion of customer Bob from c(D).
Note that Canada is missing from D′ as Bob is the only customer from Canada.
4.4 Differential privacy for multiple-relation databases
In this section we extend the standard definition of differential privacy from a
single relation to multiple relations. The original differential guarantee protects indi-
viduals in a single-relation database by requiring statistically close outputs on neigh-
boring databases that differ on a single tuple. Using such a notion of neighboring
databases in the context of a multi-relation database is insufficient because an individ-
ual’s sensitive information will be represented in multiple tables. Considering TPC-H
as an example, each customer is associated with multiple orders. Under single-table
differential privacy, a query reporting the average order amount for a customer may
reveal the fact that a customer has an extremely high number of orders due to insuf-
ficient noise. A similar issue has been identified by Kifer et al [57]. However, since a
general schema may have complicated relationships among relations, defining differ-
ential privacy for multiple relations is not straightforward. We will show below that
even the calculation of query sensitivity requires careful consideration. The PINQ
system [74] also deals with this problem, but instead of proposing a direct solution, it
uses a modified non-standard semantics of join which is not applicable in our scenario.
In the following, we first generalize the notion of neighboring databases, focusing
on a single protected entity but accounting for tables related by key/foreign-key rela-
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tionships. We then discuss the calculation of query sensitivity and the calculation of
sensitivity for the queries that make up a model.
4.4.1 Multi-relation neighboring databases
We assume that a single table is identified as the primary protected entity in the
schema. In TPC-H , we choose the customer table as the protected entity (relation
C). We then seek to protect each customer’s data, including their participation across
multiple relations connected by key/foreign-key constraints. To do so, we consider
the following categorization of tables based on a schema graph.
1) Relations that are ancestors of the protected entity represent properties of the
entity that happen to be stored in separate relations. These should be protected along
with attributes in the tuples of the protected entity table. For example, table N is
an ancestor of C in the graph defined by the TPC-H schema and stores a customers’
nationality, which should be protected.
2) Relations that are descendants of the protected entity represent a set-valued
property of the entity that should be protected. For example, O and L are descendants
of C. In the order table O, there are multiple orders associated with each customer
which deserve protection. Removing one customer should result in a cascading dele-
tion of tuples from descendant relations, e.g., deleting the multiple associated orders
from O.
3) Ancestors of the protected entity’s descendants (but not direct ancestors) can
be viewed as properties of the items represented by entity’s descendants. E.g., when
protecting lineitem L as a set-valued property of customers, each lineitem’s supplier,
stored in S, should also be protected.
To formalize neighboring databases in multiple relations, we introduce a partially
denormalized version of D, c(D), generated by repeatedly performing pairwise joins
on key and foreign keys until the database contains only the protected relation R
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and its descendants (see Figure 4.4 for an example). We say c(D) is reversible, if
the normalization of c(D) results in the original D. Consider a relation X’s primary
key is referenced by Y ’s foreign key, X → Y , we say this relationship satisfies an
inclusion constraint if each of X’s keys are referenced at least once in Y . If inclusion
constraints are held among all of the pairs of tables that are being joined during the
creation of c(D), reversibility is then guaranteed, giving us the ability of rebuilding
the original database.
Definition 4.2 (Neighboring databases). Let D and D′ be instances of schema S
such that their partially denormalized versions c(D) and c(D′) are reversible. D and
D′ are neighbors if c(D) is generated by cascade deleting some tuple in c(D) from
database c(D′), or vice versa.
Definition 4.2 completes our definition of neighboring databases for multi-relation
databases, where denormalized databases help to take care of cascading deletion start-
ing from the protected entity, and reversibility helps to maintain consistency on all
other tables that are not involved in the cascading process.
Example 4.3. Suppose we have a simplified TPC-H schema S = {N,C,O} with
N→ C→ O. Figure 4.4 demonstrates two example neighboring databases and their
collapsed versions, and the relationship between these two versions.
Remark. The assumption of reversibility simplifies the definition of neighboring
databases, but is not a requirement.
4.4.2 Query sensitivity
We turn next to computing the sensitivity of queries, which is the maximum
change in a query answer for two neighboring databases. We first calculate ∆q under
single table differential privacy by viewing signature v(q) as a virtually materialized
single table and therefore the difference between neighbors is one. Under multi-
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relation differential privacy, v(q) in neighbors can differ by more than one, thus the
sensitivity of q should be augmented a factor of that difference (the df value):
∆q · df(v(q)) (4.1)
From this point forward, without additional notation, ∆ always refers to the
sensitivity in multi-relation differential privacy, as single-relation differential privacy
is just a special case with df value equal to 1 for every table.
The key of computing sensitivity under multi-relation differential privacy is to
calculate the df value. We begin by considering a single-table counting query, where
the signature is always a single relation, say X. It is obvious that df(X) is one if X
is the protected entity table, but for other tables this number is not constant, as one
customer could potentially match as many orders as possible so df value of O table
could be as large as its size.
We address this issue by assuming a bound on the join frequency across tables. We
refer to this as a propagation constraint, K(X, Y ), defined as the maximum number
of times that each primary key in table X can be referenced in table Y for the
key/foreign-key relationshipX → Y . With a fixed schema, the propagation constraint
is the only variation to decide a query’s sensitivity. A given propagation constraint
K indicates that differential privacy fully protects the individual/entity that has join
frequency smaller than K. Those with frequency larger than K, will be partially
protected. Therefore, with consideration of utility, we also choose K as large as
possible. When K is equal to the maximum join frequency, all tuples in X are
protected.
Algorithm 4.1 computes the df value for each table, assuming R is the protected
entity for schema graph GS. We use desc(R) to refer to the set of all descendants of
R.
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Algorithm 4.1 Compute df value
1: for X in topological order of GS do
2: if X == R then df(X) = 1
3: else if X ∈ desc(R) then
4: df(X) =
∑
Y→X K(Y,X)df(Y )
5: else df(X) = 0
6: for X in reverse topological order of GS do
7: df(X) = df(X) +
∑
X→Y [df(Y )−K(X, Y )df(X)]
return all df values
R N C O
L
S
PSP
1 k1
k1k2k1k2
k1k2 + 1
k1k2
k1k2 + 1
k1k2
Figure 4.5: Difference (df value) between neighboring TPC-H instances.
Example 4.4. Let C be the protected table and K(C,O) = k1, K(O, L) = k2. As
shown in Fig. 4.5, df(C) = 1. If each customer associates with at most k1 orders,
df(O) is 1 ∗ k1 = k1. Similarly, df(L) = k1k2. Then we begin the round of reverse
topological order. We pick the PS table, since it is the only table with all of its
children (L) computed. If k1k2 lineitems are deleted in L, there are at most k1k2
tuples deleted in PS (an upper bound for all cases). Thus, df(PS) = k1k2. After
that, we consider P and S. df(N) = df(S) + df(C) because deleted tuples in S and C
could refer to different nations. At last, we calculate df(R).
Now we consider the case that a counting query’s signature involves joins of multi-
ple tables. As the join operation propagates the primary-key table into the foreign-key
table, the maximum difference after the join is just the df value of the foreign key
table, given by the following equation for a 2-way join:
103
df(X ./ Y ) = df(Y ) if X → Y
For example, in Figure 4.5, df(N ./ C) = df(C) = 1, since the removal of one tuple
in the customer table will cause at most one nation to be deleted in the nation
table. We do not consider deletions propagated from S, because they do not influence
the join on N and C. Generally, if there are multiple tables joined (i.e. more than
two) in the signature of a query, we repeatedly apply this equation, and the df
value is always equal to the last referenced table if there is only one such table.
If the signature of a query is not sequential (e.g., C ./ O ./ L) or snowflake (e.g.,
(P ./ (S ./ PS)), its overall df is the sum of df values on each of last referenced table,
such as df(S ./ N ./ C) = df(S) + df(C). Moreover, the definition of neighboring
databases proposed in Section 4.4.1 is indeed independent of queries, which means
with proper modification to the methods discussed above (e.g., knowing propagation
factors for non-key attributes), we can calculate the sensitivity for queries that beyond
key-key joins. We omit them from the discussion here.
4.5 Model Perturbation
Given a selected model Q, our next goal is to perturb the true query answers
of the model to satisfy multi-relational differential privacy. A simple approach is to
calculate the sensitivity of the whole model and then add noise calibrated to the
sensitivity. However, in the case of multi-relations, this method would add more
noise than strictly necessary to satisfy the privacy criterion, and would hurt utility.
Instead we invoke privacy mechanisms multiple times, the challenges are to generate
an optimal mechanism composition and budget allocation, and effectively deal with
data representation for multi-relation correlations. In this section, we propose a
framework for resolving these challenges.
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4.5.1 General framework for working with multi-relations
We apply a data vector based representation for databases and queries to help
deploy the perturbation process. In our framework, each table is encoded as a data
vector. A data vector x consists of cell counts, which are the counts of tuples that
satisfy a set of disjoint cell conditions (Figure 4.6(b)). Essentially, a data vec-
tor is similar to a multi-dimensional histogram, containing a set of dimensions, e.g.,
dim(x) = {age, gender}. Note that the dimensions do not need to contain all at-
tributes of a table. Using data vector x, a counting query q can be expressed as
|x| coefficients and all counting queries are combined as a query matrix Q with each
row as one query. E.g., Q (Figure 4.6(c)) is the query matrix containing the three
counting queries of Figure 4.6(a) based on x in Figure 4.6(b). The true answers to the
counting queries are computed as the matrix product of Q and x. Thus, the Gaussian
mechanism for the single-table database, which adds Gaussian noise calibrated to the
L2 sensitivity (noted as ∆) to achieve (, δ)-differential privacy [23], can be defined
as:
Definition 4.5 (Gaussian Mechanism). Assume Q contains d queries, the following
randomized algorithm G provides (, δ)-differential privacy on input database D. Here
the sensitivity ∆Q is equal to the maximum L2 norm of a column.
G(Q, D) = Q(D) + Normal(∆Q
√
2 ln(2/δ)

)d
With multiple relations, it is not possible to construct a single data vector and
format all the model queries. Instead, the general framework is that we encode a
multi-relation database into a set of data vectors X = {x1,x2, . . . xn} and thus a
model Q can be represented as n query matrices Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . ,Qn}. Since there
is no direct privacy mechanism designed for multiple relations, we invoke a single-table
mechanism multiple times under mechanism composition with a properly distributed
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the privacy budget. We call such a mechanism a unit mechanism. A simple example
is to set the unit mechanism to be Gaussian mechanism and run it on each (x,Q)
pairs, under both sequential and parallel composition rules.
The first problem of this composition framework is the choice of data vectors
because there is more than one way to represent X . Although we always have logically
equivalent representations of the model queries, the choice of X can impact answer
consistency. Consider a model with two counting queries q1 = |O| and q2 = |C ./ O|,
represented by two different data vectors encoding O and C ./ O without common
dimensions. When applying a unit mechanism on each of them, independent noise
will be added and the perturbed answers will not necessarily be the same. This is an
inconsistent state because these two queries are actually equivalent if a foreign key
constraint holds. As the perturbation of each (x,Q) is independent, the data vector
representation does not depend on the unit mechanism used in the framework.
The other problem is to distribute the privacy budget efficiently. Data vectors
may come from tables with different df values in terms of sensitivity calculation
(Section 4.4.2), thus simply splitting the privacy budget evenly among invocations
does not always give the minimal error under composition. Other than the choice of
data vector representation, each choice of unit mechanism needs a particular budget
allocation plan to optimize the perturbation error. For example, the Laplace and
Gaussian mechanism have different budget allocation in our framework.
4.5.2 Choice of data vectors
Inconsistency from noisy answers arises because there is shared information among
data vectors. In the example above, two data vectors share common total counts. The
solution is to build data vectors that always contain all key/foreign-key relationships
of ancestors. We refer to them as denormalized data vectors, where attributes in
ancestors are viewed as simple properties of the current relation. For example, for
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q1: number of customers
q2: number of male
customers
q3: difference between young
and old customers
(a) Counting queries
x cell condition
2 age≤40, gender=M
1 age≤40, gender=F
2 age>40, gender=M
1 age>40, gender=F
(b) data vector x of customer table1 1 1 11 0 1 0
1 1 −1 −1
 ·

2
1
1
2
 =
63
0

(c) The counting queries from (a) represented as a matrix Q based on x. The
answers to Q are Qx.
Figure 4.6: An example of counting queries and a data vector.
relation O, with ancestors R,N and C, we build a data vector based on the joined
result of R ./ N ./ C ./ O. We do this for each relation in the database and now
the two queries in the example above will be represented using the data vector on O
and consistency is maintained after perturbation. Under this scheme, when merging
two data vectors, correspondent model queries can be transformed automatically,
essentially summing over the extra dimensions in the expanded data vector.
Example 4.6. Consider the saturated model for workload queries W in Example
4.1 (Section 4.3.1). A consistent representation can be built with two data vectors
xC and xO, where dim(xC) = {C.age,C.gender} and dim(xO) = {C.gender,O.year}.
These two vectors contain all ancestor relationships, but skip unnecessary columns
to minimize the size of the vectors, e.g., xO does not include C.age as no model
queries related to xO apply conditions on it. For model query transformation, look
at |σC.gender=M(C)|, a model query in the C1TM model. By introducing xC, it will be
rewritten to sum up all male ages in the xC, that is |σC.gender=M,C.age=∗(C)|.
4.5.3 Minimizing perturbation error
Now we state our algorithm for budget allocation. A standard choice for the
unit mechanism would be Laplace or Gaussian mechanism, both of which can fit
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well in our framework when finding a best budget distribution plan is not difficult.
To illustrate that our framework is independent of unit mechanisms, we employ the
more advanced matrix mechanism [63]. Although it requires more dedicated design
for budget allocation, we can reach much lower perturbation error. (In fact, the
allocation algorithm for the matrix mechanism is an extended version of the allocation
for Gaussian mechanism.)
4.5.3.1 The matrix mechanism
Under single-relation differential privacy, we can formally define the matrix mech-
anism as follows, where the key difference is that a new query set (the strategy, A) is
answered with the Gaussian mechanism and then the desired queries Q are derived
from it:
Definition 4.7 (Matrix Mechanism). [63] Let A be a query strategy matrix and
A+ = (AtA)−1At, the pseudo-inverse of A. The randomized algorithm MA offers
(, δ)-differential privacy.
MA(Q,x) = QA+G(A,x)
Intuitively, answering the strategy queries privately and then deriving the desired
workload queries leads to greater accuracy when the workload queries have high
sensitivity caused by many overlapping queries. The error of query estimates in the
matrix mechanism is measured by the mean squared error, determined by Q and
strategy A (independent of x). The total error is given by the following equation:
Err(Q,A) =
2 ln(2/δ)
2
∆2A trace(Q(A
tA)
−1
Qt) (4.2)
The main challenge of the matrix mechanism is choosing a good strategy for the
given queries Q and we rely on the algorithm in [64] to compute an approximately
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optimal strategy for any given Q. So in our multi-relation framework, multiple runs
of matrix mechanism will need a series of strategies A = {A1,A2, . . . ,An} matched
with data vectors X and Q.
4.5.3.2 Sensitivity and composition rules
The sensitivity for a single Q or strategy matrix A is its maximum L2 norm of
a column, multiplied by the df value of the query signature. In general, the total
sensitivity of multiple matrices may not be equal to the summation of each of them,
i.e. ∆2Q ≤
∑
Q∈Q∆
2
Q. This is due to the possible correlation among query matrices.
In fact, calculation of the exact sensitivity relies on searching for a proper series of
columns across each query matrix that maximize the sum of the square of L2 norms.
We omit the detailed discussion on sensitivity computation here, as we are always
safe to use the upper bound as the sensitivity. In addition, in matrix mechanism,
an optimal strategy matrix will always maximize the L2 norm on each column [64],
meaning all the columns have the same norm. Thus, each matrix contributes its
full ability in the overall sensitivity of A, which means it reaches the upper bound
∆2A =
∑
i ∆
2
Ai
. However, note this equation does not hold for a general case of
multiple query matrices.
An important part of our framework is to have certain composition rules for the
unit mechanisms. We use the following sequential and parallel composition rules,
originally proposed for the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms [23, 73, 74], also apply
to the matrix mechanism, for the first time.
Proposition 4.1 (Sequential composition). If each matrix mechanism MAi, operat-
ing on workload Qi and data vector xi, provides (i, δi)-differential privacy, sequential
application of MAi on each workload in Q satisfies (
∑
i,
∑
δi)-differential privacy.
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Proposition 4.2 (Parallel composition). If each matrix mechanism MAi uses the
overall sensitivity for all strategy matrices ∆A to answer Qi over xi, combination of
all MAi satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
Using these two composition rules, we partition Q into multiple disjoint sub-
sets/groups, such that the union of these sets equals Q, and then apply Proposi-
tion 4.2 inside each group and Proposition 4.1 across groups. Note that A is also
partitioned in the same way. All strategy matrices in one group will get a unified
privacy budget assigned to that group. Let I be the set of all partitions for Q. Two
extreme partitions are the fully split one Is with only single-sized groups (applying
Proposition 4.1 only) and the fully joined one Ij with one group that contains all
query matrices (applying Proposition 4.2 only).
4.5.3.3 Error for a partition
The total error of applying privacy mechanism M on partition I is the sum of
errors from each group g ∈ I. Let ErrGM(g, g, δg) be the error of group g given
privacy budget g and δg. So the minimum total error of partition I, MinErrM(I),
is
MinErrM(I) = min
∑
group g∈I
ErrGM(g, g, δg) (4.3)
From Equation (4.2), the total error of applying matrix mechanism on one query
matrix is ErrM = 2 ln(2/δ)/2∆2Ab, where the trace value b = tr(Q(A
tA)
−1
Qt). Let
∆g(A) be the sensitivity of group g’s strategy matrices.
ErrGM(g, g, δg) =
∑
i∈g
2 ln(2/δg)
2g
∆2g(A) bi
=
2 ln(2/δg)
2g
(
∑
i∈g
∆2Ai)(
∑
i∈g
bi) (4.4)
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To calculateMinErrM(I), we apply Lagrange multiplier to solve the optimization
problem with objective function Equation (4.3) and two equality constraints
∑
g g = 
and
∑
g δg = δ, which gives us the following results:
MinErrM(I) =
2
2
( ∑
group g∈I
3
√
ln(
2
δg
) · bgcg
)3
(4.5)
Here, the group trace value, bg, is defined as
∑
Qi,Ai∈g tr(Qi (Ai
tAi)
−1
Qti). Group
sensitivity factor, cg =
∑
Ai∈g ∆
2
Ai
. The distribution of δ among groups satisfies
the condition that for any two groups g, g′ ∈ I,
3
√
bgcg
δg ln
2/3(2/δg)
=
3
√
bg′cg′
δg′ ln
2/3(2/δg′ )
, from
which we can solve δg for each group. Then the distribution of  is therefore g =
 3
√
ln(2/δg)bgcg/Z, where Z =
∑
g∈I
3
√
ln(2/δg)bgcg.
Example 4.8. Let a model Q with three matrices be partitioned into two groups
as {(Q1,Q2), (Q3)}. Suppose the trace values b = [1, 10, 1000] and sensitivity of
strategies are all equal to 1. Under (1, 0.01)-matrix mechanism, the distribution of 
and δ {0.23, 0.77} and {0.002, 0.008}, gives us the minimum error of this partition.
This means, we run matrix mechanism on Q1 and Q2 each with privacy budget
(0.23, 0.002) and Q3 with budget (0.77, 0.008).
4.5.3.4 Choosing an optimal partition
The next step is to choose a partition I that minimizes MinErrM(I) over all
valid partitions I. As the total number of partitions is exponential in n, a naive
search algorithm will cost exponential time to find the optimal partition. We propose
a heuristic algorithm limiting searching a polynomial space based on the following
observation.
Consider a model with only two query matrices. It is easy to find out that parallel
composition is better and reaches the most advantage when b1/c1 = b2/c2, where
group trace value bi and group sensitivity factor ci are defined in Equation (4.5).
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x1 cell condition
0 C.age≤40
3 C.age>40
(a) xC
x2 cell condition
9 O.year=2010,C.age≤40
2 O.year=2010,C.age>40
7 O.year=2011,C.age≤40
6 O.year=2011,C.age>40
(b) xO
Figure 4.7: Non-realizable data vectors as xC indicates no customer is younger than
40 while xO shows there must be some.
Assume φ is the angle between vectors (b1, c1) and (b2, c2) in a 2-dimensional space,
this means φ = 0. Sequential composition only benefits when φ is large. When
coming to n-sized model, we can apply the similar idea: we keep elements in each
group close to each other (smaller φ) and large difference across groups (bigger φ).
We say partition I of a set is a refinement of a partition I ′ of the same set, if
every element of I is a subset of some element of I ′, noted as I  I ′. This means
elements in I ′ can be obtained by combine some elements in I. In such cases, we
say I is finer than I ′ and I ′ is coarser than I. E.g., consider the fully split partition
Is and fully joined partition Ij, we have Is  Ij. In fact, (I,) defines a complete
lattice. We use csr(I) to denote all partitions that one-step coarser than I, meaning
each of which is generated by merging exactly two groups in I. The algorithm is to
start from Is, and search the space of csr(I) for the current best partition I at each
step and stops when all partitions in csr(I) are worse than I. This procedure reduces
the exponential search space to O(n3) where n is the number of query matrices and
our simulation shows it always approaches the optimal partition.
4.6 Sampling synthetic databases
The private, noisy answers to the model queries, generated using the techniques of
the last section, are not sufficient for carrying out performance evaluation. It remains
to generate a complete synthetic database instance from the perturbed model. The
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major challenge results from the fact that a model with perturbed data vectors might
not be realizable: it is possible that there is no database instance that conforms with
the perturbed model statistics. An example is illustrated in Figure 4.7. The idea
of consistent data vectors discussed in Section 4.5.2 is only a necessary condition for
realizability. Realizability depends on a proper relationship across different data vec-
tors. Unfortunately, existing sampling techniques are designed only for unperturbed,
realizable models.
To address this challenge, we propose a two-step approach: first we calculate a
realizable model and then sample from it using standard methods proposed from
literature (e.g. [2]). Note that these steps use the private perturbed model as input
and make no further use of the original database. As a result, there is no impact on
the privacy guarantee.
Realizable model
A perturbed model may fail to be realizable largely because the perturbation
process does not respect key-foreign key relationships. Intuitively, when you sample
from a realizable model, each cell in any data vector should have sufficiently high
counts to allow propagation to each of its direct descendants.
Formally, let x[ψ] denote the summation of the cell counts in a data vector x
that satisfy the condition ψ. For example, in Figure 4.7, xO[O.year=2011]=7+6=13.
Define Csr = dim(xr) ∩ dim(xs), the set of common dimensions between two data
vectors xs and xr. We also use E
s
r to represent the dimensions that belong to
dim(xs) − dim(xr) and at the same time are attributes of table r or r’s ancestors.
In Figure 4.7, COC = {C.age}. If dim(xO) also includes N.nation, EOC = {N.nation}
because the dimension N.nation is not in xC and is an attribute of N, an ancestor of
C.
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Theorem 4.3. Assume R and S are any two tables such that S ∈ desc(R) and let
xr and xs be their corresponding data vectors. C
s
r and E
s
r are defined as above. A
model is realizable if: ∀c ∈ dom(Csr ),
xr[C
s
r = c] ≥
∑
e∈dom(Esr)
d 1K(R, S) · xs[C
s
r = c, E
s
r = e]e
In Figure 4.7, the violation happens because
xC[C.age ≤ 40] 6≥ d 1K(C,O) · xO[C.age ≤ 40]e
In the theorem above, we use propagation constraints defined in Section 4.4.1 to
restrict the propagation behavior. In the context of privacy, the information of K is
possibly treated as sensitive information of the original dataset and the data owner
could choose not to disclose it to the third party. So from their perspective, they are
going to later sample synthetic databases with the assumption that K is infinity. Or
the owner could also release the perturbed version of K.
To calibrate the data vectors and make it realizable, we should make changes to
cell counts if necessary. An inference process that minimizes the L2 distance of all
cell counts can then be represented as a quadratic program with least squares as
the objective function. However, in real applications, data vectors could be high
dimensional with millions of entries, in which case, standard quadratic programming
inference could be quite expensive. We design a linear-time approximation which
works quite well in our application (See Section 4.7.3). The idea is that whenever the
inequality in Theorem 4.3 is violated, we choose to increase minimally the cell counts
on the left side of the inequality. To calibrate all data vectors into a realizable state,
we test each pair of data vectors in reverse topological order of the schema graph.
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4.7 Evaluation
In this section, we implement the modeling and sampling methods proposed in the
previous sections and evaluate the accuracy of performance evaluation on synthetic
data. We build various models for a given workload, perturb the models, sample a
set of synthetic databases, and finally run the original workload on both the original
and synthetic databases. The primary goal of the experiments is to compare the
accuracy, w.r.t. performance evaluation of the workload, of the non-private and
private synthetic databases.
4.7.1 Experimental setup
Datasets and workload We use two datasets conforming to the TPC-H schema,
the uniform TPC-H generator1 with scale factor 1 and the skewed TPC-H (denoted
sTPC-H ) generator [15], which generates non-uniform columns distributions from a
Zipfian distribution, where the Zipf value (z) is set to 1.25. The workload queries
are generated from TPC-H query blueprints 1, 3, 6 and 10 with various parameters
substitution, which are queries involving up to 4-way joins on primary keys and foreign
keys.
Neighboring databases definition We assume the customer table C is the pro-
tected entity. For this schema, we only need to constrain the propagation to C’s
descendants, K(C,O) and K(O, L). In both datasets, propagation from O to L is uni-
formly distributed from 1 to 7. By definition of our neighboring databases, a single
counting query on Lineitem of TPC-H then has sensitivity 41 ∗ 7 = 287. It is obvious
that the strongest privacy guarantee is offered when the propagation constraint K
is set as large as the maximum. Since the maximum propagation between C and O
in sTPC-H is 15935, the sensitivity of the same query is 15935 ∗ 7. This is indeed
1http://www.tpc.org/tpch/
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the unavoidable case when conservative propagation constraints will be too big to
maintain a reasonable level of perturbation. Thus using the modified K is one way
to avoid bad utility while still providing strong protection to the vast majority of
participants in the database. In addition, we also want to show a fair comparison
between TPC-H and sTPC-H , so K(C,O) is set to 41 and K(O, L) is set to 7 for both
datasets. In sTPC-H, 99.764% of customers have 41 orders or less, so setting K to 41
means 99.764% of customers have full protection.
We set  = 1, 0.1 and δ = 0.01. According to Equation (4.2), changing δ from
0.01 to 0.001 has a factor of 1.43. Thus, they are equivalent to  = 1.19, 0.119 and
δ = 0.001.
4.7.2 Modeling
We implement the model family described in Section 4.3.2. The null model (NM)
serves as a baseline approach because it does not depend on the workload. Table
4.1 shows details about the models. For example, we see an enormous jump in data
vectors’ size for more complex models. Our algorithm has three phases: selecting a
strategy, distributing the privacy budget and adding noise. We want to emphasize
that the cost for strategy selection is incurred only once for each workload of queries,
independent of a particular database or setting of epsilon. Once this cost is incurred,
generating perturbed data for any database instance or setting of the privacy parame-
ters is efficient, and we therefore consider the overall cost of the algorithm acceptable.
For example, in our experiments, even though we sample synthetic databases based
on both datasets, and run experiments under multiple choices of , we only run the
strategy selection step once for C3TM. Later steps of distributing the privacy budget
and performing actual perturbation run in approximately 20 seconds, even for C3TM
with 106 cells in its data vectors. Figure 4.8 tells that our budget allocation algorithm
can reach much lower total error than simply splitting budget evenly.
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4.7.3 Sampling
The sampling process involves two steps: realization and sampling. We apply
the approximated realization introduced in Section 4.6, avoiding expensive quadric
programming. In the last row of Table 4.1 we show the L1 distance on data vectors
before and after realization, which is basically negligible compared to the size of
database. The running time of realization is less than a couple of seconds for all
models.
NM C1TM C2TM C3TM
# model queries 8 250 338 463
size of data vectors 101 103 105 106
modeling time (sec) 5 262 760 3009
changes after realization 1 17 45 60
Table 4.1: Detailed information about models
4.7.4 Utility
To assess the utility of the framework, we run workload queries with synthetic
databases and measure the performance metrics of by comparing them with execution
using the original databases. We use PostgreSQL, and observe two measures: 1)
Estimated cost. The optimizer uses statistics of databases to decide a best query
plan, and estimates the running time. 2) Running time, which is actual execution
time. Note that these two metrics are not necessarily correlated even in modern
DBMS.
Model error In the absence of privacy, we apply standard sampling to generate
synthetic databases from unperturbed models and run evaluation tasks on them.
The error between the collected measurements from these synthetic instances and the
true measurements from the original databases is called model error, which helps us
to understand the quality of the selected models. We measure the model error of each
metric P by its relative error. Let Po and Ps be the value of P on the original database
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Figure 4.9: Model Error and perturbation error of TPC-H and sTPC-H
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Figure 4.11: Detailed model error and perturbation error of workload running
time based on query complexity
and the synthetic database respectively. The relative error of P is r(P ) = |Ps−Po|
Po
. The
results are summarized in the first column of Figure 4.9, “non-private”, where each
bar and its error bar represents “mean ± standard error” of the relative error. We
find that all models outperform the baseline model NM significantly, illustrating that
the models are effective and that customizing the model to the workload is important.
As expected, high-level models (C3TM and C2TM) are better than low-level ones.
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Perturbation error Next we want to evaluate the accuracy of performance metrics
for databases synthesized using the perturbed private models. We refer to this as
perturbation error, which includes model error and the additional distortion of the
privacy mechanism. The results, shown in Figure 4.9, are presented in terms of  in the
second and third column. With  = 1, our models can handle noise easily, maintaining
very small lost of performance compared to non-private case. With  = 0.1, noise
becomes more influential. We see obvious increase of both metrics across all models.
Because the estimated cost reflects how query planner sees the table statistics and the
simpler models add less distortion to model queries, they suffer less from low budget.
For actual running time, we see only C2TM can stay in sub-20% for both metrics at
 = 0.1.
Utility breakdown Our model series are constructed by stacking up more cross
table correlations, so we’d like to differentiate the performance with joins, i.e. no-
join, joining two tables and joining 3 or more tables. The breakdown on running time
metric is illustrated in Figure 4.11 (We don’t show results for estimated cost, because
error is much smaller there in all cases.) Note that, in the non-private case, C1TM
matches only non-join queries, C2TM can do up to 2-way joins, and C3TM works for
up to 3-way joins, all of which are demonstrated in the first column. It turns out that
C1TM is not capable of dealing with high joins, especially for the skewed database
source. At  = 1, both C2TM and C3TM shows modest distortion, consistent with
their overall performance from Figure 4.9. At  = 0.1, C2TM is marginally better
than C3TM, across all queries. This is because C3TM’s noise level at  = 0.1 finally
ruins the benefit of having more information. Overall, C2TM and C3TM are good
for  = 1 and C2TM works best for  = 0.1 but only marginally better than C3TM.
Better utility by changing protection percentage At the beginning of this
section, we discuss that the strongest privacy is guaranteed when setting propagation
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to its maximum value, where 100% of customers is fully protected. However, large
propagation increases the sensitivity and thus noise. If reducing the percentage of
customers being protected is allowed, we get better utility. E.g., in Figure 4.10, we
can almost achieve half perturbation error for C2TM when only fully protecting 90%
of customers from sTPC-H .
Outside workload The model-and-sample approach is tailored for particular work-
loads. The benefit of having synthetic databases is to allow users to run those queries
the way they want without privacy budget concerns, e.g., using different DBMS sys-
tems. Besides well-modeled workload queries, it is generally interesting to see the
performance of outside queries. However, arbitrary queries might not work correctly.
E.g., if workload queries do not touch customer’s age, none of models will have in-
formation for that. Querying customer’s age is nothing more than getting randomly
generated numbers between 1 and 100. To test outside queries, we randomly com-
bines modeled attributes from any models into multi-joins. Given the size of models
and data vectors, this still represents a big space of outside queries. We generate
20 queries, ranging from no joins to 4-way joins, and repeat the evaluation process
above. The performance of no-join and 2-way join queries can match up the utility of
given workload, if not worse, with all privacy budgets. For queries containing more
than three joins, the result becomes unpredictable. However, it is mostly model error
that damages the utility, and we do not see much extra distortion from perturbation
error.
4.8 Related Work
There have been many proposed methods for synthesizing relational databases [2,
7, 8, 13,38,48,65,106]. Privacy is a commonly-cited motivation [2, 106]. Yet only one
paper actually specifies a privacy condition for generated data [113] and that condition
is based on anonymization approaches that lack rigorous gaurantees and may be
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vulnerable to a range of attacks demonstrated by the anonymization community. In
addition, they do not provide a detailed evaluation of utility, so a comparison with
our proposal is difficult.
Among the many works on database synthesis (without privacy), the classical
method is to sample databases to derive the data distribution and underlying attribute
correlations. Synthesis of the database is then workload-independent [13, 38, 48, 106]
(i.e., intended to support any set of queries considered) or workload-aware [2,8,65] (tai-
lored to a specific workload of interest). We argue that the workload-aware approach
is better for database synthesis, since workload-independent approaches may main-
tain irrelevant information for particular applications, as Seltzer et al. [95] observed.
From the perspective of differential privacy, supporting arbitrary workloads requires
more noise and results in lower utility. Our modeling method, based on counting
queries extracted from workloads, is carefully adapted to the given workload. Many
researchers [8, 13] have used cardinality statistics for (non-privately) synthesizing a
database. In addition, the idea of building a probabilistic model for a database [34]
can potentially improve the accuracy of query estimation.
Differential privacy [25] has been one of the most popular privacy definitions in
recent years. Generating differentially private synthetic datasets has been a common
goal, but only for single-table schemas [46, 114, 115, 117]. Existing results show that
in order to achieve accurate results, the data must be targeted to a constrained set of
workload queries. Recent work from Li et al. [63,64] proposed matrix mechanism that
is able to compute optimal noise on a set of correlated queries and we extend that
to work in a multi-relation setting. The techniques in this chapter are a significant
extension to preliminary work [41]. The PINQ framework [74] discusses privacy for
multi-relation schemas. However, the protected entity and neighboring databases are
not clearly defined and the semantics of the join operation is modified. Lastly, Rastogi
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et al [86] consider queries with joins and show that certain limiting assumptions about
the adversary can result in improved utility under a model of adversarial privacy.
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CHAPTER 5
SHARING PRIVATE EXPONENTIAL RANDOM GRAPH
ESTIMATION
This chapter considers how to share estimated parameters of exponential random
graph model (ERGM [71]) under differential privacy. As adding direct noise to those
parameters of ERGM is not practical, we suggest a two-step solution. Firstly, the
perturbation algorithm transforms the sufficient statistics of given ERGM into private
version. Secondly, a specially designed parameter estimation process calculates the
best parameter using private statistics.
5.1 Introduction
The explosion in the collection of networked data has fueled researchers’ interest
in modeling networks and predicting their behavior. However, for important applica-
tion areas such as disease transmission, network vulnerability assessment, and fraud
detection (among others), networks contain sensitive information about individuals
and their relationships. It is difficult for institutions to release network data and
it remains difficult for researchers to acquire data in many important application
domains.
Recently, a rigorous privacy standard, differential privacy [25] was proposed that
allows for formal bounds on the disclosure about individuals that may result from
computations on sensitive data. Differential privacy provides each participant in a
dataset with a strong guarantee and makes no assumptions about the prior knowledge
of attackers.
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Since its introduction, differentially private algorithms have been developed for a
wide range of data mining and analysis tasks, for both tabular data and networked
data. For networks, existing work has focused on algorithms for accurately releasing
common graph statistics under differential privacy [45, 55, 79, 83, 90, 109]. However,
graph statistics are only one aspect of social network analysis and are often most
useful in conjunction with some paradigm for modeling structural features of graphs.
Privately modeling graph data has only rarely been explored by researchers; we are
aware only of work using the Kronecker model [61] under differential privacy [75].
In this work, we study the differentially private use of the classic exponential ran-
dom graph model (ERGM) [71, 88, 100]. ERGMs are a powerful statistical modeling
tool that allows analysts to analyze a network’s social structure and formation pro-
cess. In social science and related fields ERGMs have been successfully applied to
many scenarios, such as co-sponsorship networks [20], friendship networks [36], and
corporate and inter-organizational networks [71].
Our goal is to accurately support parameter estimation for ERGMs under dif-
ferential privacy, focusing on a specific set of model parameters of recent interest to
researchers: the alternating statistics. These sophisticated statistics represent more
structural information than traditional star and triangle counts, and have been shown
to lead to much better modeling results [36,49,88,100].
Our adaptation of differential privacy to graphs protects relationships of individ-
uals by limiting the influence on the output of any single relationship (edge) that is
created or removed from the network.1 A standard algorithm that implements this
idea is the Laplace mechanism [25], which adds random noise to the output. The
amount of noise required is related to the maximum difference in the output due to a
1This is one of the most common interpretations of differential privacy for graphs, called edge
differential privacy [45]. Node differential privacy is stronger, but often hurts utility. Our results for
edge-differential privacy can easily be extended to k-edge privacy to protect multiple edges.
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single edge addition or removal for any possible network (this is the global sensitivity
of the function producing the output). For ERGM estimation, this requires calcu-
lating the exact change in the ERGM parameter estimates as a result of changing
an edge. Unfortunately, the global sensitivity for most ERGM parameters is either
hard to compute in general, or too high, so that using noise calibrated to the global
sensitivity is not acceptable.
To overcome this obstacle, we decompose private ERGM estimation into two sep-
arate steps. We first privately compute the sufficient statistics for ERGM estimation
(typically the model statistics required by model description) and then estimate the
parameters using only these sufficient statistics. Since the estimation process uses
only the differentially-private statistics, and there is no additional access to the orig-
inal graph, the output of estimation is also differentially private. In practice, the
estimation algorithm is executed either on the server side (by the data owner) or
on the client side (by the analyst). In either case, it does not violate the privacy
condition to release both the statistics and the derived ERGM parameters.
Challenges arise in both steps of our approach. While prior work has proposed
mechanisms for various graph statistics, common ERGM models use unique statistics,
e.g., alternating graph statistics [100], which are a complex aggregation of a series
of basic graph statistics. We describe new approaches for privately computing these
statistics. The second parameter estimation step could be implemented using stan-
dard methods [14,99] while treating the privately-computed statistics as if they were
the true statistics. Instead, we propose a novel parameter estimation method based
on Bayesian inference, which considers the noise distribution from which the private
statistics are drawn and produces more accurate parameter estimates.
Contributions
• In Section 5.3, we describe (, δ)-differentially private algorithms for estimating two
key statistics: alternating k-triangle and alternating k-twopath. The algorithms add
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noise proportional to a high-likelihood bound on the local sensitivity of the statistics.
Unlike global sensitivity, local sensitivity is determined by the current graph instead of
worst-case graphs and can be much lower. Our algorithms use a technique formalized
in [55] and inspired by the Propose-Test-Release approach [24].
• We describe a new Bayesian method for ERGM parameter estimation (in Section
5.4) that is designed for the noisy sufficient statistics produced by a differentially
private algorithm. While it is possible to use a standard algorithm for estimation,
our inference takes the unknown network as a hidden variable and can result in
estimates with lower error.
• We study a set of ERGM models based on model terms consisting of alternating
graph statistics [100] (in Section 5.5). Our experiments on both synthetic and real
graphs show that our techniques significantly reduce noise over baseline approaches.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Exponential random graph model (ERGM)
A graph G = (V,E) is defined as a set of nodes V and relationships E : V × V →
{0, 1}. A common representation of a graph is as an adjacency matrix x, where
xij ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether there is an edge from node i to j. Let f(·) define a
vector of graph statistics called the model terms ; the concrete values of f(x) are the
model statistics. Formally, the ERGM with parameter vector θ defines a probability
distribution over graphs in the space X (typically the set of all simple graphs with n
vertices):
p(x|θ) = exp(θ · f(x))
Zθ
(5.1)
Zθ is a normalizing constant to make p(x) a true probability distribution, param-
eterized by θ. If x0 is the observed graph and X represents the random variable
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defined by the distribution above, our goal is to tune the parameter vector θ, s.t. the
expected value of f(X) is equal to observed statistics, meaning Eθ(f(X)) = f(x0),
which intuitively puts the observed graph in the “center” of space of possible graphs
implied by the model. For example, the simplest ERGM uses the number of edges as
the only model term. If m0 is the total number of edges in x0, the θ, which enables
the expected number of edges of ERGM equal to m0, is given by [78]:
θ = log
m0(
n
2
)−m0 (5.2)
Estimating θ The optimal θ maximizes the likelihood of x0 given θ [78], i.e.,
arg maxθ p(x0|θ). Unfortunately, most ERGMs do not have an analytical or closed-
form estimate for the optimal θ. Thus, numerical solutions are proposed in the lit-
erature, such as Markov chain monte carlo maximum likelihood estimation [99] and
Bayesian inference [14]. An interesting property of these inference methods is that the
algorithm does not require access to the input graph itself, i.e., the sufficient statistics
for the parameter estimation are just the model statistics. This feature enables us to
decompose the private inference problem into two steps, allowing analysts to see only
the sufficient statistics.
Alternating statistics A model term is usually a counting query of a specific graph
pattern. Common patterns include triangles, stars and loops [71]. Recent research
has introduced alternating statistics for k-star, k-triangle and k-twopath, which can
represent structural properties of a graph better than traditional star and triangle
counts [100]. Many works have explored these statistics since they were proposed,
and they are an active and promising form of ERGM [36, 49, 88, 100]. Our work is
focused on these alternating statistics (defined precisely in Section 5.3) which have
not been studied before under differential privacy. A wide variety of other model
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terms are used with ERGMs; our general approach is compatible with other terms
but they are beyond the scope of this work.
5.2.2 Differential privacy
In Chapter 2, we introduced differential privacy and Laplace mechanism. In this
chapter, our database is a graph describing relationships among individuals. Our
purpose is to protect relationships among individuals so we adapt differential privacy,
following [45, 55, 83, 90, 109], by defining a neighboring graph as a graph that differs
by one edge.
Local sensitivity and its smooth bound
Recall that differential privacy can be achieved by adding Laplace noise to the
output of algorithms according to privacy parameters and query’s global sensitivity.
The global sensitivity of a query is the maximum possible difference in the output
when evaluating the query on two neighboring graphs.
Some common graph analyses have high global sensitivity, requiring the Laplace
mechanism to add enormous amounts of noise. For example, consider the simplest
ERGM model above where θ is calculated by (5.2). On a graph where m0 = 0 or a
graph where m0 =
(
n
2
)
, θ can change drastically with the addition or deletion of one
edge. In other words, the global sensitivity is very high for this function. But the
fact is that most real graphs are nothing like these extremes. Thus, by only focusing
on the input graph’s neighbors, the local sensitivity [79] can be much smaller.
Definition 5.1 (Local sensitivity [79]). Given query f and graph x, local sensitivity
LSf (x)
LSf (x) = max
x,x′neighbors
|f(x)− f(x′)|
However, one cannot achieve differential privacy by adding noise proportional to
the local sensitivity because local sensitivity itself could disclose information. The
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authors of [79] proposed using a smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity, the
smooth sensitivity. Intuitively, smooth sensitivity tries to “smooth” out the difference
between local sensitivities of two neighbors, so that it is itself not sensitive. Let d(x, x′)
be the distance between two graphs, i.e. the number of edges in which they differ:
Definition 5.2 (Smooth bound and smooth sensitivity [79]). Function Sf : X ⇒ R
defines a β-smooth bound of local sensitivity on query f if
∀x : Sf (x) ≥ LSf (x)
∀x, x′ neighbors : Sf (x) ≤ exp(β)Sf (x′)
The β-smooth sensitivity of f is a β-smooth bound, and
SSf,β(x) = max
x′
{LSf (x′) · exp (−βd(x, x′))}
Calculating the smooth sensitivity for a function may be easy (in cases like the
median of a list of numbers [79]) but could be quite difficult for other functions,
requiring complex proofs and nontrivial algorithms [55]. Even though smooth sensi-
tivity may provide tight bound for local sensitivity, we show that it is NP-hard for
two alternating statistics commonly used in ERGMs.
5.3 Perturbing model statistics
In this section we provide methods for privately computing alternating graph
statistics. In Sec. 5.3.1 we define three alternating statistics and show that one of
them (alternating k-star) has a constant global sensitivity. This means the Laplace
mechanism to be applied with relatively small error. However, alternating k-triangle
and alternating k-twopath both have high global sensitivity. In Sec 5.3.2 we show
that we cannot resort to smooth sensitivity, as calculating the smooth sensitivity
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is NP-hard in both cases. To address this challenge, we adapt a technique which
calibrates noise to a private, high-likelihood upper bound on the local sensitivity [55].
That bound is produced using the global sensitivity of the local sensitivity function. If,
however, the global sensitivity of that function is high, the technique can be repeatedly
applied, using a high-likelihood bound on the local sensitivity of the local sensitivity
function. We describe these “first-order” and “second-order” algorithms in Sec 5.3.2
and then analyze the local sensitivity of alternating k-triangle and alternating k-
twopath in Sec. 5.3.3.
5.3.1 Alternating graph statistics
The three alternating graph statistics, alternating k-star, alternating k-triangle
and alternating k-twopath, are essentially complex aggregations of traditional k-star,
k-triangle and k-twopath statistics. Instead of considering a vector of k terms, the
alternating statistics aggregate over the terms but enforce alternating signs between
each consecutive term, to weaken the correlation among different terms and effectively
reduce the weight on higher terms near k.
Alternating k-star The k-star is a counting query of a star pattern in the graph,
where each star contains k edges, i.e., Sk =
∑
i
(
di
k
)
where di is the degree of node i.
Definition 5.3 (Alternating k-star [100]). With parameter λ ≥ 1, alternating k-star
S is defined as
S(x;λ) = S2 − S3
λ
+ . . .+ (−1)n−1Sn−1
λn−3
The λ parameter here is a good way to control the geometrical weights on all
k-stars.
Alternating k-triangle A k-triangle is a graph pattern in which k triangles share
a common edge. The k-triangle query asks for the total number of k-triangles in
the graph. Define the shared partner matrix C, where each entry (i, j) in C is the
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count of shared partners between nodes i and j, mathematically Cij(x) =
∑
l xilxlj.
Formally, k-triangle Tk is defined:
Tk =
∑
i<j
xij
(
Cij
k
)
(k ≥ 2), and T1 = 1
3
∑
i<j
xijCij
Alternating k-triangle is defined similarly as alternating k-star, using parameter λ:
Definition 5.4 (Alternating k-triangle [100]). With parameter λ ≥ 1, alternating
k-triangle T is:
T (x;λ) = 3T1 − T2
λ
+
T3
λ2
− . . .+
(−1
λ
)n−3
Tn−2
Alternating k-twopath A k-twopath graph pattern is very similar to k-triangle,
except it does not require the shared edge required by the k-triangle statistic. Using
the shared partners matrix C above, the counting query for k-twopath Uk is:
Uk =
∑
i<j
(
Cij
k
)
(k 6= 2), and U2 = 1
2
∑
i<j
(
Cij
2
)
And alternating k-twopath is:
Definition 5.5 (Alternating k-twopath [100]). With parameter λ ≥ 1, alternating
k-twopath U is
U(x;λ) = U1 − 2
λ
U2 +
n−2∑
k=3
(−1
λ
)k−1
Uk
Alternating k-star S is the only statistic that can be readily solved using existing
privacy mechanisms. Because the degree sequence is a sufficient statistic for S, one
natural approach is to use the mechanism described by Hay et al [45] to compute a
private degree sequence from x, and then use it to compute S by Eq. (5.3). But, in
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fact, it can be shown that the global sensitivity of S is at most 2λ. Thus, Laplace
noise may be a better choice (λ is usually set to a small integer in practice). We make
empirical comparisons between these methods in Section 5.5.
Lemma 5.1. The global sensitivity of alternating k-star is at most 2λ.
5.3.2 Bounding local sensitivity
Because the global sensitivity of alternating k-triangle and k-twopath can be as
large as O(n), we would like to use a method which adds noise scaled to the local
sensitivity or a quantity close to the local sensitivity. One approach is to compute
a smooth bound on the local sensitivity, however, the following lemma shows the
NP-hardness of computing such a bound for these two statistics:
Lemma 5.2. Computing the smooth sensitivity for both alternating k-triangle and
alternating k-twopath is NP-hard.
We therefore employ a technique inspired by the Propose-Test-Release framework
[24], and formalized by Karwa et al [55], where it was used to estimate k-triangles.
The technique first computes a private over-estimate of the local sensitivity, one
that is higher than the local sensitivity with high probability. That becomes a safe
sensitivity value for calibrating Laplace noise, however, the result satisfies only the
weaker notion of (, δ)-differential privacy.
Let f(x) be the sensitive function/query. We use LSf,1(x) to denote the local
sensitivity of f , which is a function of the input graph x.
Algorithm 5.1 Local sensitivity bounding algorithm (First order)
Require: input graph x, query f and , δ
1: a = ln(1/δ)

2: y˜1 = LSf,1(x) + Lap(GS(LSf,1(x))/) + a · GS(LSf,1(x))
3: y˜ = f(x) + Lap(y˜1/)
4: return y˜, y˜1
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In Algorithm 5.1, y˜1 is the private bound on the local sensitivity, computed by
adding scaled noise to LSf,1(x), as well a positive offset, so that the bound is higher
than LSf,1(x) with high probability. Notice that the scale of the noise is determined
by the global sensitivity of the local sensitivity, GS(LSf,1(x)).
If GS(LSf,1(x)) is large, it may cause y˜1 to be a significant over-estimate of LSf,1(x).
We can repeat this approach by using a safe upper bound of the local sensitivity
of LSf,1(x), as presented below. Thus, Algorithm 5.1 bounds the first-order local
sensitivity and the following algorithm bounds the second-order local sensitivity.
Algorithm 5.2 Local sensitivity bounding algorithm (Second order)
Require: input graph x, query f and , δ
1: a = ln(1/δ)

2: y˜2 = LSf,2(x) + Lap(GS(LSf,2(x))/) + a · GS(LSf,2(x))
3: y˜1 = LSf,1(x) + Lap(y˜2/) + a · y˜2
4: y˜ = f(x) + Lap(y˜1/)
5: return y˜, y˜1, y˜2
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm 5.1 is (2, 1
2
eδ)-differential privacy. Algorithm 5.2 is
(3, 1
2
eδ + 1
2
e2δ)-differential privacy.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 relies on the Lemma 4.4 from [55], as we restate it as
follows:
Lemma 5.4. If M is (1, δ1)-differentially private, and Pr[M(x) ≥ LSf (x)] > 1− δ2
for all x, the following A which returns a pair of values,
A(x) = (M(x), Lap(M(x)/2) )
is (1 + 2, δ1 + e
1δ2)-differentially private.
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Proof of Theorem 5.3. In Algorithm 5.1, y˜1 is -differentially private as it is based on
Laplace mechanism and post-processing (adding positive offset). Let g1 = GS(LSf,1(x)).
If the sampled Laplace noise in line 2 is b,
Pr[y˜1 ≤ LSf,1(x)] = Pr[b ≤ −ag1]
=
∫ −ag1
−∞
1
2g1/
exp(−|x|/g1) dx
=
1
2
exp(−ag1 ∗ /g1) = δ
2
So, Pr[y˜1 ≥ LSf,1(x)] > 1 − δ/2. By applying Lemma 5.4, the Algorithm 5.1 is
(+ , 0 + e δ
2
)-differential privacy, which is (2, 1
2
eδ)-differential privacy.
In Algorithm 5.2, both y˜1 and y˜2 are -differentially private. Similarly, Pr[y˜2 ≥
LSf,2(x)] > 1 − δ/2. As above, by applying Lemma 5.4, y˜1 is (2, 12eδ)-differential
privacy. Furthermore, applying Lemma 5.4 one more time, the final y˜ is (2+, 1
2
eδ+
e2 δ
2
)-differential privacy, which is (3, 1
2
eδ + 1
2
e2δ)-differential privacy.
The step of replacing the global sensitivity by a high-likelihood bound on the local
sensitivity can be repeatedly applied to form more complex higher order algorithms.
However, each additional bounding step requires splitting the privacy budget and the
combined effects of repeatedly over-estimating higher order sensitivities may diminish
utility. For the two alternating statistics we consider, and the datasets we tested on,
we found that first order and second order is sufficient.
Error analysis
Definition 5.6. Y0, Y1, . . . , Yn is a random variable chain, when the following condi-
tion is satisfied: for any i ∈ [0, n−2], Yi is conditionally independent of Yi+2, Yi+3, . . . Yn
given Yi+1.
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From conditional independence, an important property of random variable chain
is the following:
Pr(Yi|Yi+1, Yi+2, . . . , Yn) = Pr(Yi|Yi+1)
It is easy to see that y˜, y˜1, . . . is actually a random variable chain. We use mean
squared error (MSE) as the measurement of error. In Algorithm 5.1 and 5.2, MSE of
y˜ can be written as E[(y˜− f(x))2] = V[y˜] + (E[y˜]− f(x))2. Since y˜ is always unbiased
(Laplace noise in the last step with mean zero), MSE = V[y˜].
Without knowing the true value of the local sensitivities, it is quite hard to com-
pute the MSE. That is to say, we cannot compute the error like we do for the Laplace
mechanism, since the noise in the latter is independent of input graph x. But, by
exploring properties of the random variable chain, it is possible to utilize the follow-
ing Lemma as a closed form calculation tool for MSE. In fact, we extend law of total
expectation/variance [111].
Lemma 5.5. Y0, Y1, . . . , Yn is a random variable chain. Write
⊔
n,i E[·] as a shortcut
for EYn [EYn−1|Yn [. . .EYi|Yi+1 [·]]]. Then
E[Y0] =
⊔
n,0
E[Y0]
V[Y0] =
⊔
n,1
E[ V
Y0|Y1
[Y0]]
+
n−2∑
i=2
(⊔
n,i
E[ V
Yi−1|Yi
[
⊔
i−2,0
E[Y0]]]
)
+ V
Yn
[
⊔
n−1,0
E[Y0]]
Applying Lemma 5.5 , one can calculate MSE of Algorithm 5.1 and 5.2. Such
error measurement can serve an evaluation tool for privacy researchers when working
with our algorithms. From the perspectives of data owners, the analytic result of
MSE can help them to decide between Algorithm 5.1 and 5.2, i.e., with fixed privacy
parameters, selecting the algorithm with less error (more utility).
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5.3.3 Alternating k-triangle and k-twopath
Now we apply the idea of local sensitivity bounding to alternating k-triangle and
alternating k-twopath. Let β = 1 − 1/λ. By binomial coefficients, we can rewrite
alternating k-triangle T (x;λ) as
T (x;λ) = λ
∑
i<j
xij
{
1− βCij} (5.3)
Lemma 5.6. Set C ′iv = Civ − xij and C ′vj = Cvj − xij. Let Nij be all shared partners
of node i and j and Cmax = maxi<j Cij. The local sensitivity of T is
LST,1(x) = max
i<j
λ
{
1− βCij}+ ∑
v∈Nij
{
βC
′
iv + βC
′
vj
}
(5.4)
≤ λ+ 2Cmax (5.5)
As Cmax has global sensitivity 1, LST,1 has global sensitivity at most 2. So we can
construct a first-order local sensitivity bound using LST,1 = λ + 2Cmax to compute
private alternating k-triangle.
For alternating k-twopath U(x;λ), we can rewrite it as
U(x;λ) = λ
∑
i<j
{
1− βCij} (5.6)
Lemma 5.7. Let Ni be the set of neighbors of node i and dmax be the maximum
degree. Set C ′iv = Civ − xij and C ′vj = Cvj − xij. We have local sensitivity
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LSU,1(x) = max
i<j
 ∑
v∈Ni,v 6=j
βC
′
vj +
∑
v∈Nj ,v 6=i
βC
′
iv
 (5.7)
≤ 2dmax (5.8)
LSU,2(x) ≤ max(4, 1 + Cmax)
λ
(5.9)
From Lemma 5.7 above, (5.8) has global sensitivity 2, since dmax will change by at
most 1 by adding or removing an edge. (5.9) has global sensitivity 1/λ for Cmax > 3.
Therefore, we can construct either first-order or second-order bound. Note that (5.7)
is the exact local sensitivity of alternating k-twopath, but we cannot bound it in
Algorithm 5.1 as (5.7)’s global sensitivity is not clear. Instead we use (5.8). When
applying Algorithm 5.2, (5.7) is the local sensitivity to be bounded at Line 4, as by
that step the higher order (second-order) local sensitivity (5.9) has already be safely
bounded. We will compare the resulting error empirically in Section 5.5.
5.4 ERGM parameter estimation
The parameter estimation step in our workflow takes the private sufficient statis-
tics y˜ from the previous perturbation step and finds the best parameter vector θ. As
stated above, this step is essentially post-processing a differentially private output,
so the output θ is also differentially private. In this section, we discuss different ways
of estimating θ given y˜.
5.4.1 Standard estimation
Current estimation techniques [14, 99] provide a baseline solution for parameter
estimation with private statistics. As these procedures essentially only need access to
model statistics, our sufficient statistics in y˜ take the place of the true model terms.
The semantics is now to search for θ that defines a probability distribution on graphs
with expected model statistics equal to y˜. Intuitively, the utility of this method
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depends on the amount of noise added into y0 and how θ reacts to those changes in
y0.
Prior to applying standard estimation, we post-process y˜ to cope with some of the
difficulties of the perturbed model statistics. As the output of perturbed y˜ might not
be graphical (i.e., no graph has statistics equal to y˜), standard estimation may fail to
converge. We propose generating a graph that has the closest statistics to y˜ and use
the statistics from that graph to replace y˜, in order to avoid non-converging situations
and to potentially remove noise from y˜ simultaneously. We use simulated annealing
for this purpose and, in practice, we often see big improvements in the accuracy of
estimates.
5.4.2 Bayesian inference
Standard estimation is the direct way of post-processing y˜, but since we know the
distribution of the noise added to y˜, we can “guess” the true values and incorporate
them into the estimation algorithm. This idea naturally fits into Bayesian inference
based post-processing. While based on earlier work [14] on Bayesian inference for
non-private estimation, our method deals with the extra hidden variable of graph x
in our setting. And later we will see, by introducing the unknown x, our method can
utilize more information from private statistics, such as the local sensitivity bounds.
In particular, we search for θ given y˜, represented as the posterior distribution of
ERGM parameter θ:
p(θ|y˜) ∝ p(y˜|θ)p(θ) =
∑
x
p(y˜|x)p(x|θ)p(θ)
=
∑
x
p(y˜|x)q(x; θ)p(θ)/Zθ (5.10)
where x is our guess about x0, but the fact is that we need to summarize over all
possible x to get to the posterior. In (5.10), p(y˜|x) is the privacy distribution, de-
fined by the differential privacy mechanism applied on sufficient statistics. p(x|θ) is
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the ERGM distribution, as shown in (5.1) and q(x; θ) represents the unnormalized
distribution.
q(x; θ) = exp(θ · f(x)) (5.11)
The probability distribution (5.10) is hard to calculate or even sample from di-
rectly due to summarization over all graphs and normalizing constant Zθ. Using the
exchange algorithm [77], we introduce extra variables x, θ′ and x′ to bypass the dif-
ficult terms (5.10). By carefully choosing the probability distribution of these new
random variables, the posterior distribution is now augmented as shown in (5.12).
The key is that the marginal posterior distribution for θ in (5.12) is equivalent to
(5.10). Thus, if we are able to sample from the distribution in (5.12), the marginal
posterior distribution for θ can be obtained by summarizing over all samples.
p(θ, x, θ′, x′|y˜) ∝ p(y˜|x)p(x|θ)p(θ)p(θ′|θ)p(x′|θ′) (5.12)
θ′ is sampled from proposal distribution p(θ′|θ), where, for a given θ, a new θ′ can be
proposed according to p(θ′|θ). A common choice is a multivariate normal distribution
or a multivariate t distribution, with mean equal to θ. x, x′ are sampled graphs under
the ERGM with parameter θ and θ′.
Algorithm 5.3 ERGM parameter estimation with private model statistics
Require: y˜, initial θ, x
1: for i in 1 to T do
2: Sample θ′ ∼ p(θ′|θ)
3: Sample x′ ∼ p(x′|θ′)
4: Replace θ with θ′ and x with x′, with probability min(1, H) //H
by (5.13) below
5: return samples of θ.
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A MCMC based sampling process for (5.12) is shown in Algorithm 5.3. In partic-
ular, the initial input θ and x could be any parameters and any graph. In Line 3, we
need a separated MCMC chain to sample x′ ∼ p(x′|θ′). In such MCMC algorithms,
at each iteration, we propose adding or removing edges in the current state of graph,
calculate the new model statistics, compare the probability of new state xnew to that
of old state xold, and with probability p(xnew|θ′)/p(xold|θ′) the change is accepted.
This process should be run long enough so that final sample x′ is truly from p(x′|θ′).
H in Line 4 is the ratio of accepting the exchange, computed by comparing the
probability before and after exchange. That is, we exchange θ with θ′ and x with x′
in (5.12) and calculate the ratio. Then the complex terms are cancelled out and each
remaining term is easy to compute.
H =
p(y˜|x′)p(x′|θ′)p(θ′)p(θ|θ′)p(x|θ)
p(y˜|x)p(x|θ)p(θ)p(θ′|θ)p(x′|θ′)
=
p(y˜|x′)p(θ′)p(θ|θ′)
p(y˜|x)p(θ)p(θ′|θ) (5.13)
In practice, Algorithm 5.3 usually results in low acceptance rates in the exchange
step in Line 4 and thus long mixing times for the MCMC process. We now propose
to separate that last step, isolating simultaneously updated θ and x into two different
steps, as shown in Algorithm 5.4, which improves the acceptance rate significantly.
Algorithm 5.4 Improved ERGM parameter estimation with private model statistics
Require: y˜, initial θ, x
1: for i in 1 to T do
2: Sample θ′ ∼ p(θ′|θ)
3: Sample x′ ∼ p(x′|θ′)
4: Exchange θ with θ′, with probability min(1, H1) //H1 by (5.14) below
5: Replace x with x′, with probability min(1, H2) //H2 by (5.15) below
6: return samples of θ.
H1 and H2 in Algorithm 5.4 are defined as follows.
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H1 =
p(y˜|x)p(x|θ′)p(θ′)p(θ|θ′)p(x′|θ)
p(y˜|x)p(x|θ)p(θ)p(θ′|θ)p(x′|θ′)
=
q(x; θ′)p(θ′)p(θ|θ′)q(x′; θ)
q(x; θ)p(θ)p(θ′|θ)q(x′; θ′) (5.14)
H2 =
p(y˜|x′)p(x′|θ)p(θ)p(θ′|θ)p(x|θ′)
p(y˜|x)p(x|θ)p(θ)p(θ′|θ)p(x′|θ′)
=
p(y˜|x′)q(x′; θ)q(x; θ′)
p(y˜|x)q(x; θ)q(x′; θ′) (5.15)
The correctness of Algorithm 5.4 can be proved briefly in terms of a component-
wise Metropolis-Hasting algorithm, with hybrid Gibbs updating steps. In each itera-
tion, θ′ and x′ (Line 2 and 3) are drawn based on full conditional distribution, so the
updating probability is always 1. In Line 4 and 5, we update θ and x with Hasting
ratios. Although we may end up updating θ′ and x′ more times in a iteration, we still
get to the detailed balance in MCMC [32].
When applying Algorithm 5.4 to real ERGM models, the key is correctly comput-
ing H1 and H2. Everything in H1 is independent of the privacy mechanism used for
the model terms. In H2, the ratio of privacy distribution
p(y˜|x′)
p(y˜|x) is mechanism depen-
dent. Here, we illustrate the cases for both Laplace mechanism and local sensitivity
bounding algorithms.
Example 5.7 (Laplace mechanism). If the Laplace mechanism is applied on all
model terms (fi for i-th model term) independently, and y˜,  and GS are the vectors
of private statistics, privacy parameters and global sensitivities respectively, p(y˜|x) is
then:
p(y˜|x) ∝ exp
(
−
∑
i
|y˜i − fi(x)|i/GSi
)
(5.16)
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Assume we use a symmetric proposal distribution for θ, i.e., p(θ′|θ) = p(θ|θ′). With
Algorithm 5.4, ratio H1 and H2 can be written as (after taking logarithm)
logH1 = log
p(θ′)
p(θ)
+ (θ − θ′) · (f(x′)− f(x)) (5.17)
logH2 = (θ − θ′) · (f(x′)− f(x)) +∑
i
i
GSi
(|y˜i − fi(x)| − |y˜i − fi(x′)|) (5.18)
Example 5.8 (Local sensitivity bounding). Assume a single model term and first-
order local sensitivity bounding (multiple model terms and second order can be ad-
justed accordingly), and privacy parameter  and δ is the input for Algorithm 5.1.
Let a = ln(1/δ)/.
In the process of MCMC, for current sampled graph x, we write l1 as the local
sensitivity on x and g1 as the global sensitivity of local sensitivity. The first-order local
sensitivity bounding (Algorithm 5.1) returns y˜, y˜1 for the observed graph. p(y˜, y˜1|x)
can be represented as follows by omitting terms that will be cancelled out later in
calculating p(y˜,y˜1|x
′)
p(y˜,y˜1|x) .
p(y˜, y˜1|x) = p(y˜|x, y˜1)p(y˜1|g1, l1)
∝ exp
(
−|y˜ − f(x)|
y˜1/
− |y˜1 − l1 − ag1|
g1/
)
(5.19)
Calculation of p(y˜, y˜1|x) deals with not only the private version of local sensitivity y˜1,
but also more statistics from the sampled graph in each iteration of MCMC (local
sensitivity l1). Recall in the standard estimation, none of them is incorporated in
the process. In the next section, we empirically show that such extra information
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Figure 5.1: Perturbation error on alter-
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Figure 5.2: Perturbation error for
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can benefit the estimation. As in the example above, assume a symmetric proposal
distribution. With Algorithm 5.4, ratio H1 is the same as (5.17). H2 is:
logH2 = (θ − θ′) · (f(x′)− f(x)) + |y˜ − f(x)| − |y˜ − f(x
′)|
y˜1/
+
|y˜1 − l1 − ag1| − |y˜1 − l′1 − ag1|
g1/
(5.20)
Releasing θ In Algorithm 5.3 and 5.4, we use multiple sampled θ to represent
the marginal distribution on θ. A straightforward way to generate a single instance
of estimated θ is to calculate the average of those samples. However, in practice,
we found that marginal maximum a posterior (MMAP) could give analysts better
estimates instead. Formally, MMAP of θ is defined as argmax
θ
p(θ|y˜). A fast method
we apply is reusing the samples of θ from Algorithm 5.4, and performing approximate
MMAP estimation by histogram or density estimation. More sophisticated solutions
will require further expanding (5.12) before MCMC sampling [22,54].
5.5 Evaluation
Our evaluation has two goals. First we assess the perturbation error of our privacy
mechanisms, particularly the Laplace mechanism on alternating k-star and the local
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Figure 5.3: Perturbation error (1), (2) and local sensitivity values (3), (4) for alter-
nating k-twopath.
sensitivity bounding algorithms on alternating k-triangle and k-twopath. Second,
we evaluate the ERGM parameter estimation with private statistics using different
approaches proposed in Section 5.4. All our experiments are run on Linux servers with
Intel Xeon CPU and 8GB memory. In the experiments, we differ privacy parameters
 and δ. Note that, whenever we clarify a value for  or δ, it always means the overall
budget of the entire perturbation process.
5.5.1 Perturbation error
Our datasets include synthetic and real graphs. Synthetic graphs are generated
using a random graph model, G(n, p), where parameters n and p control the size of
graph and the probability of two nodes connecting, respectively. We iterate from
n = 100 to n = 1000 in steps of 100. p is set to log(n)/n for relatively sparse
graphs and then moved to 0.1 and higher. Though we only report the sparse case
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Figure 5.4: Perturbation error on real graphs
and p = 0.1, results for larger p agree with the conclusions. Error measurement is
root mean square error (RMSE).
Alternating k-star
As described in Section 5.3.1, we can apply the Laplace mechanism (LAP) directly or
compute the degree distribution privately first, by isotonic regression (ISO) from [45]
and use it as a sufficient statistic for alternating k-star. Figure 5.1 shows the error of
the two methods by varying p and λ, with different settings of  = 1, 0.1, listed in the
legend text. As we do not have analytical RMSE for the ISO case, it is calculated
from 100 independent perturbations. We clearly see LAP significantly outperforms
ISO, even when λ = 10 at both  settings (and recall that the global sensitivity is
2λ). For the rest of this section, if not stated, we set λ = 2 as it is the value normally
recommended [71] and usually plays a minor part in the workflow.
Alternating k-triangle
The first-order local sensitivity bounding algorithm is applied here while setting  to
1 and 0.1 and fixing δ = 0.01. In Figure 5.2, we use “LSB” to represent Algorithm
1. For comparison purposes, we plot the non-private noisy output resulting from
adding Laplace noise based on true local sensitivity, marked as “LS” in Figure 5.2.
We find that LSB can add modest error when compared to this non-private baseline,
especially when the privacy budget  is relatively large.
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Alternating k-twopath
We discussed in Section 5.3.3 how a first-order or second-order local sensitivity bound
can be applied to alternating k-twopath. We present these results in Figure 5.3, by
distinguishing them as “1-LSB” and “2-LSB”. We find that for our test cases with
random graphs, 1-LSB is consistantly better than 2-LSB, illustrated by RMSE in the
left two subfigures. Referring to Sec. 5.3.3, recall that in 1-LSB we bound (5.8) while
in 2-LSB we bound eqrefeq:ktwop1 by using bounded (5.9). If (5.7) and (5.9) are not
small enough compared to (5.8), the fact that we split the budget of privacy one more
time will outweigh the gain. In the right two subfigures of Figure 5.3, we plot the
true local sensitivity and the expected values of private, bounded local sensitivity for
both LSB algorithms. We see that 1-LSB results in a bound that is close to the true
value but that 2-LSB results in a significant over-estimate, especially with a smaller
 = 0.1. Although 1-LSB is superior across our tested networks, it remains possible
that 2-LSB could outperform 1-LSB for particular input graphs or large  and λ.
Real graphs
For real graphs, we consider several collected networks from the SNAP collection2 to
determine if our alternating statistics can be perturbed in a “meaningful” way, i.e.,
small relative noise that doesn’t destroy utility. Our metric is relative RMSE, which
is RMSE divided by the true statistic. As shown in Figure 5.4, with  = 0.1, all three
alternating statistics (with shortened names: astar, atri, atwop) are estimated with
low relative error. In particular, error for alternating k-star is between 10−3 and 10−4,
alternating k-triangle at 10−1 and alternating k-twopath at 10−2.
2http://snap.stanford.edu
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Network nodes edges astar atri atwop
dolphins 62 159 418.1 177.5 705.4
lesmis 77 254 756.4 426.4 1565.5
polbooks 105 441 1355.4 715.5 2817.5
adjnoun 112 425 1292.9 452.1 3801.0
football 115 613 1992.4 922.3 3675.3
Table 5.1: Real networks for ERGM parameter estimation
Model Model terms Perturbation mech
M1 edges, astar LAP, LAP
M2 edges, atri LAP, 1-LSB
M3 edges, atwop LAP, 1-LSB
Table 5.2: Model descriptions
M1 M2 M3
0
10
20
30
40
dol les pol adj foo dol les pol adj foo dol les pol adj foo
R
M
S
E STD BINF
Figure 5.5: Parameter estimation with private statistics. Every four bars, from left
to right, are θ1, θ1, θ2, θ2.
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5.5.2 ERGM parameter estimation
For the evaluation of ERGM parameter estimation, we want to compare the al-
gorithms in Section 5.4. In practice, the data owner will only perturb each statistic
once and then release it to the analysts. As the perturbation is a randomized process,
our goal is to understand how good our estimation algorithm is on average. So for
each graph and each model description, we perturb the statistics N = 50 times and
run the estimation algorithm on each perturbation, finally measuring their quality
by RMSE with respect to estimates in the non-private case,
√
1/N
∑
i∈[1,N ](θˆi − θ)2,
where θ is the “true” value, calculated from the non-private estimation algorithm
from [50] or [14], θˆi is θ from i-th perturbation.
As mentioned in [14], the estimation using the Bayesian technique has general
scalability issues, where it becomes very slow for any graphs beyond a few hundred
of nodes. Moreover such time cost also varies with the model terms, e.g., alternating
k-twopath takes much more time than the other two alternating statistics, as calcu-
lation of the acceptance ratio in MCMC sampling of x ∼ p(x|θ) is more complicated.
Therefore, here we focus on smaller graphs, and this is the common practice for
many ERGM works such as [14, 20, 71]. Our test networks3 include dolphins, lesmis,
polbooks, adjnoun and football. Detailed facts are listed in Table 5.1. We fix  = 0.5
and δ = 0.01.
We experimented with three models, each of which corresponds to one of the
alternating statistics, with the purpose of testing estimation by isolating other factors.
We include the count of edges as a shared term in all models, as it is very common
in ERGM applications. As shown in Table 5.2, each model contains two terms, with
correspondingly two parameters, θ = (θ1, θ2). The estimation algorithms will be
standard estimation (STD) and Bayesian inference (BINF). In all cases, the privacy
3http://www-personal.umich.edu/˜mejn/netdata/
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budget is distributed evenly in a way such that each generation of noise uses same
share of the overall . In Figure 5.5, each graph is represented with 4 bars, showing
θ1 of STD, θ1 of BINF, θ2 of STD, θ2 of BINF. In M1 and M2, we see a significant
improvement of θ from STD to BINF. Especially in M2, BINF limits all errors to
around 5 or smaller where STD can go up much higher. We believe this is because
BINF can utilize the extra information presented by the local sensitivity bound as
shown in Example 5.8. In M3, compared to the other models, we see that parameters
of the model is quite insensitive to the changes due to perturbation, i.e., all graphs
show much lower errors even under STD. In such situation, theoretically, there is not
much room left for the improvement from BINF. This is illustrated in our experiment
by showing comparable performance from both methods on M3. In general, we think
BINF can improve the accuracy of parameter estimation significantly by leveraging
the privacy distribution, while at the same time, the amount of benefit will vary
depending on intrinsic properties of the model.
5.6 Related work
Differential privacy [25] has been actively studied in many sub-areas of computer
science. Although the original focus was mainly on tabular data, the definition can
be adapted to graph data [45] as well as other data models. Most research into
differentially private analysis of graphs has focused on releasing graph statistics, e.g.,
degree sequence [45], triangle/star [55,79], joint degree distribution/assortativity [83,
90] and clustering coefficient [109]. For modeling graphs privately, we are aware
only of a private Kronecker graph modeling approach under differential privacy [75].
While our work relies on obtaining good private statistics, the ultimate goal is to
allow ERGM modeling under differential privacy.
All of these works, including ours, protect relationships, i.e. they support edge-
differential privacy. A stronger standard is to protect individuals, where neighbors
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are defined by changing a single node. Recently, researchers have developed some
mechanisms for calculating private graph statistics under node differential privacy [12,
16,56].
Parameter estimation for ERGMs has also evolved from pseudo likelihood es-
timation (MPLE) [6], to Monte Carlo maximum likelihood (MC-MLE) [35] to re-
cent stochastic approximation [99] and Bayesian inference [14]. These advances have
helped ERGMs become central to social network analysis with many successful ap-
plications [71].
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has addressed the challenges of sanitizing data for privacy pur-
pose in the context of data sharing. Although we are looking at problems with various
data sources, from tabular data to graph data, and various privacy requirements, from
polices based privacy protection to differential privacy, we keep our discipline of de-
signing a sanitization process consistent: protecting privacy while preserving as much
utility as possible.
6.1 Review of contributions
In Chapter 3, we have presented a framework for limiting access to historical
data, while still permitting auditing. Our redaction rules hide values but preserve
information about the lifetime of tuples in a database, allowing an auditor to get
accurate answers from the historical record despite the information removed by re-
tention restrictions. We demonstrated that our techniques have a modest performance
overhead, even when implemented using a standard relational system, and that the
uncertainty introduced by sample retention policies is acceptable. By proposing two
different models, we allow users to tune the system between accuracy and perfor-
mance: TI gives you better performance but less accuracy while TC offers improved
accuracy for audit queries under sanitized histories, at the expense of increased query
processing complexity.
Chapter 4 has addressed untrusted analysts running accurate performance evalua-
tion tasks without compromising privacy. Our method releases a differentially private
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model of the database, allowing an analyst to sample synthetic databases consistent
with the model. To achieve this we re-define differential privacy for multi-relations,
and present novel techniques for selecting the model, perturbing statistics and sam-
pling databases. To our knowledge, our framework is the only method for generating
test databases while providing a rigorous guarantee of privacy for individuals in the
database.
Chapter 5 has addressed estimating parameters for the exponential random graph
model under differential privacy. Our solution decomposes the process into two steps:
releasing private statistics first and running estimation second. The local sensitivity-
based mechanism can offer lower error than common baselines. The redesigned
Bayesian inference based parameter estimation is flexible and more accurate than
standard methods. For future work, improving scalability is an interesting direction
and the advance of technique in this area can both benefit our work and ERGM
estimation in general.
6.2 Future directions
Auditing with more power We assume that retention policies are non-negotiable
in Chapter 3, despite the auditors’ interest in analysis tasks. This assumption could
be reconsidered in the future work by prioritizing auditing accuracy, at the potential
cost of retention policy secrecy. In addition, a compelling extension to our sanitization
model could use generalization or summarization of values instead of redaction. This
would impose some cost to confidentiality, but may significantly improve auditing
capabilities. Currently, our preservation rules consist of tuple-level specifications. In
the future we would like to integrate more complex view-based preservation rules, such
as those considered by [4, 43], or rules targeting specific attribute values. We would
like to investigate alternatives for supporting the periodic application of retention
policies as a database evolves. And we would like to evaluate our system using data
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histories based on well-known benchmark databases such as TPC-H, or using real
data sets and workloads, as well as explore other physical organizations that could
lead to improved performance.
Differential privacy in multi-table databases Our framework in Chapter 4
can be deployed using other differentially-private mechanisms, thus a natural future
direction is to compare the utility achievable with different mechanisms. In addition, a
side effect of protecting an entity in our multi-relation scenario is that the descendant
entities are also protected. So it is interesting is to expand multi-relation differential
privacy if general multiple entities need to be protected. We also hope our notion
of multi-relation differential privacy, instead of bonded to key relationship, can be
interpreted with general correlation among attributes.
Modeling graph under differential privacy Modeling graph under differential
privacy is usually considered a more difficult problem than simply releasing private
graph statistics. Our work in Chapter 5 is one of pioneered attempt in the area. In
the future, we’d like to understand this problem in a bigger picture by considering
more modeling techniques.
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